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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this thesis is to explore and study various dimensions of the interaction between 
one of the most important institutional quality aspects, namely property rights, and one 
important aspect of integration into the world economy: foreign direct investment (FDI), 
and  links  them  to  economic  growth.  In  particular,  this  thesis  explores  whether  the 
interaction between institutions and FDI has  any implication for economic growth  and 
whether there is any complementarity between the role of institutions and the role of FDI 
in fostering economic growth. 
To achieve this aim, the thesis was designed to include four empirical chapters in addition 
to two chapters: one for the introduction and the other for the conclusion. The first two 
empirical chapters studied the interrelationship between FDI and institutions. And the other 
two  empirical  chapters  studied  the  implication  of  the  interrelationship  and  the 
complementarity  between  FDI  and  institutions  for  economic  growth.  Chapter  one 
motivated the thesis and set its aim and structure. The second chapter studies the role of 
institutions in determining FDI inflows and shows that institutional quality is one of the 
most  important  determinants  of  FDI.  Based  on  this  result,  chapter  three  introduces  a 
hypothesis  that  foreign  investors  will  create  a  demand  for  better  institutions  in  host 
countries, and that governments competing to attract more FDI will be induced to provide 
such institutions, leading to improvements in institutional quality in host countries. The 
empirical evidence reported in this chapter supports this hypothesis and shows that FDI 
inflows have a positive impact on property rights in host countries. Chapter four explores 
whether institutions play a role in determining the contribution of FDI to economic growth. 
The results presented in this chapter show that a host country needs to achieve a minimum 
level of institutional quality in order to be able to benefit from the positive externalities 
offered by FDI. Based on the results of chapter three, chapter five investigates whether the   II 
positive impact of FDI in institutional quality on host countries can be considered as a new 
growth-enhancing role for FDI. The results reported in chapter five show that the impact of 
FDI on economic growth that works via institutions, is a significant one, and is generally 
greater and more robust than the direct impact. 
Over all, the major contribution of this thesis is that it shows that a better understanding of 
the  contribution  of  FDI  to  economic  growth  requires  taking  into  account  the 
interrelationship and the complementarity between FDI and institutions.       
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1.  Introduction 
1.1.  Motivation 
1.1.1.  Economic growth 
Explaining the course of economic growth and determining factors that might affect it, 
have  been  for  a  long  time,  and  continue  to  be,  one  of  the  most  important  topics  of 
economic literature. In fact, the research into this particular topic has been the inspiration 
for the whole subject of Economics. The work of Adam Smith, the father of Economics, 
mostly attempted to answer questions about the sources of differences in wealth across 
nations,  as  the  famous  title,  An  Inquiry  into  the  Nature  and  Causes  of  the  Wealth  of 
Nations, tells. And after more than 200 years, this enquiry into the sources of differences in 
income levels across countries, or over time within the same country, is still as important 
as it was centuries ago. One can find many examples across economic literature where the 
same fundamental question has been asked again and again by economists. And given the 
fact that income levels in the USA and Western Europe are so many times greater than 
income levels in much of sub-Saharan Africa, it is not surprising that David Landes asks the 
same question in, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, at the end of the twentieth century. 
The relevance of this question can be shown by the simple data presented in Figure 1 and 
Figure 2. These Figures effectively illustrate the persisting gap in living standards and 
incomes  that divides the world‟s population  into a small monitory of rich and a huge 
majority of poor. The income level in Burundi, the poorest country in the world in 1965, 
was almost two hundred times lower than the income level in Switzerland, the richest 
country in the world in 1965. Moreover, about three quarters of world‟s population lived in 
countries that had income levels less than one-tenth of the income level of the richest 
country  in  1965.  Comparing  the  years  1965  and  2005  shows  that  not  much  has  been   2 
achieved in the last fifty years or so. In fact, one might say that the gap is even wider. The 
income level in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the poorest country in the world in 
2005, was  more than  four hundred times lower than the income level  in  Norway, the 
richest  country  in  the  world  in  2005.  And  again,  more  than  three  quarters  of  world‟s 
population lived in countries that had income levels less than one-tenth of the income level 
of the richest country in 2005. The huge differences in per capita income levels across 
countries is a reflection of the fact that some economies are growing rapidly and have 
managed  to  sustain  high  growth  rates  for  a  long  period  of  time,  while  others  are  not 
growing at all (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004).  
To illustrate the importance of sustaining high economic growth rates in explaining the 
huge differences in income levels across countries, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) use the 
example of the United States economy. During the period from 1870 to 2000, the United 
States economy sustained an average growth rate of 1.8 annually, resulting in a tenfold 
increase in real per capita GDP from $3340 in 1870 to $33,330 in 2000. Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004) state that it is sustaining this growth rate over a long period of time that 
makes the United States the second-richest country in the world in 2000 after Luxembourg. 
To further emphasise the importance of economic growth, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) 
show  that  if  the  United  States  economy  experienced  a  lower  growth  rate,  like  those 
experienced  by  India, Pakistan, or Philippines during the period 1900  to  1987, then it 
would have experienced less than a threefold increase in per capita GDP from $3340 in 
1870  to  $9450  in  2000,  and  would  have  ranked  45
th  instead  of  second  in  the  world.  
Another illustration of the importance of economic growth is given by Durlauf et al (2004), 
who stress that the division of the world‟s population into a small monitory of rich and a 
huge majority of poor, is a result of the fact that the UK and other Western  countries 
managed to sustain positive economic growth rates during the 18
th and 19
th centuries, while 
the rest of the world failed to sustain positive growth rates for much of this time. Thus, 
although the level of incomes was low across the world in 1700, it  was the sustained   3 
growth in Western Europe that steadily increased per capita GDP, and gradually Western 
countries  outperformed  countries  elsewhere  in  the  world,  resulting  in  the  income  gap 
between developed countries in the West and developing countries. 
 
Figure 1: The world income distribution (1965): GDP per capita in 1965 (left axis) and cumulative 
percentage of world population (right axis). Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2008). 
 
 
Figure 2: The world income distribution (2005): GDP per capita in 1965 (left axis) and cumulative 
percentage of world population (right axis). Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2008).   4 
The importance of economic growth can be further illustrated by the data in Table 1. The 
Table reports averages of GDP per capita in 1965 and 2005 for some income groups and 
geographical regions in absolute figures, and as ratios of the average GDP per capita in 
high income group. It also reports the average annual growth rates of GDP per capita 
during  the  period  from  1965  to  2005,  and  the  factors  of  increase  in  GDP  per  capita 
achieved  during  the  same  period.  The  Table  makes  clear  that  there  were  enormous 
disparities in average GDP per capita across income groups and geographical regions in 
1965. For example the average GDP per capita level in low income countries was only 
2.44 % of the average GDP per capita level in high income countries. The per capita GDP 
in East Asia and Pacific was only 1.38% of the average of high income countries, while the 
same ratio was 4.68% for Sub-Saharan Africa in 1965.  
During the period from 1965 to 2005, although there were some differences in economic 
growth rates across various income groups and regions, the huge disparities in income 
level seemed to persist. However, two slightly remarkable experiences can be highlighted. 
East Asia and Pacific achieved the highest economic growth rate, 5.82, and increased the 
income level by a factor of 10.21, and as a result, the income gap between the region and 
high income countries group decreased slightly. This is shown by the increase in the ratio 
of the average income in the region to the income in the high income group, from 1.38% in 
1965 to 5.27% in 2005. On the other hand, sub-Saharan Africa recorded the lowest average 
growth rate, 0.41, and as a result, increased the income level by a factor of 1.17. And 
because of this low growth rate, the income gap between sub-Saharan Africa and high 
income countries increased, as shown by the decrease in the ratio of the average income 
level in sub-Saharan Africa to the income in high income countries from 4.68% in 1965 to 
2.05% in 2005.   5 
 
Table 1: Statistics on growth and GDP per capita (1965-2005) 
 
GDP per 
capita, 
1965 
GDP Per 
Capita relative 
to High Income 
countries 
GDP per 
capita, 
2005 
GDP Per 
Capita relative 
to High Income 
countries 
Average 
annual growth 
rate,1965-
2005 
Factor of 
increase 
High income countries  10583  100.00%  28243  100.00%  2.48  2.67 
Middle income countries  611  5.77%  1876  6.64%  2.70  3.07 
Low income countries  258  2.44%  398  1.41%  1.03  1.54 
East Asia & Pacific  145  1.38%  1487  5.27%  5.82  10.21 
Latin America & Caribbean  2314  21.87%  4385  15.53%  1.57  1.89 
Middle East & North Africa  812  7.68%  1795  6.36%  1.97  2.21 
South Asia  201  1.91%  605  2.15%  2.50  3.00 
Sub-Saharan Africa  494  4.68%  579  2.05%  0.41  1.17 
Growth miracles             
Botswana  294  2.78%  4414  15.63%  7.02  15.00 
Singapore  2733  25.82%  26739  94.68%  6.02  9.78 
South Korea  1296  12.25%  13282  47.03%  5.97  10.25 
Growth disasters             
Congo, Dem. Rep.  316  2.99%  89  0.32%  -2.95  0.28 
Liberia  699  6.61%  129  0.46%  -2.10  0.18 
Niger  383  3.63%  166  0.59%  -1.75  0.43 
Venezuela  6090  57.55%  5000  17.70%  -0.33  0.82 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2008) 
 
In general, one can say that regions or income groups that grew faster than the high income 
group, managed to reduce the income gap and make some improvements in their relative 
living standards, whereas regions or income groups that grew slower than the high income 
group, increased the income gap between them and the high income group, and witnessed 
deterioration in their relative living standards.  
Despite the persistence of the income gap during the period from 1965 and 2005, some 
countries  showed  exceptional  performance  that  further  highlights  the  importance  of 
growth.  These  countries  are  known  in  the  literature  as  growth  miracles  and  growth 
disasters. Table 1 shows some examples of both groups. As can be seen from the Table, 
growth miracles, represented by Botswana, Singapore, and South Korea, grew by rates that   6 
are more than double that achieved by the high income group. They increased their income 
level by factors varying from 9.78 to 15, and as a result, made tremendous reductions in 
income gap, and increased the ratio of their incomes to the income level of the high income 
group from: 2.78% to 15.63% in Botswana, from 25.82% to 94.68% in Singapore, and 
from 12.25% to 47.03% in South Korea. Growth disasters, on the other hand, experienced 
absolute deterioration in their per capita income level as they recoded negative growth 
rates  during  the  period  1965-2005.  Countries  in  this  group  include  the  Democratic 
Republic of Congo, with its growth rate of -2.95, which resulted in a reduction in income 
level from $316 in 1965 to $89 in 2005, and a drop in the ratio of its income relative to the 
high income group from 2.99% in 1965 to 0.32% in 2005. The same applies to Liberia, 
Niger, and Venezuela, all of which recorded negative growth rates and witnessed relative 
and absolute reduction in their per capita income level
1.  
The examples of growth miracles and growth disasters make it clear that economic growth 
could result in vast improvements to human wellbeing. Therefore, economists  believe that 
a better understanding of what determines economic growth could contribute significantly 
to improving the living standards of many people around the globe and alleviate  poverty. 
Some economists even believe that there is no question of greater relevance to the majority 
of the world‟s population or of any greater academic significance than the question of what 
explains  differences  in  economic  growth  across  countries  and  what  can  be  done  to 
accelerate economic growth (Rodride et al 2004). Lucas (1988:3) describes the importance 
of these questions by saying “Once one starts to think about them, it is hard to think about 
anything else”.  
In response to this most important question, and with the increase in data availability, 
economic literature has shown a resurgence of interest in testing and quantifying various 
theories of economic growth and explaining post-1960 growth experience (Temple 1999).  
                                                 
1 Appendix I provides a list of the countries included in data presented in Figure 1 and 2, and Table 1.   7 
One  important  aspect  of  the  recent  empirical  growth  literature  is  the  differentiation 
between the proximate sources of growth and the deeper sources of growth (Rodrik 2003). 
The proximate sources of growth; capital accumulation and technological progress, only 
partly explain variations in economic growth across countries, and are considered as a first 
step in explaining economic growth (Temple 1999). In other words, proximate sources of 
growth  do  not  provide  much  insight  into  the  process  of  generating  economic  growth 
because, using North and Thomas‟ words (1973:3), “they are growth”. Explanations of 
growth based on proximate sources raise more questions than they answer. For example, 
these  explanations  do  not  answer  questions  like  what  policy  options  can  accelerate 
economic growth (Temple 1999), and more importantly, they do not explain why some 
countries invest more than others in physical and human capital, and why some countries 
are so much more productive than others (Rodrik et al 2004).  
Better understanding of the process of generating economic growth requires more than 
studying  the  role  of  proximate  sources  of  growth.  Thus,  empirical  growth  literate  has 
recently shown greater interest in studying the deeper determinants of economic growth, 
and factors that explain the differences in accumulation and technological progress and 
productivity growth. Deeper sources of growth work through influencing the proximate 
sources of growth; i.e. they affect the factor inputs and total factor productivity (Temple, 
1999). Several variables have been proposed in the recent literature as deep determinants 
of growth, such as population growth and demographic transition, financial development, 
economic policy etc (Temple, 1999). However, two factors have received great deal of 
attention in the recent literature. These factors are the quality of institutional environment 
and  the  degree  of  openness  to  trade  and  capital  flow,  and  integration  into  the  world 
economy.  
Examining the relationship between institutions and integration into the world economy on 
the one hand, and economic growth on the other, has attracted much interest. However, a   8 
substantial part of this literature has investigated whether it is institutions or integration 
that matter more for growth. In the words of Rodrik et al (2004: 2), the literature shows an 
interest in running ''horse races'' between institutions, and integration views. Two groups 
of researchers, among others, have been involved in this race, where the integration view is 
represented by Dollar and Kray (2003), and institutions are represented by Rodrik et al 
(2004). Indeed, it is of great importance to examine which determinant “trumps everything 
else”,  however,  it  is  also  important,  perhaps  more  important,  to  examine  whether  the 
interactions  between  institutions,  and  the  process  of  the  integration  into  the  world 
economy, has any implications for economic growth. Yet this research area has attracted 
very little attention in recent empirical growth literature. This thesis tries to fill this gap in 
the economic literature by exploring and studying various dimensions of the interaction 
between one of the most important institutional quality aspects, namely property rights, 
and one important aspect of integration into the world economy, namely foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and links them to economic growth. In particular, this thesis explores 
whether the interaction between institutions and FDI has any implications for economic 
growth, and whether there is any complementarity between the role of institutions and the 
role of FDI in fostering economic growth. 
1.1.2.  Institutions  
The  need  for  an  institutional  framework  that  supports  markets,  facilitates  economic 
exchange,  defines  and  protects  rights,  registers  and  enforces  contracts  etc  has  been 
explicitly recognized by economists at least since Adam Smith‟s Wealth of Nations (Tanzi, 
2000). However, it is the work of North (1981 and 1990), Weingast (1995 and 1997), and 
Olson  (1982)  among  others,  that  has  highlighted  the  relevance  of  institutions,  and 
particularly property rights  protection, for economic development  and  growth, and has 
inspired a burgeoning literature linking institutions to economic growth. North (1990: 107) 
assigns  an  essential  role  for  institutions  by  stating  that  “they  are  the  underlying   9 
determinant  of  the  long-run  performance  of  economies”.  Moreover,  North  (1990:  54) 
emphasizes the role of institutions in determining economic growth by asserting that “the 
inability  of  societies  to  develop  effective,  low-cost  enforcement  contracts  is  the  most 
important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the 
third world”. 
Institutions play this essential role because they, as defined by North (1990), are the rules 
of  the  game  in  a  society  and,  therefore,  they  are  the  framework  that  shapes  the  way 
individuals of a society interact, and guides the economic behaviour of agents. And more 
importantly, institutions determine the security for property rights in a society. Property 
rights are the rights of a firm or individual to assets, to the incomes gained from the use of 
these assets, and to any other contractual obligations due to the firm or individual (North, 
1990). By determining the security and the certainty over property rights, institutions also 
determine the incentives for investment and innovation (Baumol, 1990) and as such, the 
low  security  of  property  rights  over  physical  capital,  profits,  and  patents,  reduces 
incentives  and  opportunity  to  invest,  innovate,  and  obtain  foreign  technology  (Mauro, 
1995) and (Parente and Prescott, 1992). In another words, uncertainty about property rights 
creates a wedge between the marginal product of capital and the rate of return that can be 
privately appropriated by investors (Svensson, 1998). Moreover, poor institutions allow 
and encourage unproductive activities which can slow down economic growth as resources 
are driven away from the most productive activities. An example is spending much time 
and effort securing the required permits to open up a factory or to start a business (Gamber 
and Scott 2007). This diversion of scarce resources away from productive activities has 
profound negative effects on economic growth. 
On  the  other  hand,  proficient  and  established  institutions  provide  an  appropriate 
environment  for  growth-enhancing  activities  like  investment,  innovation,  and 
entrepreneurship, and permit society to function smoothly as individuals are able to invest   10 
their time in fruitful activities (IMF, 2003) and (World Bank, 2002). In another words, 
more secure property rights will increase the incentive to entrepreneurs to adopt new and 
efficient  technologies  that  maximize long term  performance.  It  seems  that there is  not 
much dispute that the quality of institutions, and particularly the security of property rights, 
is a significant determinant of economic growth.   
This claim has been supported by vast empirical evidence as many empirical studies have 
found a positive relationship between institutions and economic growth. The early studies 
that explored this relationship used various measures of political attributes like indices of 
political stability, including number of coups, revolutions, and political assassinations, or 
indices of political freedom and civil liberties, such as Gastil‟s (1983) index, because of the 
scarcity of indices that directly measure the status of property rights protection. However, 
the availability of subjective indices that measures various attributes of property rights 
protection  such  as  the  International  Country  Risk  Guide  (ICRG)  and  the  Business 
Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) has made it easier for recent papers to directly test 
North‟s  notions  about  the  importance  of  institutions  and  property  rights  for  economic 
growth.  
Among the pioneering studies that explored the relationship between institutional quality 
and economic growth, is that of Kormendi and Meguire (1985), who use Gastil‟s indices of 
political freedom (civil liberties and political rights) to proxy institutions, and found that 
institutions have a marginal impact  on economic growth. Scully  (1988) uses the same 
index to examine the impact of institutions on economic growth. His results support the 
claim  that  institutions  matter  for  growth.  Dawson  (1998)  also  uses  Gastile‟s  index  to 
explore the role of institutions in economic growth. He finds that institutions affect growth 
directly through influencing total factor productivity, and indirectly through influencing 
investment. Applying extreme bound analysis to identify the robust determinants of growth 
and investment, Levine and Renelt (1992) find that the index of revolution and coups is   11 
among  the  robust  variables  that  explain  cross-country  variation  in  investment  but  not 
growth. Barro (1991) finds that institutional attributes related to political instability, such 
as coups, revolutions, and political assassinations, are significantly related to investment. 
Mauro (1995) uses the quality of bureaucratic index to explore the role of institutions in 
economic  growth,  and  finds  that  corruption  lowers  investment  and  therefore  hinders 
economic growth. 
Knack and Keefer (1995) are the first to use indictors that are closely related to those 
institutions emphasized by North, Weingast, and Olson. They use ICRG and BERI to test 
the relevance of institutions to economic growth and find strong support for the notion that 
institutions,  and  property  rights  in  particular,  are  crucial  to  economic  growth  and 
investment. Hall and Jones (1999) find that institutions have a substantial impact on labour 
productivity and growth. Acemoglu et al (2001) document that institutional quality has a 
strong impact on income level. Rodrik et al (2004) find that institutions trump all other 
growth determinants. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) identify property rights institutions as 
one of the main determinants of economic growth.  
It seems that there is consensus that institutions matter for growth, and that building high 
quality institutions that enforce contracts, and that specify and protect property rights, is 
one of the preconditions for sustaining economic growth. However, economic literature 
does not provide much insight into how to attain well-functioning institutions (Shirley, 
2005).  In  particular,  available  empirical  evidence  on  the  determinants  of  institutional 
quality  and  property  rights  link  institutions  to  historical,  cultural,  and  geographical 
variables (Levine 2005). It is an explicit assumption in this literature that institutions are 
persistent and change very slowly over time (Acemoglu et al, 2001). Yet North (1990:6) 
states that “we live in a world where the rapidity of institutional change is very apparent”. 
In fact, Kaufmann et al (2009) report that between 1998 and 2008, many countries have 
made  a  tremendous  improvement  in  different  governance  and  institutional  indicators   12 
including the Rule of Law index, one of the indictors of property rights protection, while 
many countries witnessed dramatic deterioration in theirs within the same period
2.  What 
explains these changes? The available empirical literature does not provide much insight to 
answer this question.  
Recently, the notion that the forces of globalization have induced radi cal change in 
institutional  quality in local  economies  has been widely  debated (Campbell,  2004). 
However, exploring the impact of FDI inflows on property rights has received very little 
attention in  the  recent literature
3, despite its intuitive appeal not only for its obvious 
academic relevance, but also for its policy implications. If FDI is found to have a positive 
impact on property rights, then openness to foreign capital can be proposed as a strategy 
for improving institutional quality in developing countries. This is particularly important as 
the available evidence shows that using aid as a strategy to enhance institutional quality in 
developing countries has been generally unsatisfactory or  has even had negative results 
(Brautigam and Knack, 2004) and (Shirley, 2005).       
 
 
 
            
                                                 
2 Appendix I provides list of the countries that made significant changes in their institutional quality within the period 
1996-2008.  
3 To my knowledge these is not any published work that links institutional change to FDI. The exception is a work in 
progress by Ahlquist and Prakash (2005) which is mainly about exploring whether there is positive dependency as 
opposite to the negative dependency on FDI but the work says nothing about institutions and institutional change.   13 
1.1.3.  Foreign direct investment 
Foreign direct investment is defined as investment made to acquire a lasting management 
interest  in  an  enterprise  operating  in  a  country  other  than  that  of  the  investor  and  in 
general,  foreign  investment  must  be  at  least  10%  ownership  of  an  enterprise  to  be 
considered as FDI (Patterson et al, 2004). Usually, foreign direct investments are made by 
large Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) through a merger or acquisition, or through the 
construction  of  a  new  facility.  The  general  perception  of  Multinational  Enterprises  is 
twofold: the first is that they play a dominant role in research and development activities 
and in generating new technologies, and the second is that they have a powerful influence 
on local economies (Balaam and Veseth, 2008) and as such, Multinational Enterprises and 
their  activities  have  stimulated  wide  debate,  making  the  question  about  the  domestic 
consequences of their activities one of the most persistent questions asked by academics 
and policy makers alike (Dunning and Lundan 2008). However, the debate about foreign 
direct investment and Multinational Enterprises has increased recently as a result of the 
staggering  increase  of  FDI  both  in  developed  and  developing  countries  since  the  late 
1980s,  and  the  increase  in  the  importance  of  Multinational  Enterprises  in  the  global 
economy.  
As shown in Table 2, there has been a dramatic rise in FDI inflows across the globe; the 
average annual FDI inflows across the world increased from just US $23.97 billion in 
1970s,  to  US  $92.70  billion  in  the  1980s,  with  a  factor  of  increase  of  3.87.  Then  it 
increased with a factor of 4.34 to reach an annual average of US $402.05 in the 1990s. 
After this rapid increase, FDI inflows across the globe witnessed a period of less dramatic 
increase, since average annual FDI inflows was US $1041.2 billion during 2000-2007, 
with a factor of increase of 2.59. This rapid increase was in developed and in developing 
countries alike, as can be seen from Table 2 and Figure 3. However, most of these direct 
investments were flowing to developed countries; the share of developed countries in these   14 
investments was always more than two thirds during the period from the 1970s  to the 
2000s. But developing countries increased their share in total FDI inflows gradually from 
25.05% in 1970s to 30.82% in 1990s, before it dropped to 29.11% in the 2000s. This 
increase reflects the fact that FDI inflows to developing countries grew slightly faster than 
FDI inflows to developed countries during the period from the 1970s to the 1990s.  
This rapid increase in FDI inflows has been reflected in increasing the significance of the 
role played by FDI in host economies. One way to illustrate the increase in the significance 
of FDI is to use the FDI – GDP ratio. The Table shows that this ratio increased from just 
0.46% in the 1970s to 2.57% in the 2000s across the globe. The Table also shows that this 
ratio is slightly higher in developing countries than in developed countries, which might 
suggest that although developing countries receive a far smaller share of total FDI inflows, 
the significance of these inflows to their local economies is higher. Despite the reduction in 
the growth rate of FDI inflows from 22.08% in the 1990s to 11.39 in the 2000s in 
developed countries, and from 22.82% in the 1990s to 12.71% in the 2000s in developing 
countries, its share in GDP continued to increase from 1.25% in the 1990s to 2.38% in the 
2000s in developed countries and from 2.08% in the 1990s to 3.12% in the 2000s in 
developing countries.   15 
Table 2: Foreign direct investment inflows, trends and shares 
 
World 
 
Developed Countries 
 
Developing Countries 
     
  1970s  1980s  1990s  2000s    1970s  1980s  1990s  2000s    1970s  1980s  1990s  2000s 
                             
                             
FDI in US $  23.97  92.70  402.05  1041.20    18.05  72.10  279.52  717.80    5.92  20.60  118.13  291.85 
FDI as 
percentage of 
Total FDI 
100  100  100  100    74.95  74.63  68.17  67.99    25.05  25.36  30.82  29.11 
                             
FDI-GDP Ratio  0.46  0.64  1.40  2.57    0.43  0.62  1.25  2.38    0.61  0.72  2.08  3.12 
FDI-Domestic 
Investment 
Ratio 
2.01  2.86  6.45  11.49    1.84  2.82  5.90  11.03    2.84  3.10  8.49  12.42 
                             
FDI Annual 
growth rates 
14.74  19.06  20.77  11.45    17.05  20.71  22.08  11.39    31.00  25.70  22.82  12.71 
Exports Annual 
growth rates 
20.42  5.98  6.77  11.33    18.79  7.21  5.88  9.51    25.67  3.11  9.10  14.17 
Imports Annual 
growth rates 
20.26  6.05  6.70  11.25    19.39  6.81  6.16  10.03    23.63  3.99  8.54  13.36 
                             
                             
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report (2008). 
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These changes in the FDI – GDP ratio show that the significance of FDI to host economies 
increased on average, despite the slower growth rate of FDI recorded in the 2000s (See 
Figures 3 and 4). The significance of FDI to host economies becomes even clearer if one 
uses the ratio of FDI to cross fixed capital formation in host economies. The Table shows 
that for the world as whole, this ratio increased from 2.01% in the 1970s to 11.49% in the 
2000s.  Comparing  this  ratio  in  developed  and  developing  economies  shows  that  the 
significance of FDI has increased enormously in both groups. However, the fact that the 
FDI – gross fixed capital formation ratio is slightly higher in developing  countries, as 
compared with the ratio in developed countries, supports the notion that the significance of 
FDI to developing countries is higher, despite the fact that they attracted a far smaller share 
of FDI than the developed countries. Another illustration of the increased importance of 
FDI inflows is shown by comparing the growth rate of FDI inflows with those of exports 
and  imports.  Table  2  shows  that  in  the  1970s,  the  growth  rate  of  FDI  flows  was 
considerably lower than the growth rates of exports and imports either one considers the 
whole world or the developed and developing countries. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
FDI grew with a rate more than three times higher than those of exports and imports. But 
in  the  2000s,  the  growth  rates  of  FDI,  exports,  and  imports  became  more  or  less 
comparable.  
This increase in the FDI inflows, and its growing importance, has revitalized the debate 
about FDI and its potential positive effects on host countries, and about how to boost them, 
costs, negative implications and how to minimize them, and how to attract a higher share 
of its inflows. One particular research area that has received growing attention recently is 
the growth effects of FDI on host countries. This literature has been stimulated by the fact 
that while economic theory states that FDI can be an important source of economic growth, 
the empirical literature has been unable to provide unambiguous evidence about the 
positive impact of FDI on economic growth (Campos and Kinoshita, 2002; Carkovic and 
Levine, 2005).   17 
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Figure 3: FDI net inflows in US $ Billion 
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Figure 4: FDI net inflows as percentage of GDP 
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 Economic theory attributes an important role for FDI in fostering economic growth in 
developing countries because, on the one hand, modern economic growth theories stress 
the crucial role of technological progress and the creation of new ideas in determining the 
rate of growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Grossman and Helpman, 1993), and, on the 
other hand, FDI literature states that FDI is one of the most important channels through 
which advance technologies can be transferred to developing countries (Findlay, 1978; 
Blomstrom, 1986). FDI plays this role because the literature on Multinational Enterprises 
shows that Multinationals possess technological advantages over local firms (Caves, 2007; 
Markusen, 2004).  
However, despite these theoretical propositions, empirical literature on growth effects of 
FDI provides mixed evidence. The ambiguity of this empirical evidence on growth effects 
of FDI has been justified in FDI literature by providing two explanations. The first one is 
that not all host countries are capable of benefiting from FDI externalities. In particular, 
host  countries  need  to  reach  a  minimum  threshold  of  absorptive  capacity,  such  as  the 
quality of human capital and the development of the financial sector etc, before they can 
benefit from the growth effects of FDI (OECD, 2002). The second line of explanation 
states  that  not  all  kinds  of  FDI  are  capable  of  providing  host  countries  with  positive 
externalities. In particular, the positive growth effects attributed to FDI in the literature are 
confined  to  manufacturing  FDI,  whereas  primary  FDI  has  negative  effects  on  growth 
(Alfaro,  2003;  Aykut  and  Sayek,  2007).  While  the  role  of  institutional  quality  in 
determining  the  impact  of  FDI  on  economic  growth  as  one  aspect  of  the  absorptive 
capacity of the host countries is generally recognized in the literature (World Bank, 2001), 
the empirical literature gives little attention towards exploring its role in determining the 
contribution of FDI to economic growth. Thus it might be informative to explore the role 
of institutions in determining the impact of FDI on economic growth.   19 
Another research area that has received considerable attention in the recent literature, is the 
furious competition between countries to attract more FDI inflows, and the resultant effects 
of this competition on policy variables and institutions in host countries. There are two 
lines of argument in this debate. In the first, scholars argue that in competing to attract FDI, 
countries  may  be  forced  to  adopt  policies  with  deleterious  effects,  such  as  lowering 
environmental standards, corporate taxes, and labour rights (Oman, 2000). Some authors 
even argue that Multinational Enterprises and foreign investors lobby local governments 
and use their bargaining power to force them to make these negative changes (Cola et al, 
2006). These negative effects of FDI are known as the “race to the bottom” (Oman, 2000). 
The  second  line  argument  suggests  that  the  “race  to  the  bottom”  hypothesis  is  an 
exaggeration, and that competition between countries does not have harmful consequences 
for policy variables and institutions in host countries. And in fact, the competition may 
have positive implications, such as improving the environmental quality in host countries, 
i.e. the competition between countries actually leads to a “race to the top” (Bhagwati, 
2007). In line with this argument, Loungani and Razin (2001) and Feldstein (2000) state 
that the global mobility of foreign investments may limit the ability of governments to 
adopt  bad  policies  or  regulations,  and  encourage  them  to  embrace  good  policies, 
institutions and growth-enhancing legal traditions etc. However, these possible effects of 
FDI tend to be overlooked by the literature.  
 If FDI is found to have positive implications for institutional quality in host countries, 
then, in principal, FDI can contribute to economic growth in host countries through this 
channel,  i.e.  through  improving  institutional  quality.  However,  the  economic  literature 
shows little or no interest at all in exploring the significance of this channel of influence. 
Exploring this channel of influence may enhance the understanding of the contribution of 
FDI to economic growth, and may provide policy makers with additional justification for 
the efforts spent in attracting FDI, particularly in light of recent evidence, such as the work   20 
of Carkovic and Levine (2005), that casts doubt regarding the growth effects of FDI, and 
therefore deeply questions the merits of various incentives provided to foreign investors. 
1.2.  Thesis aim and structure 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate various aspects of the relationship between foreign 
direct investment inflows and institutional quality on host countries in an attempt to reach a 
better understanding  of  the contribution  of FDI to  economic  growth.  In particular, the 
thesis  will  empirically  examine  the  implication  of  the  interrelationship  and  the 
complementarity  between  FDI  and  institutions  to  the  contribution  of  FDI  to  economic 
growth.   
To  achieve  this  aim,  the  thesis  will  contain  four  core  empirical  chapters  (Essays)  in 
addition  to  an  introductory  chapter  and  a  concluding  chapter.  The  first  two  empirical 
chapters  will  address  the  interrelationship  between  foreign  direct  investment  and 
institutions. In particular, the first of these two chapters will assess the role of institutions 
in determining FDI inflows, and investigate how important institutional quality is for FDI. 
This  chapter  is  titled  The  Role  of  Institutional  Quality  in  Determining  Foreign  Direct 
Investment.  The analysis and evidence in this chapter will be used to build the argument of 
the  other  empirical  chapter,  which  will  investigate  whether  FDI  has  an  influence  on 
institutional  quality  in  host  countries.  This  chapter  will  endogenize  institutions  and 
empirically  test  the  hypothesis  that  FDI  inflows  may  positively  influence  institutional 
quality  in  host  countries,  as  foreign  investors  may  create  effective  demand  for  better 
institutions, and governments competing to attract FDI may be encouraged to provide such 
institutions. This chapter is titled Integration into the World Economy and Institutional 
Quality: the Impact of FDI on Property Rights. 
The other two empirical chapters will study the implications of the relationship between 
FDI  and  institutions  for  the  contribution  of  FDI  to  economic  growth.  The  first  will   21 
investigate  the  role  played  by  institutions  in  determining  the  contribution  of  FDI  to 
economic growth, i.e. this chapter tests whether institutional quality on host countries is a 
precondition for reaping the positive externalities of FDI. This chapter aims to demonstrate 
the importance of complementarity between FDI and institutions for the contribution of 
FDI to economic growth. This chapter is titled Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment 
Contribution  to  Economic  Growth.  The  other  empirical  chapter  will  test  whether  FDI 
affects  economic  growth  through  institutions,  i.e.  it  will  investigate  whether  FDI  has 
positive  contributions  to  economic  growth  that  work  through  improving  institutional 
quality in host countries. The chapter will assess the significance of this possible channel 
of impact. The last chapter will conclude the thesis, highlighting the main findings and 
stating their academic significance and their policy implications.   22 
Appendix I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of the countries and data used in Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 
country  GDP per capita 1965  GDP per capita 2005 
Average annual  
growth rate 1965 2005 
Norway  12899  40618  2.96 
Japan  10595  38972  3.40 
United States  16417  37008  2.13 
Iceland  12888  36136  2.74 
Switzerland  22180  35783  1.22 
Denmark  14169  31464  2.07 
Sweden  14113  30873  2.01 
Hong Kong, China  4855  30395  4.90 
Ireland  5973  30286  4.11 
United Kingdom  11781  27200  2.13 
Singapore  2733  26740  6.02 
Finland  8994  26310  2.82 
Canada  11284  25437  2.14 
Austria  9001  25299  2.64 
Netherlands  10450  25062  2.35 
Belgium  9224  23945  2.44 
France  9464  23693  2.37 
Australia  10450  23181  2.12 
Israel  7663  19850  2.54 
Italy  7222  19548  2.54 
Bahamas, The  12167  16723  1.16 
Spain  5324  15713  2.82 
New Zealand  9235  14840  1.31 
Greece  4901  14002  2.87 
Korea, Rep.  1296  13282  5.97 
Portugal  3124  11153  3.40 
Malta  1207  10042  5.54 
Oman  1072  9951  6.47 
Trinidad and Tobago  4206  9067  1.99 
Argentina  5859  8094  1.17 
Seychelles  2486  6789  2.58 
Uruguay  3874  6548  1.41 
Mexico  3098  6177  1.83 
Hungary  1775  5857  3.09 
Chile  1951  5671  2.71 
Venezuela, RB  6091  5000  -0.33 
Malaysia  973  4609  4.04 
Costa Rica  1946  4502  2.27 
Panama  2200  4440  1.96   23 
Botswana  294  4415  7.02 
Gabon  2621  4279  1.92 
Brazil  1559  3959  2.38 
Belize  1022  3707  3.33 
South Africa  2690  3427  0.77 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines  1115  3306  2.88 
Colombia  1160  2658  2.07 
Thailand  384  2496  4.87 
Dominican Republic  724  2471  2.75 
Peru  1925  2399  0.72 
Fiji  1097  2300  1.80 
El Salvador  1858  2202  0.54 
Algeria  1215  2117  1.59 
Guatemala  1088  1762  1.25 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  547  1630  2.90 
Ecuador  868  1589  1.55 
Morocco  683  1566  2.12 
China  100  1452  7.20 
Paraguay  749  1360  1.60 
Honduras  819  1305  1.33 
Syrian Arab Republic  575  1257  2.17 
Philippines  677  1118  1.33 
Congo, Rep.  645  1101  1.50 
Bolivia  1017  1065  0.26 
Sri Lanka  292  1009  3.09 
Guyana  684  995  1.22 
Indonesia  195  943  3.96 
Nicaragua  1262  842  -0.63 
Cameroon  520  679  0.83 
Papua New Guinea  515  628  0.79 
Pakistan  234  606  2.56 
India  193  589  2.70 
Cote d'Ivoire  678  560  -0.52 
Senegal  548  501  -0.18 
Lesotho  167  496  2.92 
Sudan  284  449  1.38 
Mauritania  448  444  0.39 
Nigeria  336  438  0.99 
Zimbabwe  470  428  -0.01 
Kenya  261  426  1.26 
Haiti  696  403  -1.24 
Bangladesh  260  400  1.11 
Zambia  608  356  -0.89 
Benin  288  321  0.39 
Ghana  270  282  0.18 
Chad  234  274  0.72 
Rwanda  176  256  1.69 
Burkina Faso  140  252  1.54 
Nepal  138  239  1.30 
Togo  268  237  0.16   24 
Madagascar  367  233  -1.08 
Central African Republic  328  218  -0.94 
Sierra Leone  246  216  0.05 
Niger  384  166  -1.75 
Malawi  109  138  0.99 
Liberia  699  129  -2.10 
Burundi  98  100  0.27 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  317  89  -2.95 
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Examples of countries that experienced significant institutional change from 1998-2008  
Institutions attribute  countries made significant  improvement  countries witnessed significant deterioration 
Government  
Effectiveness 
Israel  Maldives 
China  Zimbabwe 
Tajikistan  Cote D'Ivoire 
Indonesia  Chad 
Colombia  Mauritania 
Malaysia  Fiji 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  Belize 
Algeria  Togo 
Ethiopia  Spain 
Iraq  Bolivia 
Georgia  Belarus 
Hong Kong  Italy 
Korea, South  Lebanon 
Serbia   
Afghanistan   
Rwanda   
Regulatory  
Quality 
Slovakia  Zimbabwe 
Angola  Eritrea 
Tajikistan  Bolivia 
Belarus  Venezuela 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  Argentina 
Libya  Maldives 
Georgia  Ecuador 
Iraq  Cote D'Ivoire 
  Gabon 
  Uruguay 
Rule of Law 
Latvia  Zimbabwe 
Estonia  Eritrea 
Albania  Venezuela 
Serbia  Bolivia 
Liberia  Argentina 
Georgia  Cote D'Ivoire 
Rwanda  Trinidad And Tobago 
  Ecuador 
  Kyrgyzstan 
  Thailand 
Control of  
Corruption 
Estonia  Eritrea 
Indonesia  Zimbabwe 
Tanzania  Cote D'Ivoire 
Albania  Greece 
Georgia   
Hong Kong   
Rwanda   
Serbia   
Liberia   
Source: Kaufmann et al (2009)   26 
  
2.  The Role of Institutional Environment in 
Determining Foreign Direct Investment Inflows
4 
2.1.  Introduction 
The importance of the socio-political factors in determining FDI inflows has been long 
understood and emphasized in economic literature. Thus, the inclusion of various measures 
of social and political attributes of the host country in factors explaining FDI inflows is not 
a  recent  aspect  of  FDI  literature.  One  can  cite  studies  as  early  as  Basi  (1963)  who 
investigated the effects of political instability on FDI (Schneider and Frey, 1985). In the 
past few years however, there has been a resurgence of interest in this subject, with special 
focus  on  factors  representing  institutional  quality.  A  growing  number  of  papers  that 
address this topic have been published, resulting in a burgeoning literature linking FDI 
inflows to institutions. 
Three factors contributed to the emergence of this interest. First, since the influential study 
of  North  (1990),  there  has  been  growing  awareness  of  the  important  role  played  by 
institutions in shaping the incentives for investment and economic activities in general. 
Second, there was fast growth of FDI inflows during the 1990s, and growing interest in 
transition countries and developing countries in attracting a bigger share of these flows. 
Third, foreign investors have demonstrated a greater interest in institutional quality relative 
to conventional “natural assets” as a location advantage of a potential host country (Bevan, 
Estrin et al. 2004). Taking these factors into account, it is natural to find such interest in 
investigating the role of institutions in determining FDI inflows. 
                                                 
4 A paper based on the analysis of this chapter was submitted to Open Economies Review and a revised version has been 
invited which will be submitted soon.   27 
There are strong reasons to believe that countries with sound institutional environments 
(including  efficient  bureaucracy  and  low  corruption,  rule  of  law,  good  enforcement  of 
contracts etc.), will attract more FDI. According to recent surveys of the relevant literature, 
nevertheless, there has been no clear evidence in favour of institutions. Lim (2001) says 
that  the  empirical  results  in  this  regard  are  mixed.  He  also  notices  that  evidence  on 
regulatory, bureaucratic red tape and judicial transparency, are less encouraging compared 
with  evidence  on  political  risk.  Blonigen  (2005)  provides  some  examples  of  papers 
providing evidence in favour of institutions, like Wei (2000), and some providing evidence 
against institutions; such as Wheeler and Mody (1992), concluding that more convincing 
evidence  requires  more  studies  in  the  future.  Both  authors  attribute  the  inconclusive 
evidence to various measurement, conceptual, and methodical problems in the empirical 
literature.  
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the role of institutional quality in determining FDI, 
addressing some of the drawbacks of the empirical literature so that a better understanding 
of the relevance of institutions to FDI can be achieved. In particular, the chapter surveys 
the  recent  empirical  literature  and  identifies  areas  that  need  future  investigation,  and 
addresses  them  in  way  that  may  help  to  reduce  the  inconclusiveness  of  the  empirical 
evidence, and to reach a better assessment of the role played by institutions in determining 
FDI.     
The  rest  of  the  chapter  is  organised  as  follows:  section  2.2  discusses  the  theoretical 
arguments linking institutions to FDI. This theoretical discussion will provide the basis for 
evaluating  the  empirical  literature.  Section  2.3  critically  reviews  the  recent  empirical 
literature,  highlighting  issues  that  need  further  investigation.  Section  2.4  presents  the 
empirical results. Section 2.5 concludes the chapter.   28 
2.2.  FDI inflows and institutions: Theoretical 
overview 
To reach a better understanding of the role of institutions in determining FDI inflows, it is 
necessary  to  link  frameworks  addressing  the  determinants  of  FDI  to  those  addressing 
effects of institutions on economic activities in general, and on investment incentives in 
particular. One way of doing this is by collaborating Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm or OLI 
paradigm  with  North's  views  on  effects  of  institutions  on  investment  and  economic 
activities. Dunning's paradigm has been developed basically to explain the behaviour of 
Multinational  Enterprises  (MNEs)  i.e.  to  explain  why  firms  owns  foreign  production 
facilities. However, it has been used widely to analyze the determinants of FDI inflows 
(Gastanaga,  Nugent  et  al.  1998).  North's  views  on  institutions,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
mainly about the effects of institutions on economic activities and investment, but they can 
also be applied to FDI.  
2.2.1.  The eclectic paradigm and the determinants of 
FDI inflows 
According to Dunning (1993) and (2001), a firm has to meet three conditions to become a 
Multinational Enterprise. These conditions are: (1) possession of certain assets that provide 
the firm with some advantage over other firms in the host country. Otherwise, the firm 
would not be able to overcome the additional costs of operating in a foreign market, such 
as  the  cost  of  dealing  with  foreign  administrations,  regulatory  and  tax  systems,  and 
customer  preferences,  and  would  become  non-competitive  vis-à-vis  indigenous  firms. 
These assets can be tangible, like patented products or production processes, or intangible, 
such  as  managerial,  marketing,  and  entrepreneurial  skills.  Dunning  calls  these  assets 
ownership advantage or O advantages. (2) If the firm satisfies the first condition, it must 
find  it  beneficial  to  exploit  the  ownership  advantages  through  FDI  and  keep  them 
internally, rather than selling or leasing them, in order to prevent the asset from being   29 
replicated  by  competitors.  This  advantage  is  called  internalization  advantage  or  I 
advantages. (3) The firm must find it profitable to combine ownership and internalization 
advantages with some locational advantages - L advantages - in the host country, such as 
low input costs, large and growing markets, and so on. Otherwise, the foreign market could 
be served exclusively through exports.  
The third condition can help to explain the distribution of FDI across countries, because it 
is a country-specific advantage. Dunning identifies several locational advantages that may 
make some countries more attractive than others for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs). 
These  locational  advantages  may  include  variables  including:  availability  of  natural 
resources, input prices and quality, infrastructure quality, investment incentives, economic 
system and strategies, etc. (Dunning 1993; 1998). Dunning (2001) argues that considering 
a variable as a locational advantage must rest on the assumption that firms seek to site their 
value-added activities at the most profitable locations. In general, one might say that any 
variable that has a potential effect on the profitability of the firm‟s decision about where to 
invest,  may  be  included  in  the  variable  set  affecting  the  distribution  of  FDI  across 
countries. Thus, the eclectic paradigm  provides us  with  a flexible tool to  analyze FDI 
determinants, allowing us to test several hypotheses about the determinants of FDI inflows. 
This flexibility makes the eclectic paradigm a popular theoretical framework for studying 
FDI determinants; however, it is not without limitations. One limitation is that a large 
number of variables have been suggested as potential determinants of FDI inflows on the 
base of the paradigm, which may undermine the paradigm‟s value as an analysis tool. 
However, Dunning (2001) argues that there is only modest truth in this argument. Another 
limitation is that the paradigm does not provide us with clear expectations of the relative 
importance of different determinants. This means that the only way to give any speculation 
about the relative importance of various determinants is through empirical investigations.    30 
2.2.2.  Institutions and FDI 
North (1990) defines institutions as the rule of the game in a society. According to this 
definition, institutional framework consists of all kinds of human-devised constraints that 
shape human interactions, including economic exchange. Institutions can be formal, such 
as constitutions, laws etc, or informal, such as conventions, customs and so on. They are 
created to reduce the uncertainty associated with human interaction and exchange, and to 
determine what individuals should or should not do under different conditions, providing 
societies with predictable frameworks for interaction. 
North argues that institutions affect economic activities because they affect transaction and 
transformation costs. Transaction costs are those costs associated with economic exchange 
and consist of: (1) The cost of measuring the values of what is being exchanged. (2) The 
cost of protecting rights, and policing and enforcing agreements. These costs arise because 
of incomplete information about the behaviour of the other party of economic exchange. 
Without  institutions,  there  would  be  uncertainties  over  the  behaviours  of  parties  of 
economic exchanges. The other party may cheat, shirk, or deny agreements, if he/she finds 
it in his/her interests to do so. Because of this uncertainty, a risk premium will be included 
in the transaction cost. Institutions, both formal and informal, arise to provide exchange 
parties  with  rules  and  procedures  that  reduce  the  uncertainties  involved  in  economic 
exchange. Informal institutions like codes of conduct, norms of behaviour, and conventions 
can reduce these uncertainties, but they can do that in personal simple exchange where 
exchange parties have a great deal of information about each other and they find it in their 
interests to live up to the agreement. Both self-interest and social sanctions provide the 
enforcement mechanism in such exchanges, and reduce the payoff of cheating, lying, etc.  
However, in complex, impersonal exchanges, where the returns on opportunism, cheating 
and shirking are high, a coercive third party is needed to enforce agreements and reduce   31 
uncertainties. States can play this role and provide exchange parties with the enforcement 
mechanism via rules, laws, effective judicial systems, and other formal institutions.  
Thus, when property rights are poorly protected and contracts are difficult to enforce, risk 
premium  will  be  high  and  so  transaction  costs  which,  in  turn,  foreclose  any  complex 
impersonal  exchange  and  economic  activities  will  be  restricted  to  simple  interpersonal 
exchange. 
Institutions can also affect economic activities by affecting transformation or production 
cost. North (1990) argues that production process is a function not only of the level of 
technology  used,  but  also  of  the  quality  of  institutions,  and  hence  institutions  play  an 
important role in determining production costs. Institutions play this role because of their 
effects  on  the  environment  within  which  firms  interact.  Production  process  involves 
transforming inputs of land, labour, and capital, into output of goods and services. The 
efficiency of production process requires secure provision of these inputs. Firms will find it 
difficult to operate efficiently if they are not able to ascertain the quantity and quality of 
their  inputs  and  hence  their  outputs.  Thus,  when  there  is  variability  in  the  quality  or 
quantity  of  inputs,  firms  have  to  allocate  more  time  and  resources  to  organization, 
supervision, coordination, monitoring, and metering. Institutions can affect the variability 
in  the  quality  or  quantity  of  inputs,  because  they  determine  the  enforceability, 
measurement, and uncertainty problems involved in input markets. Therefore, institutions 
can affect production costs by affecting the time and resources allocated to dealing with 
problems of inputs variability. They can also affect production costs by affecting the extent 
of  production  interruptions.  Production  process  can  be  adversely  affected  when  long 
queues or briberies are required to get different kinds of permits or different kinds of public 
services, all of which are determined by the efficiency of institutions.      32 
 The  previous  discussion  makes  it  clear  that  institutions  have  potential  effects  on  FDI 
inflows and that countries with good institutions will, ceteris paribus, attract more FDI. 
Institutions play this role because they affect transaction and transformation cost, which in 
turn  affects  the  profitability  of  establishing  production  facilities  in  the  host  country.  
However,  the  impact  of  institutions  of  FDI  may  go  beyond  these  effects  (Henisz  and 
Williamson 1999). Several reasons make Multinational Enterprises, MNEs, particularly 
sensitive  to  the  institutional  quality  of  the  host  country.  For  example,  Henisz  and 
Williamson (1999) and Henisz (2000) stress that in countries where property rights are not 
well  protected,  Multinational  Enterprises  face  two  kinds  of  political  hazard  or 
expropriation risk. First, a host country‟s government may find it tempting to behave in an 
opportunistic way and appropriate some of the returns of MNEs, or even nationalize them 
(the direct hazard). Second, because they have better access to political processes, host 
country partners or host country competitors may persuade the government to favour them 
at  the  expense  of  Multinational  Enterprises  (the  indirect  hazard).  Moreover,  recent 
developments in the global economy have changed the way that Multinational Enterprises 
perceive the locational advantages they seek, making them increasingly prefer locations 
which offer the best economic and institutional facilities (Dunning, 1998).  The focus of 
Multinationals  has  moved  from  traditional  locational  advantages,  like  labour  cost, 
availability  of  natural  resources  etc,  to  creative  locational  advantages  which  include 
knowledge-based assets, infrastructure and institutions (Narula and Dunning, 2000) and 
(Bevan, Estrin et al. 2004). The importance of institutions for Multinational Enterprises can 
be attributed to the fact that they represent the major immobile factors in a globalized 
market (Mudambi and Navarra 2002), and that Multinationals need them to efficiently 
utilize their core competencies, and augment and improve their firm-specific advantages 
(Dunning, 1998) and (Bevan, Estrin et al. 2004).   33 
2.3.  FDI inflows and institutions: Empirical evidence 
review 
This section discusses recent findings of empirical studies that use cross-country regression 
to investigate the role of institutions in determining FDI inflows, highlighting issues that 
need further investigation. Table 3 provides an overview of the different studies in terms of 
country samples, time periods, and institutional variables used, and summarizes the main 
findings. The literature appears to offer several lessons. First, the majority of the studies 
show that institutions have significant effects on FDI. This can be broadly interpreted as a 
general  consensus  that  institutions,  however  defined  or  measured,  matter  for  FDI.  
Nevertheless, few studies do not find institutions to be significantly related to FDI. One 
example  comes  from  Asiedu  (2002),  who  concludes  that  neither  political  risk  nor 
expropriation  risk  have  significant  effects  on  FDI.  Another  example  comes  from 
Noorbakhash et al (2001), who find that democracy and political risk are insignificantly 
related to FDI. Moreover, some authors, like Harms and Ursprung (2002), and Jun and 
Singh (1996), report that the effects of institutions on FDI are not robust.  
These results may cast a doubt about the relevance of institutions to FDI, suggesting that 
institutions are not a robust determinant of FDI. However, they may be merely a result of 
sampling or measurement problems. Studies that tend to reject any significant impact of 
institutions on FDI are generally based on rather small country samples. For example, 
Noorbakhsh et al (2001) use 36 developing countries, while June and Singh (1996) use 31 
countries.  Using  a  small  and  limited  country  sample  may,  as  noted  by  Campos  and 
Kinoshita  (2003),  underestimate  the  effect  of  the  relevant  determinant  if  it  exhibits  a 
limited variation within that particular sample. As institutional indicators usually exhibit 
little time variation, inference on their impact should therefore ideally be based on large 
samples. This means that large samples, which represent the whole global market, not a   34 
subset  of  it,  should  be  used  if  one  needs  to  properly  assess  the  role  of  a  specific 
determinant. 
Measurement problems, on the other hand, result from using an inappropriate index to 
capture the impact of institutions. One aspect of the measurement problem is related to 
using indictors that capture only partly the quality of property rights. Although the above 
discussion shows that the central argument in North‟s proposition is that the absence of 
secure  property  and  contractual  rights  raises  transaction  and  transformation  costs,  and 
therefore discourages investment, including foreign direct investment, the Table shows that 
diverse  measures  of  institutional  quality  have  been  used  in  the  empirical  literature, 
encompassing measures of democracy, political instability, corruption, political rights and 
civil liberties, property rights, social tension, etc. Most of these indicators do not directly 
capture the quality of property rights. For example, Knack and Keefer (1995) argue that 
measures of political instability, such as coups, revolutions, and political assassinations, or 
political freedom and civil liberties, capture only incompletely many of the relevant threats 
to property rights. They notice that the argument for using indicators of political instability 
to proxy property rights is that rulers who are facing the risk of losing power are more 
likely to expropriate rights, because they think that they will not incur the future cost of 
their present actions, and that the times of political instability are usually accompanied by 
periods of weak systems for protecting property rights. 
However, Knack and Keefer (1995) argue that there are good reasons make us believe that 
indictors of political instability only partially capture property rights. One reason is that 
indices of political instability do not take into account the impact of losing power as a 
result of constitutional change, which is likely to have the same impact on rulers‟ actions 
with regard to the protection of property rights. In other words, the actions of rulers who 
are facing the risk of losing power as a result of constitutional change and their implication 
to property rights protection are not taken into account by measures of political instability.35 
Table 3: Summary of recent studies of the impact of institutions on FDI 
Author(s)  Sample  Institutions aspects considered & sources  Main results 
(Addison and 
Heshmati 2004) 
110 countries  Democracy; Freedom House.  Democracy has a positive effect on FDI. 
(Asiedu 2002)  71 developing 
countries, 1988-97 
Political risk; Barro & Lee 1993. Expropriation risk; 
ICRG PRS. 
Political risk and expropriation risk have no significant effects on 
FDI.  
Asiedu 2005  22 African 
countries,1984-2000. 
Corruption, rule of law; ICRG PRS, Political risk; 
Cross-National Time Series Data Archive. 
Less corruption, political stability, and reliable legal system can 
attract FDI 
(Busse and 
Hefeker 2007) 
83 developing 
countries,1984-2003. 
12 subcomponents of ICRG, Investment profile, 
internal and external conflict, ethnic and religious 
tension, rule of law, democracy, Military in politics 
Government stability, Socio-economic conditions, 
Quality bureaucracy, Corruption. 
Government stability, the absence of internal conflict and ethnic 
tensions, basic democratic rights and ensuring law and order are 
highly significant determinants of FDI 
(Busse 2004)  69 developing 
&emerging market 
countries, 1972-2001 
Democracy; Freedom House  There is a powerful positive link between democracy and FDI, but 
this does not hold for 1970‟s and 1980‟s. 
(Campos and 
Kinoshita 2003) 
25 transition 
economies, 1990-1998. 
Rule of law; ICRG & quality of bureaucracy; Campos 
2000. 
Both institutional aspects are positive and significant. 
(Drabek and 
Payne 2002) 
49 countries, 1991-95.  ICRG Political Risk Index; PRS.  A nation that takes steps to increase the degree of transparency in 
its policies and institutions could expect significant increase in 
FDI inflows. 
(Gastanaga, 
Nugent et al. 
1998) 
22 less-developed 
countries,1970-95. 
Nationalization risk, Contract enforcement, 
Bureaucratic delay; Business Environmental Risk 
Intelligence. BERI. Corruption; Mauro 1995. 
Different institutional characteristics are shown to have significant 
effects on FDI. 
(Globerman and  144 countries 1995-97  Governance Index, Rule of law, Political instability  The general Governance Index is more important than its 36 
Shapiro 2002)  Regulatory quality, Government effectiveness, Graft 
and corruption, Voice and accountability; Kaufmann et 
al 1999 
subcomponent and than Human development index and 
Infrastructure index. 
(Harms and 
Ursprung 2002) 
62 developing & 
emerging-market 
countries, 1989-97 
Democracy; Freedom House. Political risk: 
expropriation, exchange control, and contract 
repudiation; ICRG. Business Environment: corruption, 
bureaucratic quality and law and order; ICRG PRS. 
FDI appear to be attracted by countries in which civil and political 
freedom is respected. Other institutional aspects do not have 
robust effects on FDI. 
(Jensen 2003)  114 countries, 1970-97.  Democracy; Polity III data Jagger & Gurr 1996, 
Government Reputation, Expropriation, Corruption, 
Rule of law, Bureaucratic quality; Easterly Data Set 
Easterly 1999. 
Democracy has a robust positive effect on FDI. Other institutional 
aspects have no significant effects on FDI or on the effect of 
democracy on FDI. 
(Jun and Singh 
1996) 
31 countries, 1970-93.  Political risk, Operational risk; Business 
Environmental Risk Intelligence. BERI. Political 
rights; Freedom House. 
Institutional aspects have positive but not robust effects on FDI. 
(Kolstad and 
Tøndel 2002) 
61 developing 
countries, 1989-2000. 
12 subcomponents of ICRG, Investment profile, 
internal and external conflict, ethnic and religious 
tension, rule of law, democracy, Military in politics 
Government stability, Socio-economic conditions, 
Quality bureaucracy, Corruption. 
Foreign investors are concerned about and deterred by ethnic 
tension and internal conflict in a country. They pay less attention 
to external conflict, law and order and military in politics. 
Government stability and bureaucratic quality do not matter for 
FDI. Democracy is a very robust determinant of FDI. 
(Li and Resnick 
2003) 
53 developing 
countries, 1982-95 
Democracy; Polity IV. Property rights protection; 
Knack & Keefer 1995. 
Democratic institutions affect FDI inflows both positively, by 
improving property rights, and negatively, by imposing 
constraints on FDI and host country's government. 
(Méon and 
Sekkat 2005) 
107 countries.  ICRG Political Risk Index; PRS, Corruption; 
Transparency International & Rule of law & 
Government effectiveness index; Kaufmann et al 1999. 
It is Political risk in general that determines FDI not only one 
aspect of institutions such as corruption. 
(Noorbakhsh, 
Paloni et al. 
2001) 
36 developing 
countries, 1980-94. 
Democracy; Freedom House, Political instability; 
Euromoney. 
Democracy and political risk have no significant effect on FDI. 37 
Another reason is that there are many examples of rulers who systematically expropriate 
rights while managing to stay in power for a long time, and who successfully repress any 
coups or revolutions against them. The ignorance of such cases by measures of political 
instability would make poor specification and enforcement of property rights positively 
associated with political stability.  
The same can be applied to measures of democracy and other measures of political and 
civil freedom. While democratic regimes generally tend to enhance economic and other 
rights, including property rights, there is nothing to guarantee that this would always be the 
case. Moreover, there is nothing preventing autocratic regimes from respecting property 
rights. In fact, and as noted by Clague et al (1996), there are lots of examples of bad 
democracies and good autocracies. In general, one might say that although these indices 
proxy to some extent the security of property rights, there are considerable measurement 
errors embodied in them, making them inappropriate measures for institutional quality and 
property rights in particular.  
The  other  measurement  problem  is  related  to  using  only  one  single  index  like  the 
Expropriation Risk or Rule of Law to capture the status of property rights. To the extent 
that investors make their decision with respect to the overall state of property rights rather 
than a single aspect of them, using an index that captures only one aspect of property rights 
quality  will  underestimate  their  role  in  determining  FDI.  To  better  assess  the  role  of 
institutions on determining FDI inflows, a comprehensive indicator for institutions and 
property rights in particular should be used. 
Second, despite the general agreement about the role played by institutions in determining 
FDI, the surveyed literature is difficult to interpret in terms of policy implications. The 
literature provides little guidance about the relative importance of institutional reform as a 
means to attract FDI. Policy makers may be interested in whether institutional reform has a 38 
larger  pay-off  than  other  policies  in  terms  of  attracting  FDI.  Gastanaga  et  al  (1998) 
acknowledge the scarcity of research on the effects of policy variables in general, and 
institutions in particular, on FDI. Apart from Gastanaga et al (1998) and Asiedu (2005), the 
surveyed  literature  does  not  provide  much  insight  into  the  relative  importance  of 
institutions in determining FDI. The work of Gastanaga et al (1998) tests whether policy 
and institutional variables have any effects on FDI. They find institutional variables like 
contract  enforcement,  nationalization  risk,  and  bureaucratic  delay  to  have  significant 
effects  on  FDI,  but  they  do  not  try  to  compare  them  with  the  impact  of  other  policy 
variables. The exception to this is corruption. They find that a doubling in the corruption 
index has an effect on FDI inflows that is approximately equal to a percent increase in the 
corporate tax rate. 
 Asiedu (2005), on the other hand, provides evidence comparing the effects of institutions 
on FDI with the effects of non-policy variables like the availability of natural resources and 
market size, concluding that countries that are small or lack natural resources can attract 
FDI by improving their institutions. Both of the studies use rather limited country samples, 
which makes generalizing the results to other countries problematic. More importantly, 
given the growing interest of many countries in attracting FDI inflows, policy makers may 
be interested more in knowing the relative importance of institutions compared with other 
policy tools they have rather than non-policy variables. This can help them to build their 
priorities for attracting FDI.  
Third, although some authors acknowledge that institutions may differently affect different 
sectors, especially FDI in primary sectors, there has been no attempt to study institutions‟ 
effects on FDI at sectoral level.  Asiedu (2002), explaining the insignificance of political 
risk in determining FDI inflows, states that FDI in primary sectors like petroleum, is very 
profitable even after controlling for political risk. More interestingly, Busse (2004) finds 
that the effect of democracy on FDI changes over time. In the 1970s and 1980s the effect 39 
of democracy is not significant (in fact, in the 1970s, it is actually negative), while it is 
positive and significant in the 1990s. He partly attributes this result to the change of FDI 
structure in developing countries from the primary sector to manufacturing and services. 
Spar (1999) argues that FDI in the primary sector may not be sensitive to institutional 
quality in the host country: as resource-seeking FDI depends on the availability of raw 
materials  compared  to  other  kinds  of  FDI,  choices  are  greatly  limited  when  choosing 
between alternative investment sites. Referring to Spar‟s (1999) views, Busse (2004) states 
that FDI inflows to developing countries in the 1970s was driven largely by a search for 
raw materials, and that because of the importance of these sectors for both MNEs and host 
governments, they may arrive  at an agreement in which host governments protect and 
maintain MNEs‟ access to natural resources, and in turn the host governments benefit from 
the  inflows  of  investment  of  MNEs,  and  increase  their  earnings  from  selling  the  raw 
materials which directly relate to their power. Such an agreement makes MNEs follow 
natural resource deposits regardless of regime type in the host country. 
Busse (2004) states that it is difficult to test Spar‟s hypothesis without getting the data on 
FDI inflows at sectoral level. Fortunately, UNCTAD has recently published data on FDI 
inflows at sectoral level, which makes it possible to examine Spar‟s hypothesis. More 
importantly,  if  primary  FDI  is  found  to  be  insensitive  to  institutional  quality  in  host 
countries, then this may explain why some studies that use samples cover time periods or/ 
and countries in which primary FDI represents large share in aggregate FDI fail to find 
institutions significantly related to FDI.   
2.4.  Model and data description  
This section specifies the model used in the empirical investigation of the relationship 
between institutions and FDI. It also provides a simple description of the data set used in 
the empirical investigation.  40 
2.4.1.  Model description  
To empirically investigate the role played by institutions in determining FDI, the following 
simple model is used  
           (1) it i it it it FDI Inst CV           
Where  
FDI , the dependent variable, is the log of net FDI inflows expressed as a percentage of 
GDP to take into account the effect of the country size.  
Inst is an indicator of institutional quality. It is constructed from the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) which is provided by the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group. Since 
the  beginnings  of  the  1980s,  PRS  Group  has  been  providing  information  on  12 
subcategories of political risk indicators that assess different aspects of institutional quality 
of 142 countries. ICRG is an indicator based on the evaluation of group expertise to meet 
the need of foreign investors for an indicator of potential risks to international business 
operations. Although ICRG and other institutional indices are subjective indicators, two 
facts give them some credibility (Clague et al, 1996). First, firms producing these kind of 
indictors have strong incentives to make them as accurate as possible, so that they can sell 
them to foreign investors. Second, these indicators are being used in practice by foreign 
investors to evaluate the institutional quality of potential host countries. Besides, ICRG has 
been used widely in economic literature to proxy institutions. Another advantage of ICRG 
is that it provides a consistent cross-sectional time series measure for several aspects of 
institutional quality. The index used in this chapter is constructed from combining two 
subcomponents  of  ICRG:  Investment  Profile  index  and  Law  and  Order  index.  These 
indicators measure the quality of institutions that are related to property rights, such as 
expropriation  risk,  risk  of  contract  repudiation  by  the  government,  the  strength  and 41 
impartiality of the legal and judicial system, and observance of the law.  Inst varies from 0 
to 12, where higher values indicate better institutions and secure property rights.  
CV is  a  vector  of  controlling  variables  drawn  from  the  empirical  literature  of  FDI 
determinants.  
i    is a common fixed-effect term. 
it  is the disturbance term.  
idenotes cross-section unit with  1,2,........, iN  ; N is the number of countries. 
tdenotes time-periods with  1, 2, .........,  tT  ; T is number of time periods.  
Choosing  the  set  of  controlling  variables  is  to  some  extent  problematic,  because  the 
empirical literature suggests a large number of variables as potential determinants of FDI, 
and  while  some  of  these  are  proposed  by  various theories of  FDI,  others  are  included 
because they can be linked intuitively to FDI (Moosa and  Cardak, 2006). However, some 
of these variables have appeared repeatedly significant in different studies, which lends 
them  some  sort  of  robustness  as  important  determinants  of  FDI.  Two  variables  have 
appeared repeatedly in the empirical literature: market size indicator and trade openness. 
For example, Chakrabarti (2001) applies extreme bound analysis to assess the robustness 
of a number of variables as FDI determinants, and concludes that market size, as measured 
by  GDP per capita, is the most robust determinant of  FDI  and that openness to trade, 
measured by trade – GDP ratio, is more likely to be correlated with FDI than any other 
potential determinant. Moosa and Cardak (2006), on the other hand, find that openness, 
measured by export – GDP ratio, and infrastructure quality, measured by telephone lines 
per thousand people, to be the most robust determinants of FDI.  42 
Given  this  evidence,  and  following  the  main-stream  of  FDI  literature,  the  controlling 
variable vector will include the following variables: 
LGDPpc, the log of GDP per capita, which is used to capture the influence of market size 
of the host country. FDI literature documents that a market size measure is expected to 
have a positive impact on FDI, as a large market means a greater demand for goods and 
services which attracts market-seeking FDI.  
Open, the ratio of merchandised trade to GDP, which is used to capture the influence of 
trade openness on FDI. 
Tele, the number of telephones per 1000 population, which is used to proxy the quality of 
physical infrastructure of the host country. Teleis expected to be positively correlated with 
FDI, as good infrastructure augments the efficiency of investment, and therefore attracts 
FDI, especially efficiency-seeking FDI.  
In  addition  to  these  three  variables,  the  set of  controlling  variables will  include  other 
policy-related variables. The inclusion of policy-related variables allows us to compare the 
relevance of institutional quality to foreign investors vis-à-vis policy options available to 
policy makers to attract FDI. Thus the model will include the following three variables: 
Tariff , the mean of tariff rate, which is used to capture the impact of trade policy on FDI. 
The literature documents that a more liberal trade policy and low level of tariff attract FDI. 
Infl ,  the  inflation  rate,  which  is  measured  by  the  annual  percentage  change  in the 
consumer  price  index.  Inflation  rate  is  used  as  a  proxy  for  macroeconomic  stability. 
Macroeconomic  stability  reduces  the  level  of  uncertainty  encountered  by  investors  and 
increases the level of confidence in the economy, which encourages FDI.  43 
LTax, the log of top marginal corporate income tax rate, which is used to capture the 
impact of the corporate statutory tax rate on FDI. Higher tax rates are expected to reduce 
FDI. 
Thus, the model that will be used as a benchmark to assess the role played by institutions 
in determining FDI, takes the following form: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7    (2) it i it it it it it it it FDI Inst LGDPpc GDPG Open Tele Tariff Infl LTax                    
 
2.4.2.  Data description 
The empirical analysis is based on 69 developing countries and covers the period from 
1981 to 2005. A list of the  countries included in the sample, and data sources for all 
variables used in the analysis, are presented in Appendix II. The choice of countries and 
the time period is determined by the availability of the data. All data were sampled at 5-
year intervals for 25 years from 1981 to 2005, that is, 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-2000, 
and 2001-2005.  Transforming data  from annual observations  to  five-year averages  has 
several  advantages.  First,  it  may  help  to  limit  the  impact  of  business  cycles  on  the 
estimated coefficient, as FDI net inflows vary widely from year to year, resulting in large 
fluctuations that may obscure the impact of persistent variables like institutions on FDI. 
Second, averaging the data over five-year intervals reduces the number of observations 
with  zero or negative values, which  would  otherwise be excluded from  the regression 
analysis. Excluding such observations is likely to bias the country sample. Moreover, some 
of the explanatory variables included in the benchmark model, such as the average tariff 
rate and the top rates of corporate income tax, are available only as five year averages. 44 
Table 4 gives summary statistics of the variables included in the benchmark model and 
Table 5 shows the correlation matrix for all the explanatory variables and the log of FDI, 
the dependent variable.  
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in benchmark model 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
FDI  255  0.28  1.43  -6.75  3.01 
LGDPpc  255  7.29  1.11  4.44  10.21 
GDPG  255  1.83  2.98  -8.97  10.95 
Open  255  61.66  47.67  11.43  317.73 
Tariff  255  19.10  15.67  0.00  98.80 
Infl  255  56.82  256.32  -1.34  2692.45 
Tele  255  100.17  119.20  0.19  568.55 
LTax  255  3.62  0.36  2.30  4.47 
Inst  255  6.66  1.81  2.13  11.41 
 
The  correlation  matrix shown  in  Table  5  gives  a  first  but  crude  approximation  of  the 
relationship between FDI and its determinants. The Table shows, as expected, that FDI has 
a negative correlation with tariff rate, inflation, and tax rate. The Table also shows that FDI 
is positively correlated with indictors of market size, log of GDP per capita and GDP 
growth rate, the ratio of trade to  GDP,  infrastructure quality,  and institutional quality. 
However, the Table shows that the relationship between FDI and indicators of openness to 
trade is particularly strong. On the other hand, the correlation between FDI and market size 
variables,  LGDPpc  and  GDPG,  is  not  that  strong.  The  same  applies  to  inflation  and 
infrastructure quality. Institutions and tax level have a fairly strong correlation with FDI, as 
shown by the sizes of the correlation coefficients. 45 
Table 5: Correlation matrix of the variables included in benchmark model 
  FDI  LGDPpc  GDPG  Open  Tariff  Infl  Tele  LTax  Inst 
FDI  1.000                 
LGDPpc  0.187*  1.000               
Growth  0.200*  0.053  1.000             
Open  0.416*  0.194*  0.161*  1.000           
Tariff  -0.429*  -0.588*  -0.067  -0.303*  1.000         
Ifla  -0.157*  -0.102*  -0.318*  -0.066  0.089  1.000       
Tele  0.231*  0.859*  0.079  0.187*  -0.559*  -0.111*  1.000     
LTax  -0.344*  0.260*  -0.131*  -0.222*  0.077  -0.058  0.185*  1.000   
Inst  0.342*  0.708*  0.247*  0.270*  -0.567*  -0.220*  0.768*  0.099  1.000 
* indicates significance at the 0.05 level or better.  
 
The  correlations  between  FDI  and  the  variables  included  in  the  benchmark  model  are 
further illustrated in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Correlation matrix of regression variables 
   46 
2.5.  The empirical results 
To empirically assess the role played by institutions in determining FDI inflows, Model 2 
will be estimated using a panel approach. The empirical investigation will first cover the 
impact of institutions on aggregate FDI, and then the role of institutions at sectoral level 
will be considered.   
2.5.1.  The results from aggregate FDI  
Table 6 contains the results obtained by estimating different variants of Model 2. The 
results are based on a random-effects model, since the Hausman (1978) test suggests using 
a random-effects model instead of a fixed-effects model. And as mentioned above, the 
dependent variable is the log of FDI-GDP ratio expressed as five-year averages.   
Column 1 of Table 6 reports the results of the benchmark Model without the institutions 
variable, Inst. The results shows that FDI were attracted to countries with growing markets, 
as  the  coefficient  on  GDP  growth  rate,  GDPG,  is  positive  and  significant.  This  may 
indicate that market-related variables are important for FDI. However, the other market 
size indicator, the log of GDP per capita, appears insignificant, indicating that market size 
is not an important factor in explaining the variations of FDI within the considered sample. 
This result seems to contradict the results of most empirical studies on FDI determinants. 
Nevertheless, it is not an uncommon result in the empirical literature. For example, Lunn 
(1980), UNCTC (1992), and UNCTAD (1998) find market size insignificantly related to 
FDI. The results in column 1 also show that trade openness, as measured by trade-GDP 
ratio, has a positive and significant impact on FDI, and that countries with higher trade-
GDP ratio attracted, ceteris paribus, more FDI. The importance of a liberal trade regime for 
FDI is further supported by the negative and significant impact of Tariff rate on FDI. 
Column 1 also shows that infrastructure, as measured by the number of telephone lines per 47 
thousand population, and macroeconomic stability, as measured by the percentage change 
on consumer price index, are insignificantly related to FDI. The results also show that tax 
level plays a significant role in determining FDI, as higher corporate income tax reduces 
FDI inflows. In column 2, the indicator of institutional quality is added to the model. The 
results  in  column  2  indicate  that  institutions  play  significant  roles  in  determining  FDI 
inflows, as shown by the positive and significant coefficient on the institutions variable, 
Inst. This means that FDI is attracted to countries with high quality institutions that protect 
property rights.  
Table 6: FDI Determinants: Random-Effects regressions, 1981-2005 (5-year averages) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
LGDPpc  0.023  -0.026  -0.035  -0.019  -0.027  0.015  -0.007 
  (0.19)  (-0.22)  (-0.22)  (-0.16)  (-0.22)  (0.14)  (-0.04) 
GDPG  0.053**  0.040*  0.027  0.036  0.042*  0.030  0.035 
  (2.27)  (1.70)  (0.84)  (1.38)  (1.72)  (1.20)  (0.86) 
Open  0.009***  0.008***  0.010***  0.008***  0.008***  0.006**  0.008** 
  (3.60)  (3.40)  (3.30)  (3.43)  (3.49)  (2.53)  (2.24) 
Tele  0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  -0.001 
  (1.33)  (0.83)  (-0.38)  (0.81)  (0.71)  (1.12)  (-0.36) 
Tariff  -0.026***  -0.024***  -0.023***  -0.022***  -0.024***  -0.023***  -0.020** 
  (-4.09)  (-3.82)  (-3.06)  (-3.08)  (-3.87)  (-3.47)  (-2.19) 
Infl  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (-1.20)  (-0.80)  (-0.51)  (-0.92)  (-0.77)  (-0.91)  (-0.38) 
LTax  -0.582**  -0.493**  -0.298  -0.425*  -0.506**  -0.523*  -0.444 
  (-2.32)  (-2.05)  (-0.90)  (-1.87)  (-2.10)  (-1.94)  (-1.18) 
Inst    0.114**  0.187**  0.103**  0.111**  0.111**  0.185** 
    (2.27)  (2.52)  (2.03)  (2.19)  (2.17)  (2.41) 
Sch      0.337        0.373 
      (1.12)        (1.27) 
BMI        0.029      0.008 
        (0.75)      (0.19) 
Gov          0.009    0.023 
          (0.54)    (0.81) 
Reso            0.009  0.004 
            (1.17)  (0.31) 
cons  1.955*  1.292  -0.205  0.764  1.235  1.158  -0.270 
  (1.82)  (1.19)  (-0.13)  (0.62)  (1.10)  (1.04)  (-0.14) 
R2  0.396  0.403  0.408  0.400  0.406  0.440  0.4609 
Wald test  177.5  186.3  150.6  189.5  182.0  179.2  155.96 
No. countries  69  69  51  69  69  68  51 
No. observations  255  255  159  255  253  242  152 
z-values reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively 48 
  To test the sensitivity of these results, other potential FDI determinants are added to the 
benchmark model. In column 3, the level of human capital, as measured by the average 
years  of  secondary  schooling  in  the  total  population,  Sch,  is  added  to  the  set  of  the 
controlling  variables.  A  number  of  papers  argue  that  the  level  of  human  capital  is  an 
important  factor  in  determining  FDI,  especially  in  an  increasingly  globalized  world 
(Noorbakhsh,  Paloni  et  al.,  2001).  However,  the  results  show  that  the  human  capital 
indicator,  Sch,  does  not  play  a  significant  role  in  determining  FDI  within  the  sample 
considered. With regards to the impact of institutions on FDI, controlling for the impact of 
human capital does not affect the significance of the institutional quality indicator, Inst. In 
column 4, the impact of exchange rate distortion, as measured by the index of difference 
between  official  exchange  rate  and  black  market  rate,  is  controlled  for.  However,  the 
results  show  that  the  coefficient  on  the  exchange  rate  distortion  index,  BMI,  is  not 
significant although it has the expected sign. Again, the relevance of institutions to FDI is 
not  affected  by  controlling  for  exchange  rate  distortion.  In  column  5,  the  role  of 
government  size,  Gov,  as  measured  by  the  ratio  of  government  spending  to  GDP  is 
controlled for. The results show that controlling for government size does not affect the 
significance of institutions. In column 6, the role of the availability of natural resources, 
Reso, as measured by the ratio of primary exports to GDP, is added to the model. The 
availability  of  natural  resources  is  expected  to  be  positively  correlated  with  FDI,  as 
abundant natural resources are expected to attract more FDI, especially resources-seeking 
FDI. The results shown in column 6 indicate that although Reso has the expected sign, it is 
not significantly related to FDI. Moreover, controlling for the role of resource availability 
does not affect the significance of institutions. Even more interesting is that controlling for 
all  of  these  variables  at  the  same  time  in  column  7  does  not  affect  the  relevance  of 
institutions to FDI.  49 
Several aspects of the results from different variants of Model 2 can be highlighted: First, 
it seems that institutions have a positive and significant impact on FDI and that this impact 
is not sensitive to controlling variables changes.  
Second, as far as the country sample and time period covered is concerned, it seems that 
FDI is driven mainly by the liberty of the trade regime and institutional quality, and to a 
lesser extent, by corporate tax level, while market size indicators, infrastructure quality, 
and macroeconomic stability did not play a significant role in determining FDI inflows. 
Given these results, it might be interesting, especially for policy makers, to explore the 
relative importance of institutions in attracting FDI inflows compared with other variables, 
particularly with policy related variables like tariff rates and taxes. This is particularly 
important as empirical literature provides little guidance on the relative contribution of 
institutional quality in attracting FDI. Using beta
5 coefficient estimates can help to assess 
the relative importance of the contributions of various variables included in the benchmark.  
Table 7 compares the impact of  a favourable change in each of the explanatory variables 
by one standard deviation on log of FDI expressed  as units of standard deviations. For 
example, a reduction in Tariff rate by one standard deviation will increase the log of FDI -
GDP ratio by 0.26 standard deviation. The Table also reports the  P-value of the estimated 
coefficients. As can be seen from the Table, the contribution of institutions in attracting 
FDI is greater than the contribution of taxes, and the growth of the market size. However, 
the contribution of institutions is far less than the contribution of the tariff rate and the 
contributions of trade ratio.   
                                                 
5 Beta coefficient, or standardised coefficient, is used to overcome the problem of unit measurement since beta 
coefficients measure the impact of a one-standard-deviation change in a given regressor on the dependent variable.  50 
Table 7: Relative contribution of explanatory variables in attracting FDI 
Variable  LGDPpc  GDPG  Open  Tariff  Infl  Tele  LTax  Inst 
Coefficient  -0.020  0.084  0.267  0.260  0.039  0.065  0.124  0.144 
P- Value  0.827  0.089  0.001  0.000  0.422  0.408  0.040  0.023 
 
The coefficients on LGDPpc, Infl and Tele are not significant. The results from this Table 
indicate that institutional quality is a very important factor in attracting FDI. However, it is 
of lower importance than liberalizing the trade regime.   
Third,  it seems  that using an institutional  quality indicator that  proxies the quality of 
property rights protection helps to reduce the inconclusiveness of the evidence regarding 
the relevance of institutions to FDI reported by some empirical studies. However, it is 
informative to investigate the role played by other aspects  of institutions and to verify 
whether  institutions  related  to  property  rights  dominate  other  aspects  of  institutional 
quality proposed by the empirical literature on FDI. If property rights institutions are found 
to be the most relevant institutional aspect to FDI, then this explains why some studies that 
use either indicators capturing a subset of property rights protection or indicators capturing 
institutional  aspects  other  than  property  rights,  fail  to  find  a  significant  relationship 
between institutions and FDI. 
To  assess  the  role  played  by  other  institutional  aspects  in  determining  FDI,  ICRG 
subcomponents are rearranged to proxy four institutional aspects that are considered by 
empirical  literature  as  potential  determinants  of  FDI,  namely  democracy  (Demo), 
corruption (Corr), political instability (Polt), and social tension (Soci)
6. Table 8 reports the 
results of adding the various institutional aspects indicators  to the benchmark model. 
Column 1 reports the results of the benchmark model.  In the next five columns , various 
institutional variables are added to the model one at time , and then all of them at once in 
column 6. The results reported in Table 8 show that ot her institutional aspects have no 
                                                 
6 Appendix II shows how  these indicators are constructed.   51 
significant impact on FDI if the property rights aspect of institutions is controlled for. 
Moreover, the property rights indicator maintains its significance at least at 10% in all 
columns.  The  reduction  in  the  significance  of  the  property  rights  indicator  in  some 
specifications may be a result of the high correlation between the property rights indicator 
and other institutional variables, particularly the correlation with Polit and Demo.  These 
results suggest that institutions linked to the protection of property rights are the most 
relevant institutions to FDI, and that the impact of other aspects of institutions on FDI, if 
any, work through their effects on property rights.   
Table 8: FDI and institutional variables, Random-Effects regressions, 1981-2005 (5-year 
averages) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
LGDPpc  -0.047  -0.055  -0.064  -0.066  -0.023  -0.062 
  (-0.38)  (-0.44)  (-0.51)  (-0.52)  (-0.18)  (-0.47) 
GDPG  0.053**  0.053**  0.056**  0.056**  0.047*  0.051** 
  (2.37)  (2.38)  (2.53)  (2.49)  (1.90)  (2.12) 
Open  0.007***  0.007***  0.007***  0.007***  0.007***  0.007*** 
  (3.00)  (3.04)  (2.91)  (3.09)  (2.92)  (2.91) 
Tele  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (1.22)  (1.19)  (1.36)  (1.15)  (1.02)  (0.99) 
Tariff  -0.027***  -0.026***  -0.027***  -0.026***  -0.027***  -0.027*** 
  (-4.97)  (-4.93)  (-5.06)  (-4.86)  (-5.14)  (-5.15) 
Infl  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (-0.89)  (-0.89)  (-0.86)  (-0.89)  (-0.91)  (-0.90) 
LTax  -0.358*  -0.364*  -0.374*  -0.365*  -0.417*  -0.473** 
  (-1.72)  (-1.74)  (-1.80)  (-1.73)  (-1.83)  (-1.98) 
Inst  0.098**  0.090*  0.089*  0.088*  0.132**  0.118** 
  (2.06)  (1.78)  (1.86)  (1.79)  (2.28)  (2.03) 
Demo    0.015        0.021 
    (0.49)        (0.63) 
Corr      0.057      0.053 
      (0.86)      (0.72) 
Polti        -0.028    -0.040 
        (-1.01)    (-1.29) 
Soci          0.032  0.036 
          (0.82)  (0.81) 
Cons  1.156  1.176  1.215  1.101  1.527  1.722 
  (1.06)  (1.07)  (1.12)  (1.01)  (1.29)  (1.43) 
R2  0.410  0.409  0.408  0.419  0.409  0.416 
Wald test  197.6  200.0  198.5  199.9  197.0  205.0 
No. countries  68  68  68  68  68  68 
No. observations  251  251  251  251  251  251 
z-values reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 52 
2.5.2.   The results from sectoral FDI 
The  studies  surveyed  above  use  aggregate  FDI  data  to  explore  the  role  played  by 
institutions in determining the variations of FDI inflows. However, some papers argue that 
the impact of institutions on FDI may differ across primary, manufacturing, and services 
sectors.  For  example,  Asiedu  (2002)  finds  that  institutional  indicators  like  political 
instability and expropriation risk are insignificantly related to FDI. She argues that this 
result should not be surprising, since a country like Angola, which ranked first in attracting 
FDI in Sub Saharan Africa, is also a highly instable country. The reason for this, according 
to  Asiedu,  is  that  FDI  to  Angola  is  driven  mostly  by  the  availability  of  petroleum 
resources, and that the returns on these investments are high enough to cover the risk of 
political instability. Asiedu (2002) concludes that political risk and expropriation risk are 
less relevant for primary FDI, particularly in the oil sector.  
Moreover, Busse (2004) argues that democracy matters more for FDI in the manufacturing 
and services sectors, but less for FDI in the primary sector. He outlines that there are 
claims that MNEs support repressive regimes and neglect political freedom, and adds that 
there is some anecdotal evidence that MNEs, especially in extractive industries, do not 
refrain from investing in non-democratic countries, and that they even collude with these 
non-democratic  regimes.  The  examples  include  Shell  in  Nigeria,  Uncoal  in  Myanmar, 
British Petroleum in Columbia, and United Fruit in Guatemala. Busse (2004) argues that 
primary FDI as a resource-seeking FDI has little choice as where to invest, but has to 
follow resource deposits. This fact, according to Busse (2004), may cause primary FDI to 
be less sensitive to the institutional quality of the host country. Busse (2004) tries to verify 
the hypothesis that FDI in the primary sector may not be sensitive to democracy, but he 
does so by studying aggregate FDI in the 1970s and 1980s. His main argument is that most 
FDI inflows to developing countries in the 1970s and 1980s were driven to the primary 
sector, and that studying the relationship between aggregate FDI and democracy in these 53 
periods may help to uncover the relationship between primary FDI and democracy. Busse 
(2004) finds that democracy is insignificantly related to FDI in the 1970s and 1980s, but 
that it becomes significant in the 1990s. He considers his results as support for Spar‟s 
hypothesis, but states that testing Spar‟s hypothesis requires using disaggregated data on 
FDI.    
Despite these arguments and evidence, the literature on FDI determinants shows little or no 
interest in exploring the impact of institutions in different FDI sectors. The aim of this 
section is to investigate the influence of institutions on FDI in the main economic sectors: 
primary, manufacturing, and services.  
First,  an  approximate  exploration  of  the  relationship  between  institutions  and  FDI  in 
primary, manufacturing, and services sectors is shown in Table 9. This Table shows the 
correlation matrix of institutions and FDI in various sectors, and as can be seen from the 
Table, the simple correlation coefficient between the log of primary FDI inflows, LFDIP, 
and institutional quality indicator, is very low and insignificant, while the same coefficients 
for  manufacturing  FDI,  LFDIS,  and  services  FDI,  LFDIT,  are  relatively  high  and 
significant. It is clear from the Table that the relationship between institutions and FDI on 
the primary sector is not a strong one, at least compared with FDI in manufacturing and 
services sectors. A further insight into the relationship between institutions and FDI in 
various sectors is shown in Figure 6, which shows a scatter graph for the relationship 
between institutions and FDI in various sectors. Another feature of Table 9 and Figure 6 is 
that the correlation between institutions and FDI on the service sector appears relatively 
strong  compared  to  the  correlation  between  institutions  and  FDI  in  the  manufacturing 
sector. This suggests that FDI in the services sector is more sensitive to institutions than 
FDI in the manufacturing sector. 54 
 
Table 9: Correlation matrix of institutions and FDI in various sectors 
   LFDIP  LFDIS  LFDIT  Inst 
LFDIP  1       
LFDIS  0.251*  1     
LFDIT  0.335*  0.581*  1   
Inst  0.088  0.356*  0.509*  1 
* indicates significance at the 0.05 level or better. 
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Figure 6: Simple correlation between institution and FDI in various sectors 
 
Table 9 and Figure 6 can be considered as the first support for the hypothesis that FDI in 
the primary sector is not sensitive to institutional quality in host countries, and that the 
relevance of institutions to FDI may vary across sectors. However, testing this hypothesis 
requires more than simple correlation coefficients or scatter graphs.  
To investigate whether institutions affect FDI differently in different sectors, one needs to 
specify  the  determinants  of  FDI  at  sectoral  level,  and  to  control  for  sector  specific 
determinants. However, this is not an easy task, since the literature on FDI determinants by 55 
sectors is very rare, especially when it comes to primary FDI. It is important to stress that 
the intention here is not to provide a perfect model specification to sectoral FDI. However, 
better evaluation of the role of institutions at sectoral level requires controlling for sector 
specific determinants. One way to do this is to use the benchmark model as a general 
framework to study various sectors, and to adjust it either by adding or excluding variables 
in  the  light  of  theoretical  arguments  and  empirical  evidence  proposed  by  the  relevant 
literature. 
One important adjustment to the benchmark model is related to modelling primary FDI. 
Dunning (1993) argues that the locational advantages for natural resource-seeking FDI are 
the availability of resources, the level of taxes, and the quality of transport infrastructure. 
Besides,  it  is  difficult  to  argue  that  primary  FDI,  as  resource-seeking  FDI,  is  affected 
significantly by the market size of a host country or its growth rate. The same applies to 
trade openness indicators. Thus, primary FDI is modelled as a function of the availability 
of natural resources measured by Reso, tax level, LTax, in addition to the ratio of paved 
roads as a percentage of total roads, Road, to proxy the quality of transport infrastructure, 
while market size indictors, LGDPpc and GDPG, and trade openness indicators, Open and 
Tariff, are dropped.  
For  manufacturing  FDI,  most  of  the  variables  on  the  benchmark  model  are  relevant, 
however, Stobaugh (1969) argues that GDP as whole, or GDP per capita, may not be a 
good  indicator  for  market  size  for  a  specific  industry  or  sector.  He  proposes  using 
manufacturing output to proxy the market size. Following this proposal, Root and Ahmed 
(1979) use the ratio of manufacturing output to GDP as a potential determinant of FDI in 
the manufacturing sector. Thus, following this argument, and given that the log of GDP per 
capita  appears  insignificantly  related  to  aggregate  FDI  in  Table  6,  the  ratio  of 
manufacturing output to GDP, Manuf, will be used instead of the log of GDP per capita to 
proxy the market size. Other variables will stay the same.  56 
To model service FDI, some changes to the benchmark model are needed, because there 
are some reasons to believe that the determinants of services FDI may differ from those 
proposed by the benchmark model. First, Kolstad and Villanger (2004) notice that services 
FDI  is  by  and  large  a  non-tradable  sector,  and  its  products  are  not  exchanged  across 
country borders. Thus it is difficult to argue that tariff rates may affect services FDI to any 
large extent. Second, satisfying the demand for services  requires  in  general  a physical 
presence in a host country, and thus services FDI can be considered generally as market-
seeking FDI (Kolstad and Villanger, 2004). Therefore, market size indictors are expected 
to be important for services FDI. Thus services value added as percentage of GDP, will be 
used to proxy the market size of this sector. However, the empirical literature on services 
FDI shows that the source of demand for the products of services FDI does not come only 
from local business in  host countries, but also from foreign investors in other sectors, 
particularly in the manufacturing sector (Kolstad and Villanger, 2004). FDI in services like 
finance,  business,  transport,  and  post  and  telecommunications,  known  generally  as 
producers services (Norads, 2001), are expected to follow manufacturing FDI in order to 
provide them with essential components for their success in the global market (Kolstad and 
Villanger, 2004). Following this line of argument, one may expect that a greater degree of 
integration  in  the  world  economy,  such  as  in  the  large  international  trade  sector,  will 
increase the demand for producer services, particularly in finance and insurance, and in 
telecommunications etc and therefore attract more services FDI. Kolstad and Villanger 
(2004) find services FDI to be positively and significantly related to manufacturing FDI, 
and to the ratio of trade to GDP. Thus services FDI will be modelled as a function of all the 
explanatory variables included in the benchmark model, apart from the tariff rate, and the 
log  of  manufacturing  FDI  as  ratio  of  GDP,  LFDIS,  will  be  added  to  the  set  of  the 
explanatory variables.  57 
To test whether FDI in different sectors reacts differently to institutional quality in host 
countries, the random effects panel technique is used. The dependent variables are the log 
of five year averages of FDI to GDP ratio in various sectors.  
Table 10 reports the results of estimating the determinants of FDI in the three sectors; 
primary, manufacturing, and services. Columns 1, 4, and 6 in Table 10 show the results of 
regressing FDI in primary, manufacturing, and services FDI, respectively, on institutional 
quality index alone. This may help to give an initial indication of the heterogeneity in the 
impact of institutions on FDI in various sectors. The results in columns 1, 4, and 6 show 
that institutions are positively and significantly related to FDI in primary, manufacturing, 
and services sectors. However, it seems that the relevance of institutions to services FDI is 
particularly strong, as can be seen from the volume of the coefficient of institutions, which 
is nearly double the volume of manufacturing and primary FDI. Moreover, the relatively 
low value of t statistics of institutions coefficient in the equation of primary FDI, may 
suggest that the relationship between institutions and primary FDI is not very strong, at 
least compared with the relations between institutions and manufacturing and services FDI.  
 Of course, a proper evaluation of the role of institutions requires controlling for other 
potential determinants in each sector. In column 2, the availability of natural resources and 
tax level are controlled for by introducing Reso and LTax. The results show that primary 
FDI  is  positively  and  significantly  related  to  the  availability  of  natural  resources  as 
measured by the ratio of primary exports to GDP. The results also show that primary FDI 
reacts negatively and significantly to taxes. More related to the aim of this chapter is the 
finding that the institutional quality indicator loses its significance once these variables are 
controlled for. 58 
 
Table 10: Determinants of FDI by sector, Random Effects regressions, 1981-2005 (5 year 
averages) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)    (6)  (7) 
  Primary FDI    Manufacturing FDI     Services FDI 
Inst  0.260**  0.081  0.157    0.276***  0.159**    0.592***  0.218*** 
  (2.27)  (0.71)  (1.37)    (6.57)  (2.42)    (7.01)  (3.04) 
Reso    0.130***  0.121***             
    (5.27)  (5.10)             
LTax    -2.133***  -1.863***      -0.156      -0.616** 
    (-3.06)  (-2.75)      (-0.51)      (-2.02) 
Road      -0.024***             
      (-2.58)             
Manuf            0.039*       
            (1.78)       
Open            0.003      0.014*** 
            (0.84)      (2.75) 
Tariff            -0.019***       
            (-2.63)       
Infl            -0.001***      0.001 
            (-4.92)      (0.24) 
Tele            -0.001      -0.001 
            (-1.06)      (-1.06) 
Serv                  0.047*** 
                  (2.60) 
LFDIS                  0.631*** 
                  (5.44) 
cons  -3.452***  4.214  3.743    -2.444***  -1.423    -4.376***  -2.294 
  (-3.78)  (1.54)  (1.45)    (-7.50)  (-1.20)    (-6.52)  (-1.32) 
R2  0.008  0.411  0.474    0.127  0.287    0.259  0.549 
Wald test  5.2  30.3  46.3    43.2  86.5    49.1  210.7 
No. countries  52  42  42    55  45    53  44 
No. observations  133  109  109    140  112    138  110 
z-values reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
In column 3, the quality of transport infrastructure as measured by the ratio of paved roads 
to total roads, Road, is controlled for. Contrary to what is expected, the coefficient on Road 
is negative and significant, a result that is difficult to explain. However, controlling for 
road quality does not affect the result that institutions enter insignificantly in the primary 
FDI equation. 59 
 In  general,  these  results  suggest  that  institutions  do  not  play  a  significant  role  in 
determining  FDI  in  the  primary  sector.  This  result  can  be  considered  as  an  empirical 
support to the argument made by Spar (1999), Asiedu (2002), and Busse (2004), which 
states that primary FDI may not be sensitive to institutional quality in host countries.      
In column 5, other potential determinants of manufacturing FDI are controlled for. The 
results show that taxes, infrastructure quality, as measured by Tele, and trade ratio, do not 
play significant roles in determining FDI in this sector. On the other hand, the results show 
that trade barriers, as measured by tariff play a significant role in determining FDI inflows 
to this sector where high tariff rates discourage manufacturing FDI. This may indicate that 
manufacturing FDI to the sample countries were largely vertical FDI. However, the market 
size consideration still play a role in attracting manufacturing FDI although it is not that 
strong  role  as  shown  by  the  low  t  statistics  of  the  coefficient  on  Manuf,  the  ratio  of 
manufacturing output to GDP. Macroeconomic stability, as measured by Infl, appears to 
play  a  highly  significant  role  where  higher  inflation  rates  discourage  FDI  in  the 
manufacturing sector. More related to this chapter‟s aim is that institutions appear to play a 
significant role in determining FDI flows to this sector. 
In column 7, other potential determinants of services FDI are controlled for. The results 
show that taxes, contrary to the results found in the manufacturing sector, play a significant 
role  in  determining  services  FDI,  while  macroeconomic  stability  does  not.  In  another 
contrast with manufacturing FDI, services FDI is affected significantly by the market size 
indicator, Serv; the ratio of services value added to GDP. The results show that services 
FDI is not only attracted by the demand of local agents and businesses, but also by the 
demand  of  foreign  investors  in  the  manufacturing  sector,  as  shown  by  the  significant 
coefficient on the log of manufacturing FDI – GDP ratio. Moreover, services FDI is also 
attracted  by  the  volume  of  international  trade  in  host  countries,  which  indicates  that 60 
services FDI reacts also to the demand resulting from increasing integration in the world 
market. 
However, services FDI shows some similarities to manufacturing FDI. For a start, they are 
both  insensitive  to  the  quality  of  infrastructure  in  the  host  country,  as  shown  by  the 
insignificant coefficient on Tele in columns 5 and 7. Another similarity is that they both 
react significantly to institutional quality in host  countries. However, it seems that the 
impact of institutions on FDI in the services sector is stronger than on manufacturing FDI, 
though it is difficult to test this claim empirically, as columns 5 and 7 are not directly 
comparable. 
2.6.  Conclusion 
This chapter aims to assess the role of institutional quality in determining FDI inflows, and 
to address some of the issues related to the inconclusiveness of the empirical evidence 
reported  in  the  relevant  literature.  The  analysis  in  this  chapter  covers  69  developing 
countries during the period from 1981 to 2005. The main results of this chapter can be 
summarized as follows:  
First,  institutional  quality  plays  a  significant  role  in  determining  FDI  inflows,  as 
institutions appear to have a consistent effect on FDI under different model specifications 
and various controlling variables. Therefore, institutional quality can be considered as a 
quite robust determinant of FDI. Moreover, compared with the impact of other variables on 
FDI, institutions appear to have a rather strong influence, as the impact of institutions on 
FDI is greater than those of the growth of the market size, the degree of macroeconomic 
stability, infrastructure quality, and tax levels. Thus, institutional quality can be considered 
as one of the most important factors that foreign investors consider when deciding where to 
invest. 61 
Second,  compared  with  other  institutional  attributes,  such  as  democracy,  corruption, 
political  instability,  and  social  tension,  property  rights  protection  is  the  most  relevant 
institutional quality to foreign investors, and once the property rights index is controlled 
for, other institutional attributes lose their significance. This result can be considered as a 
possible explanation for the failure of the studies that use indices other than the property 
rights index to proxy institutions to find a robust relationship between institutions and FDI, 
as these indices may not fully capture the status of property rights protection, which is the 
most important institutional attribute for foreign investors. 
Third, the relevance of institutional quality is not equally important across all sectors of 
FDI. In particular, institutional quality does not have a robust impact on primary FDI, 
while it does have a positive and robust impact on both manufacturing FDI and services 
FDI.  Moreover,  there  is  tentative  evidence  that  services  FDI  is  more  sensitive  to 
institutional quality than manufacturing FDI. This result can be considered as support for 
Spar‟s notion that primary FDI is not particularly sensitive to institutional quality on host 
countries. It also helps explain why some studies that use country samples or time periods 
where  primary  FDI  represents  a  large  share  on  FDI  inflows,  fail  to  find  a  robust 
relationship between institutions and FDI. 
Beside  the  academic  significance  of  these  results,  as  they  help  to  reduce  the 
inconclusiveness of evidence regarding the impact of institutions on FDI, and provide a 
better assessment of the relevance of institutions to FDI, they also have some important 
policy implications. First, the result that institutional quality is one of the most important 
determinants of FDI, and that the impact of institutional reform on FDI is higher than the 
impact  of  maintaining  macroeconomic  stability,  or  improving  infrastructure  quality,  or 
reducing tax rates, helps policy makers to build their policy option priorities for attracting 
FDI.  62 
Second, the result that property rights protection is the most important institutional quality 
attribute for FDI, means that reforming the legal system and strengthening the judicial 
system is an effective policy for attracting FDI. Given that these aspects belong to a lower 
level of institutions, and that they are easier to change than higher levels of institution, like 
democracy, political stability, or social and cultural characteristics (Jütting, 2003), policy 
makers have a good chance to attract FDI inflows through institutional reform.  
Third, the result that the relevance of institutions to FDI varies across sectors, implies that 
institutional reform may not be an effective policy tool for countries trying to attract FDI in 
the primary sector, and that institutional reform can attract more FDI in the services sector 
than in the manufacturing sector. And given the increasing share of services FDI in total 
FDI inflows in recent years (UNCTAD, 2004), the importance of institutional reform as a 
policy tool for attracting FDI in general, may increase in future. 
Finally, and with particular relevance to this thesis, there is clear evidence that institutions 
matter to foreign investors, and that they give institutional quality greater importance when 
considering where to invest. Thus it is quite natural to assume that foreign investors will 
create a demand for better institutions, and that countries that compete to attract more FDI, 
and/or retrain the existing stock of FDI, will be induced to provide such institutions. The 
next chapter will develop this hypothesis and empirically investigate it.  63 
     
   Appendix II 
 
List of countries included in the empirical analysis 
Asia  East Europe  Latin America and Caribbean  Middle East and North Africa  Sub-Saharan Africa 
China  Bulgaria  Argentina  Egypt  Botswana 
Hong Kong  Croatia  Bolivia  Iran  Cameroon 
Indonesia  Czech Republic  Brazil  Jordan  Congo 
Korea  Estonia  Chile  Morocco  Congo 
Malaysia  Hungary  Colombia  Syrian  Cote d'Ivoire 
Papua New Guinea  Latvia  Costa Rica  Tunisia  Gabon 
Philippines  Lithuania  Dominican Republic  Turkey  Ghana 
Singapore  Poland  Ecuador    Kenya 
Thailand  Romania  El Salvador    Malawi 
Bangladesh  Russian Federation  Guatemala    Nigeria 
India  Slovak Republic  Guyana    Senegal 
Pakistan  Slovenia  Honduras    South Africa 
Sri Lanka  Ukraine  Jamaica    Tanzania 
    Mexico    Uganda 
    Nicaragua    Zambia 
    Panama    Zimbabwe 
    Paraguay     
    Peru     
    Trinidad and Tobago     
    Venezuela     
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Definition of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable  Definition  Source 
FDI 
Log of Foreign direct investment  net inflows as % 
of GDP 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 
LGDPpc  Log of GDP per capita US $  World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 
GGDP  GDP Growth (annual %)  World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 
Open  Merchandise trade as % of GDP  World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 
Tele  Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people)  World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 
Tariff  Mean tariff rate.  EFW, 2006 Annual Report. The 
Fraser Institute. 
Infl  Consumer prices (annual %) 
 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 
LTax  Log of Top Marginal Income Tax Rate. 
Economic Freedom of the World, 
2006 Annual Report. The Fraser 
Institute. 
Inst 
 
Simple Average of indices of 
Law and Order & 
Investment Profile, scale 0-12. 
Calculated from ICRG Data, PRS 
Group. 
Sch  Average years of higher schooling in the total 
population. 
Barro R. and J.W. Lee.2000. 
 
BMI  Index of Difference between official exchange rate 
and black market rate, 0-10 scale. 
EFW, 2006 Annual Report. The 
Fraser Institute. 
Gov  Government consumptions as a % of GDP  World Bank, World Development 
Indicators.. 
Reso  Ratio of Primary exports to GDP  World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 
Demo 
 
Simple Average of indices of Democratic 
Accountability& Military in Politics, Scale 0-12. 
Calculated from ICRG Data, PRS 
Group. 
corr 
 
Simple Average of indices of 
Bureaucracy Quality & Corruption, scale 0-12. 
 
Calculated from ICRG Data, PRS 
Group. 
Polti 
Simple Average of indices of Internal Conflict and 
external Conflict 
 
Calculated from ICRG Data, PRS 
Group. 
Social Tension 
Simple Average of indices of Socioeconomic 
Conditions, Ethnic Tensions& Religion in Politics, 
Scale 0-12. 
Calculated from ICRG Data, PRS 
Group. 65 
 
3.  Integration into the World Economy and 
Institutional Quality: The Impact of FDI on Property 
Rights
7 
3.1.  Introduction 
The impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on host countries is a well researched topic, 
and the bulk of the literature focuses on the impact of FDI on economic growth. However, 
with  the  rapid  growth  of  FDI  inflows  during  the  1990s,  and  the  growing  competition 
among countries to attract FDI flows, researchers have recently shown a resurgence of 
interest in studying new aspects of the impact of FDI flows on host countries. Most of the 
work in this area argues that the increase of FDI inflows in the 1990s, and the competition 
among governments to attract FDI, have led to “bidding wars” in which governments were 
forced to adopt policies with a negative impact on host countries‟ economies, such as a 
reduction in tax rates, deterioration in standards of the environment, and workers‟ rights 
(see, for example, Oman, 2000). Some of these negative aspects, known as the “race to the 
bottom” effects, are supported by empirical evidence. For example, Garretsen and Peeters 
(2007) find that FDI inflows lead to lower corporate tax rates. However, foreign investors 
do not only search for lower tax rates; they also demand better institutional quality, and 
governments competing to attract FDI may be induced to supply them with an efficient 
institutional framework. FDI may therefore have positive impact on institutional quality in 
host  countries.  This  aspect  of  FDI  effects  has  not  received  much  attention  from  FDI 
literature.  
                                                 
7 A paper based on the analysis of this chapter has been accepted on 16-12-2009 for publication in Economic Inquiry. 66 
Institutional  quality  has  been  identified  as  one  of  the  most  important,  if  not  the  most 
important, determinant of economic growth. Hall and Jones (1999) find that differences in 
income growth  are largely explained by differences in institutional quality. Knack and 
Keefer (1995) identify property rights as being crucial for growth and investment. While 
there  is  considerable  consensus  that  institutions  matter  for  growth,  how  efficient 
institutions come about, and what explains differences in institutional quality between and 
within  countries,  still  remains  an  open  question.  The  empirical  evidence  on  the 
determinants  of  property  rights  links  institutions  to  cultural,  historical,  and  geographic 
factors  (see,  for  example,  Levine,  2005).  If  property  rights  are  mainly  determined  by 
factors like culture or geography, then what explains changes in institutions over time? 
And  if  property  rights  are  only  determined  by  unchangeable  factors  like  history  and 
geography,  then  there  is  not  much  prospect  for  developing  countries  to  achieve  high 
quality  institutions.  There  is  a  clear  need  to  link  institutions  to  changeable,  if  not 
controllable, variables. Such evidence would provide a basis for institutional reform that 
enables developing countries to build high quality institutions.  
The hypothesis that this chapter introduces and empirically investigates, is whether FDI 
inflows  have  a  positive  impact  on  property  rights  in  the  host  country.  Testing  this 
hypothesis may have both academic and practical significance. First, it explores a new 
dimension of the impact  of FDI inflows on the host country, which may advance  our 
understanding of the contribution of FDI inflows to economic growth in the host country. 
Second, it provides a new argument and empirical verification on explaining differences in 
property rights, which is one of the most important aspects of institutional quality.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section 3.2 briefly discusses the theory of 
property rights determinants, with more emphasis on the empirical literature. Section 3.3 
introduces arguments for linking property rights to FDI inflows. The empirical results are 
presented in section 3.4, and section 3.5 concludes the chapter. 67 
3.2.  Determinants of institutional quality 
According  to  La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer,  and  Vishny  (1999),  theories  that 
explain determinants of institutional quality, and in particular property rights protection 
and contract enforcement, can be grouped into three broad categories: economic, political 
and  cultural.  Beck,  Demirguc-Kunt,  and  Levine  (2003),  and  Levine  (2005),  add  the 
endowments category. While economic theory stresses the role of social efficiency when 
creating institutions, political theory focuses on the redistributional aspects. Cultural theory 
emphasizes  the  role  of  social  beliefs,  and  endowment  theory  points  to  the  role  of 
geographical factors, such as the availability of natural resources or climate, in shaping 
institutions8. 
Economic  theory,  represented  by  Demsetz  (1967)  and  North  (1981),  argues  that 
institutions are created when it is efficient to do so. To repeat the example provided by La 
Porta et al. (1999), private property rights are created when land becomes scarce, and when 
their  benefits  exceeds  the  cost  of  their  enforcement.  As  institutions  are  generally 
considered  efficient,  economic  theory  sees  poor  property  rights  as  a  reflection  of 
insufficient resources and high costs. Within this view, economic development creates a 
demand for good institutions, and governments will oblige, if benefits exceed enforcement 
costs. 
Political theory, represented by Marx (1872), North (1990), and Olson (1993), states that 
institutions are designed by the elite to retain existing power structures. History provides 
many examples that demonstrate that institutions are shaped by the ability of powerful 
groups  to  extract  rents,  rather  than  social  efficiency  considerations:  Russian  Czars, 
Ottoman  Sultans  and  Tokugawa  Shoguns  all  created  institutions  that  increased  their 
                                                 
8 This section is a summary of the discussions in La Porta et al. (1999) and Beck et al. (2003). 
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absolute authority and control, resulting in a poor definition and enforcement of property 
rights (see La Porta et al., 1999, and references therein). According to this view, political 
divergence in society (social, ethnic, class or other) has a negative impact on government 
performance and property rights. 
The other prediction of this theory is based upon the historic circumstances within which 
Common and Civil laws have been developed. Common Law was developed, in part, as a 
tool to limit the authority of the crown and to protect property rights, while Civil Law was 
developed to restrain the authority of sovereigns over their subjects. Thus political theory 
argues that Civil law, compared with Common law, has a negative impact on property 
rights.  
Cultural  theory,  represented  by  Weber  (1958),  Banfield  (1958),  Putnam  (1993),  and 
Landes (1998), states that institutions are a reflection of the beliefs in a society. In some 
societies, intolerance and distrust run so high that governments cannot function effectively, 
which creates poor institutional quality and insufficient property rights protection (La Porta 
et al., 1999). Landes (1998) argues that Catholicism and Islam are hostile to institutional 
development. The reason for this, according to Landes (1998) and Putnam (1993), is that 
these two religions tend to foster “vertical bonds of authority”, which limits the security of 
property rights and private contracting (Levine, 2005).  
Endowment theory, represented by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) and Acemoglu et al. 
(2001),  states  that  today‟s  institutions  are  affected  by  factor  endowments  and  initial 
conditions  at  the  time  of  colonisation.  Two  versions  of  the  endowment  theory  exist: 
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) emphasize that natural resource endowments, related to 
mining  and  crops,  often  gave  rise  to  highly  unequal  societies,  where  the  ruling  elite 
prevents the development of egalitarian institutions, and instead favours institutions that 
foster their hegemony (Levine, 2005).  Acemoglu et al. (2001) establish a link between 69 
settler strategies of European colonialists and institutional quality in developing countries 
today. They argue that in areas where disease produced high mortality rates, Europeans did 
not settle, but set up „extractive colonies‟ (e.g. Congo). The institutions of these „extractive 
colonies‟  favoured  the  elite,  and  facilitated  the  extraction  of  wealth;  only  in  „settler 
colonies‟ where European colonialists settled, did they create institutions that supported 
property rights (e.g. Australia) . 
3.3.  Foreign direct investment and property rights 
There is growing evidence that greater integration into the global economy has an impact 
on  institutional  quality.  For  example,  Bonaglia  et  al.  (2001)  provide  robust  empirical 
support that higher import openness lowers corruption. Li and Reuveny (2002) establish 
that trade openness and portfolio investment have negative impacts on democracy, while 
FDI has a positive one. Larrain and Tavares (2004) show evidence that FDI is a robust 
predictor of corruption, and that larger FDI inflows reduce the level of corruption in the 
host  country.  Al-Marhubi  (2004)  finds  that  trade  openness  has  a  positive  impact  on 
governance indictors, and concludes that openness may encourage governments to adopt 
better governance to reap the full benefits of integration into the world economy. Mosley 
and Uno (2007) find FDI to be positively and significantly correlated with labour rights, 
while trade openness impacts on them negatively.    
This  section  develops  arguments  that  facilitate  a  better  understanding  of  the  possible 
impact of FDI on property rights. Given the results of the previous chapter, which state that 
institutions matter for foreign investors, one can argue that FDI affects both the demand 
and the supply of property rights, and through this, FDI leads to better institutional quality. 
The demand for property rights arises because property rights allow foreign investors and 
Multinationals  to  capture  potential  rents  and  benefits  in  host  countries;  governments 70 
competing to attract FDI, on the other hand, may be induced to supply property rights 
when it is advantageous to do so.  
3.3.1.  Demand side 
Foreign direct investors may create an effective demand for better institutional quality in 
host countries. This may be the case for two reasons: first, there is growing evidence that 
foreign investors consider institutional quality, especially property rights, as an important 
factor for their business success. In fact, chapter two of this thesis shows that institutional 
aspects  related  to  property  rights  are  one  of  the  most  important  determinants  of  FDI 
inflows. Moreover, the results of the previous chapter show that institutions matter for 
foreign  investors  more  than  many  other  factors,  such  as  tax  levels,  macroeconomic 
stability,  infrastructure,  and  market  size.  Second,  there  is  evidence  that  Multinational 
Enterprises tend to manipulate their business environment in order to maximize profits and 
to achieve their business goals. For example, Poynter (1985) finds that some Multinational 
Enterprises attempt to change government policy by entering domestic political processes. 
Moreover, according to Navaretti and Venables (2006), at times, foreign investors rely on 
domestic interest groups with a vested interest to pressurize the government to change the 
FDI incentive scheme in their favour. Libman (2006) provides evidence that Multinational 
Enterprises have played an important role in shaping the course of reform and institutional 
change in some transitional countries. Given the above points, it seems plausible to assume 
that foreign investors  have an incentive to lobby for institutional change when faced with 
a poor property rights and business climate. FDI inflows should therefore create a higher 
demand for better institutional quality and property rights. 71 
3.3.2.  Supply side 
The demand for property rights is not enough to explain the existence of property rights. 
To understand the impact  of  FDI inflows in  property  rights,  one needs to  include the 
supply side in the analysis, by explaining why governments would respond to the demand 
of foreign investors to improve institutional quality. One way to understand the incentives 
of the government is provided by North (1981). He assumes that the government acts like a 
discriminating  monopolist,  offering  property  rights  protection  to  different  groups  of 
constituents  in  return  for  tax  revenues.  Using  this  argument,  one  may  argue  that 
governments might find it advantageous to provide foreign investors with property rights, 
and to ensure contract enforcement so that they can enjoy the benefits of FDI inflows, 
which  ultimately  strengthen  the  government‟s  position.  While  this  might  explain  why 
governments  protect  property  rights  and  enforce  contracts,  it  does  not  explain  why 
governments would commit to this role if they find it to their advantage to renege on their 
commitments. For example, policy makers may try to alter property rights for their own 
benefits after investment has taken place (North and Weingast, 1989). 
Two factors may prevent governments from reneging on their commitments, or at least 
make  it  costly  for  them  to  do  so.  The  first  factor  is  reputation.  The  fact  that  foreign 
investors can, at least in the medium and long-run, reallocate their investments to another 
country, makes governments value the long-run effects of reneging on their commitments. 
Thus, building a good reputation can induce governments to honour their commitments at 
the present time, so as to retain the opportunity to attract FDI inflows in the future. The 
other factor is related to devising more complex institutional arrangements to limit a ruler‟s 
incentives to renege. Bullow and Rogoff (1989) show that reputation alone may not be 
enough to prevent reneging in developing countries, and that more complex institutional 
arrangements are necessary to police reneging (North and Weingast, 1989). In the context 
of FDI inflows to developing countries, Buthe and Milner (2008) stress that governments 72 
try to assure foreign investors about their commitments by binding themselves by various 
kinds of agreements and treaties, such as bilateral investment treaties, preferential trade 
agreements, and multilateral agreements. These international commitments, although not 
determining  government  behaviour,  are  more  credible  than  domestic  commitments, 
because reneging on these commitments is more costly.     
The above arguments can be supported by the fact that since the beginning of the 1980s, 
many countries, in an attempt to attract FDI inflows, have introduced several changes in 
their regulatory frameworks. The aim of these changes was to create stronger incentives for 
foreign investors. According to UNCTAD (2002), in 2001 alone, 71 countries introduced 
208 changes to their FDI laws, and 194 of these changes created a more favourable climate 
for  attracting  more  FDI.  Furthermore,  many  countries  have  tried  to  increase  their 
commitment to provide a better regulatory framework for FDI, by entering into bilateral 
investment treaties. The number of these treaties has increased rapidly over recent decades 
(UNCTAD, 2002). Table 11 and Figure 7 show the evolution of the number of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties concluded between 1980 to 2006. Table 11 shows the average number 
of annual treaties signed in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. As can be seen from the Table, 
the average number of treaties for the world as whole, increased from just 20 in the 1980s, 
to 148 in the 1990s, and much of this increase took place in developing countries; the 
number of signed treaties increased from 15 to 105. The annual number of signed treaties 
witnessed a slight reduction in the 2000s, but it is still high compared to the number in the 
1980s, as Figure 7 shows.  It seems plausible to view these changes to domestic regulations 
and investment treaties, at least in part, as host governments‟ response to foreign investors‟ 
demand for a better investment climate, including better institutions, and as a result of the 
competition between countries to attract FDI inflows.    
 73 
 Table 11: Bilateral investment treaties: Average annual count 
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Figure 7: The annual number of bilateral investment treaties 
 
In  summary,  one  can  expect  that  in  a  search  for  higher  profits,  foreign  investors  will 
demand more secure property rights; host governments, aware of the potential benefits of 
FDI for growth and development, will respond. In an attempt to retain established FDI and 
attract new FDI, governments will further try to signal a high level of commitment by 
binding  themselves  through  various  international  treaties.  It  therefore  seems  entirely 
plausible to expect that FDI inflows have a positive impact on institutional quality, and in 
particular, on the protection of property rights.         
  1980s  1990s  2000s 
World  20  148  111 
Developed countries  16  88  57 
Developing economies  15  105  92 
Source: UNCDAT World Investment Report 2008 
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3.4.  Empirical results 
The previous sections laid out a hypothesis about the impact of FDI inflows on property 
rights. This section attempts to empirically verify this hypothesis. To ensure comparability 
of the analysis of this chapter with the existing work on the determinants of institutional 
quality, the cross-sectional analysis of La Porta et al. (1999), Beck et al. (2003) and Levine 
(2005) will be replicated first. Their work will then be expanded in several directions, 
which  significantly  adds  to  the  literature  on  determinants  of  institutional  quality  and 
property rights. In particular, the cross-sectional analysis in La Porta et al. (1999), Beck et 
al. (2003) and Levine (2005) will be extended to a dynamic panel setting which allows us 
to study variations over time. Furthermore, the analysis will control for the possibility that 
some of the regressors, in particular FDI, could be endogenous. Moreover, North (1990) 
argues that previous levels of institutional quality determine current levels (see below). 
The use of a dynamic panel framework also enables us to test this hypothesis.  Finally, to 
gain robustness, we present results from different estimation techniques.  
In general, this model will be estimated: 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Inst B B polit B Econ B FDI B Cultr B Endo BV           
 
Where: Inst is the institutional quality index. Polit is a vector of variables representing the 
political  theory.  Econ  is  a  vector  of  variables  capturing  the  impact  of  economic 
development.  FDI  is  the  ratio  of  foreign  direct  investment  inflows  to  gross  domestic 
product. Cultr is a vector of variables capturing the impact of culture. Endo is a vector of 
variables representing the endowment theory. V is a vector of controlling variables and   
is the disturbance term.  75 
3.4.1.  Results from cross-sectional estimations 
To investigate the impact of FDI inflows on institutional quality, the empirical analysis 
starts by using the same data set as La Porta et al. (1999). To measure institutional quality, 
La Porta et al. (1999) use the Property Rights Index in the year 1997. This index is broadly 
based  on  the  degree  of  legal  protection  of  private  property,  the  extent  to  which  the 
government protects and enforces laws that protect private property; the probability that 
the  government  will  expropriate  private  property,  and  a  country‟s  legal  protection  of 
private property. This index takes values between 1 and 5, with higher values indicating 
greater protection of private property. 
As already mentioned above, La Porta et al. (1999) empirically evaluate the contribution of 
political, cultural and economic theories in explaining institutional quality, and they also 
control  for  geography.  Political  theory  is  tested  by  the  degree  of  ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization  as  well  as  the  origin  of  commercial  law.  The  Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization Index (Ethn) is an average of several measures of ethnic diversity. The 
index ranges from 0 to 1, and is expected to have a negative impact on property rights. The 
higher ethnic and linguistic division, the poorer property rights are.  A country‟s Company 
Law or Commercial Code can stem from five different origins: (1) English Common Law 
(BCLaw),  (2)  French  Commercial  Code  (FCLaw),  (3)  German  Commercial  Code 
(GCLaw), (4) Scandinavian Commercial Code (ScCLaw), (5) Socialist/Communist laws 
(SoLaw). Given the historical context within which these Laws have been developed, as 
already  explained  earlier,  it  is  expected  that,  with  respect  to  English  Common  Law, 
French, German, Scandinavian, and socialist laws have a negative impact on the property 
rights index.  
The relative shares of Roman Catholics (Cath), Protestants (Prots), and Muslims (Islam) in 
a country (religious composition of population) proxy cultural determinants of institutional 76 
quality (La Porta et al., 1999). It is expected that relative to Protestantism, Catholicism and 
Islam have negative impacts on property rights. 
La Porta et al. (1999) use the logarithm of the average of GNP per capita in current US 
dollars during 1970-1995 (LGNPpc) as a proxy for economic determinants of institutional 
quality. Per capita income is expected to have a positive impact on the property rights 
index. La Porta et al. (1999) further use latitude (Latit), scaled to take values between 0 
and 1, to control for geography. They argue that latitude impacts upon institutional quality, 
as more temperate regions have more productive agriculture and healthier climates, which 
allows them to develop better economically and possibly also institutionally.  
The results are summarized in Table 12. Column 1 replicates Column 3 in Table 4 in La 
Porta et al. (1999). It serves as a benchmark to which the other variables discussed above 
will be added, and in which the impact of FDI on property rights will be explicitly tested. 
Column 1 replicates La Porta et al. (1999)‟s finding that political variables, represented by 
ethno-linguistic  fractionalization  (Ethn)  and  French  legal  origin  (FCLaw),  have  the 
expected negative impact on property rights. Column 2 controls for the impact of economic 
and geographic factors, by including the log of GNP per capita (LGNPpc) and latitude 
(Latit). The results show that both of them have the expected positive impact on property 
rights, however, ethno-linguistic fractionalization (Ethn) loses its significance. In Column 
3, the average of FDI-GDP ratio during 1970-1995 (FDI) is added to test the impact of FDI 
on  the property rights  index.  Column 3 shows that FDI has  a positive and significant 
correlation with property rights. In all further model specifications, FDI will be retained as 
a regressor. In Column 4, the impact of cultural factors on property rights is controlled for 
by including the percentage of the population which is Catholic (Cath), Muslim (Islam) or 
of  other non-protestant  faiths  (Oth.Relig). The  results  show that  FDI  does  not  lose  its 
significance  even  after  controlling  for  the  cultural  determinants  of  property  rights. 77 
However, the results show that cultural factors do not have a significant impact on property 
rights once we control for other factors.  
Table 12: FDI and institutions, Cross-Sectional regressions (Dependent variable: Property 
rights index 1997) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)+ 
  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV 
Ethn  -0.826***  0.332  0.387  0.474  -0.103  -0.257 
  (-2.76)  (1.26)  (1.39)  (1.64)  (-0.24)  (-0.34) 
FCLaw  -0.704***  -0.559***  -0.483***  -0.560***  -0.728**  -0.604 
  (-3.51)  (-3.84)  (-3.14)  (-2.99)  (-2.37)  (-1.15) 
SocLaw  -1.386***  -1.114***  -1.133***  -1.273***  -  - 
  (-3.65)  (-4.26)  (-4.47)  (-4.30)     
GCLaw  1.084***  0.068  0.285  0.270  -  - 
  (4.91)  (0.28)  (1.07)  (1.08)     
ScnCLaw  0.879***  -0.531**  -0.394  -0.030  -  - 
  (3.08)  (-2.03)  (-1.42)  (-0.06)     
Latit    1.638***  1.964***  2.178***  -  - 
    (3.30)  (3.83)  (3.67)     
LGNPpc    0.417***  0.365***  0.342***  -  - 
    (5.79)  (5.09)  (3.82)     
FDI      0.110**  0.113***  0.182***  0.468** 
      (2.57)  (2.71)  (2.74)  (2.16) 
Cath        0.007  -0.011  -0.031 
        (1.27)  (-1.22)  (-1.59) 
Islam        0.003  -0.007  -0.018 
        (0.56)  (-0.85)  (-1.39) 
Oth.Relig        0.006  -0.012  -0.033 
        (1.06)  (-1.40)  (-1.40) 
Indp          0.502  1.379 
          (0.91)  (1.67) 
Mort          -0.191**  0.023 
          (-2.07)  (0.19) 
Cons  3.981***  0.191  0.262  -0.091  5.039***  4.988*** 
  (16.97)  (0.38)  (0.51)  (-0.12)  (6.65)  (4.59) 
N  124  124  121  121  69  36 
F (p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
R2  0.527  0.535  0.665  0.676  0.578  0.611 
Values in parentheses are White heteroskedastic adjusted t-values. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 F is F-statistics. 
+FDI is instrumented by the by real exchange rate, infrastructure, and continental dummies for Africa and Latin America.  
The validity of these instruments is supported by Sargan Test 
2  (3) = 5.36 (Prob>
2  = ( 0.147)). 
 
Column 5 shows the results based on data from Beck et al. (2003) and Levine (2005). Beck 
et al. (2003) and Levine (2005) basically use the same data set as that used by in La Porta 78 
et al. (1999), but they include only countries with either British or French legal origin, as 
most countries are based on these legal traditions.  
The other difference between La Porta et al. (1999), and Beck et al. (2003) and Levine 
(2005),  is  that  the  latter  two  studies  introduce  the  endowment  factor  as  an  additional 
determinant of institutional quality. Beck et al. (2003) and Levine (2005) follow Acemoglu 
et  al.  (2001),  and  use  the  settler  mortality  rate;  the  log  of  the  annualized  deaths  per 
thousand European soldiers in European colonies in the early 19
th century (Mort), to test 
endowment theory. The Column shows that French legal origin (FCLaw) has the expected 
negative impact on property rights, while Ethnic Fractionalization (Ethn) has the expected 
negative sign, but is insignificant. The results also show that FDI maintains a significant 
and  positive  impact  on  property  rights.  Column  5  shows  that  non-Protestant  religions 
(Oth.Relig) have a negative but insignificant impact on the property rights index. Settler 
mortality rate (Mort) has a negative and statistically significant correlation with property 
rights, which accords with the predictions of the endowment theory.  
Beck  et  al.  (2003)  and  Levine  (2005)  argue  that  the  longer  a  country  has  spent  in 
independence, the more time it has had to develop sound institutions, and hence the better 
its property rights might have become. They, therefore, use the percentage of years since 
1776 that a country has been independent (Indp) to control for the impact of independence 
on property rights. The results show that independence (Indp) does not have a significant 
impact on property rights, though it has the expected sign.  
So far there has been no consideration of the endogeneity problem. It should be noticed 
that  the  above  results  may  be  subject  to  endogeneity  bias.  There  is  a  large  body  of 
literature showing that FDI is determined by institutional quality. In fact the claim that FDI 
may  have  a  positive  impact  in  institutions,  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  foreign 
investors consider institutions as an essential factor for their business and therefore demand 79 
institutions of high quality. And as shown in the previous chapter, institutions and property 
rights in particular, have a significant correlation with FDI. Thus, Column 6 tries to control 
for  endogeneity  bias  by  using  the  instrumental  variable  approach  (IV).  The  choice  of 
appropriate instruments should be driven by the literature of FDI determinants. A good 
instrument  should  be  highly  correlated  with  FDI  but  not  with  the  disturbance  term  of 
property rights regression. Several empirical  studies show that real exchange rates and 
infrastructure  quality  are  among  the  significant  determents  of  FDI  inflows  (Froot  and 
Stein,  1991),  (Blonigen,  1997),  and  (Dunning  and  Lundan,  2008).  Therefore,  FDI  is 
instrumented by real exchange rates and infrastructure (measured by number of landlines 
per thousand of people), in addition to continental dummies for Africa and Latin America. 
The result of IV regression, reported in Column 6, shows that the estimated coefficient on 
FDI is still significantly positive, which can be interpreted as evidence that the impact of 
FDI on property rights is robust to endogeneity bias.  
The above results make it very clear that compared to other determinants, the correlation 
between FDI and property rights is highly significant in a cross-sectional setting. These 
results can be interpreted as offering base-line support to the hypothesis that FDI has a 
positive impact  on institutional  quality, and that  countries  that attract  more FDI enjoy 
greater protection of property rights. However, these results are not without limitations, as 
they do not consider changes in property rights over time. This issue is taken up in more 
detail below.  80 
 
3.4.2.  Results from panel data estimations 
The cross-sectional approach helps us to explain the differences in property rights across 
countries,  i.e.  identifying  which  characteristics  explain  why  one  country  has  a  higher 
degree of property rights protection than another. However, a panel framework is needed 
to assess how institutions are affected by FDI over time, and how different determinants 
interact dynamically. To investigate the time dimension of variations in property rights, a 
sample of 70 developing countries over the period 1981-2005 is used. Data availability 
restricts the sample size and the time period covered. Appendix III describes the sample 
and data sources used in the subsequent analysis. The property rights index is constructed 
by  combining  two  ICRG  sub-indices:  Law  and  Order  and  Investment  Profile,  both  of 
which are published by the Political Risk Services Group. The index is scaled to take 
values between 0 and 12, with higher values indicating better protection of property rights. 
The  Law  and  Order  Index  assesses  the  strength  and  impartiality  of  the  legal  system, 
popular observance of the law, and the effectiveness of sanctions. The Investment Profile 
Index assesses contract viability, expropriation risk, and profits repatriation. 
 A panel dataset is constructed with data averaged over each of the 5-year periods between 
1981 and 2005. Within the sample, some countries have made remarkable improvements in 
their property rights indices, while others experienced deterioration, as shown in Table 13 
and Figure 8. For example, Morocco‟s property rights index increased from 4.5 in the 
period 1981-85, to 9.94 in the period 2000-05. Bolivia, which started from a very low 
score; 2.12, in the 1980‟s, reached a high score of 7.4 in 2000-05. The same applies to 
Chile and Tunisia.  Zimbabwe, on the other hand, showed a decline in its score from 4.25 
in 1984-85, to 2.47 in 2000-05. Cote d'Ivoire and Venezuela also experienced a fall in the 
property rights index.  81 
 
 
Table 13: Changes in averages of institutional quality Index for selected countries 
country  1981-85  1986-90  1991-95  1996-2000  2001-05 
Morocco  4.542  4.542  7.567  9.875  9.938 
Bolivia  2.125  3.092  5.150  7.533  7.400 
Chile  5.417  7.000  8.108  9.475  10.483 
Tunisia  4.500  4.500  7.025  9.367  9.225 
Venezuela, RB  6.104  6.892  6.883  6.300  4.925 
Cote d'Ivoire  7.167  6.775  5.908  6.208  5.517 
Zimbabwe  4.250  4.708  5.750  6.050  2.475 
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Figure 8: Changes in averages of institutional quality Index for selected countries  
 
The  panel  analysis  is  started  with  a  Random  Effects  model.  This  model  specification 
allows  us  to  capture  the  impact  of  the  time-invariant  variables  that  represent  culture, 
political, and endowment theories. One limitation of this technique is that it does not allow 82 
for the endogeneity of some of regressors, particularly FDI. To reduce the problem of 
endogeneity, all endogenous variables are lagged by one period, that is, five years. System 
GMM will also be used where lagged differences and levels of the endogenous variables 
are used as instruments. 
The  results  are  reported  in  Table  14.  Column  1  includes  political  variables,  Ethno-
linguistic fractionalization index (Ethn) and French legal origin (FCLaw), in addition to 
lagged FDI inflows. Both of the political variables have the expected sign, although it is 
not statistically significant. FDI has the expected positive sign and is highly significant. In 
Column  2,  variables  representing  cultural  theory  are  added;  the  results  show  that 
Catholicism has a negative and significant correlation with the property rights index, while 
Islam has no significant correlation with property rights. The FDI term is still significant 
and positive, and the Ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (Ethn) becomes significantly 
related to property rights, while French legal origin dummy (FCLaw) becomes positively 
but insignificantly correlated with property rights.  
Column 3 controls for endowment and economic effects, by including settler mortality 
(Mort) and GDP per capita growth
9 (Growth). The results show that while settler mortality 
has  a  negative  but  insignificant  impact,  lagged  economic  growth  has  a  positive  and 
significant  impact  on  property  rights,  which  confirms  economic  theory.  FDI  remains 
significant even after controlling for the impact of economic growth, which shows that FDI 
influences property rights beyond its contribution to economic growth and development.  
Using settler mortality reduces the sample size from 70 to 57 countries, as data on settler 
mortality are available only for a limited number of countries. To deal with this problem, 
settler mortality rate is replaced with the ratio of primary exports to GDP (Reso). This 
variable  is  widely  used  in  the  literature  to  represent  natural  resources  abundance  (e.g. 
                                                 
9  GDP per capita is also used to control for economic effects but it provides poor results. However, the significance of 
FDI is not dependent on using GDP per capita growth rather than GDP per capita.  83 
(Sachs and Warner, 1995b). Using the primary export ratio is in accordance with the view 
of Engerman and Sokoloff about endowments. Column 4 shows the results; the coefficient 
on  primary  export  ratio  suggests  that  natural  resource  endowments  have  a  negative 
correlation with property rights, which gives some support for Engerman and Sokoloff‟s 
view. However, it is not significant. Controlling for natural resources endowment does not 
affect  the  significance  of  FDI;  interestingly  Catholic  dummy  becomes  statistically 
significant. 
Table 14: FDI and institutions: Panel Data Regressions, (Dependent variable: Institutions 
index(1981-2005)  5-year intervals)  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  RE(1)  RE(1)  RE(1)  RE(1)  RE(1)  FE(2)  Sys GMM(3)  Sys 
GMM(4) 
Ethn  -0.671  -0.947**  -0.327  -0.246  -0.074  -  0.019  - 
  (-1.50)  (-2.07)  (-0.59)  (-0.47)  (-0.14)    (0.07)   
FCLaw  -0.352  0.232  0.490  0.373  0.415  -  0.648**  0.688*** 
  (-1.23)  (0.63)  (1.15)  (0.91)  (1.02)    (2.47)  (3.05) 
GDPG  -  -  0.163***  0.133***  0.129***  0.119***  0.209***  0.236*** 
      (4.65)  (3.87)  (3.71)  (3.27)  (2.71)  (3.38) 
FDI  0.237***  0.241***  0.172***  0.200***  0.173***  0.162***  0.116**  0.124*** 
  (6.50)  (6.59)  (4.93)  (5.00)  (4.59)  (3.13)  (2.24)  (2.71) 
Cath  -  -0.016**  -0.011  -0.014**  -0.011  -  -0.004  -0.008** 
    (-2.47)  (-1.57)  (-2.20)  (-1.63)    (-1.08)  (-2.12) 
Islam  -  -0.007  -0.005  -0.010  -0.008  -  -0.004  -0.006* 
    (-1.25)  (-0.76)  (-1.58)  (-1.19)    (-1.06)  (-1.88) 
Mort  -  -  -0.174  -  -  -  -  - 
      (-1.31)           
Reso  -  -  -  -0.019  -0.025**  -0.009  -0.010  -0.005 
        (-1.62)  (-2.13)  (-0.28)  (-1.38)  (-0.76) 
Open  -  -  -  -  0.007**  0.014**  0.004  0.004* 
          (2.49)  (1.98)  (1.49)  (1.87) 
LInst  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.619***  0.492*** 
              (5.90)  (4.83) 
Ethn.Ten  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.231*** 
                (4.67) 
Cons  6.342***  6.860***  6.596***  6.432***  5.877***  4.991***  1.081  1.211* 
  (18.59)  (16.97)  (9.50)  (14.42)  (11.33)  (10.60)  (1.3)  (1.73) 
R2  0.385  0.392  0.423  0.411  0.532  0.210  -  - 
Wald test   51.44  58.62  86.72  69.37  77.67  -  644.64  902.91 
No. countries  70  70  57  68  68  68  68  68 
No. observations  278  278  224  240  240  240  240  240 
(1) Random effects model, z-values reported in parentheses. (2) Fixed effects model, t-values reported in parentheses (3) System GMM. Arellano-Bond 
test for AR (2) in first differences: z = -1.01, Pr > z = 0.312, Hansen test of over identification restrictions 2   (32)   = 34.29, Prob >  2   = 0.359. 
4) System GMM.  Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences: z = -1.24, Pr > z = 0.215. Hansen test of over identification restrictions:  2   (32)   = 33.67 
, Prob >  2  =  0.386.  Model 7 & 8 include time dummies.   *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 84 
Rodrik (2000) argues that openness to trade could help developing countries to build sound 
institutions. A growing body of empirical evidence shows that trade has a positive impact 
on some aspects of institutions, such as corruption (see, for example, Bonaglia et al., 2001, 
and Al-Marhubi, 2004). Thus Column 5 controls for openness by including lagged trade-
GDP ratio (Open)
10. The result shows that trade ratio has a positive and significant impact 
on property rights; the negative impact of natural resource abundance becomes significant, 
while Catholic dummy loses its significance. Interestingly, FDI maintains its positive  and 
significant correlation with property rights, while political and cultural variables lose their 
significance.  
In Column 6, the fixed effects technique is used to investigate the role played by FDI in 
determining property rights. This technique concen trates on variations within  countries, 
which gives insights into how variations in FDI contribute to explaining the variations of 
property rights index in each country around its own mean. In other words,  the fixed 
effects technique allows us to investigate what causes property rights to change over time 
within each country. However, this advantage comes at the cost of dropping time-invariant 
variables. Column 6 shows that FDI remains significant, as does GDP growth term. Trade 
ratio also enters positively and significantly. This result suggests that these three variables 
played a positive role in determining changes in property rights index during the period of 
the analysis
11. The endowment variable (Reso), on the other hand, loses its significance, 
although it maintains a negative sign. This may be due to the fact that the primary exports 
to GDP ratio varies little over time, which implies that the endowments view explains 
differences in property rights across countries, but not over time.  
So far, the endogeneity of FDI has been dealt with by using the lagged value of FDI 
inflows. A more appropriate way to address endogeneity is to use the instrumental variable 
                                                 
10 Trade – GDP ratio can be endogenous as it quite possible the degree of openness depends on the quality of institutions.  
11 Note that, as in the previous models, we lagged all of these variables one period, i.e. five years, in order to mitigate the 
possible endogeneity bias. 85 
approach.  Arellano  and  Bond  (1991)  show  that  in  a  dynamic  panel  setting,  lagged 
differences of endogenous variables can be used as effective instruments. Including the 
lagged value of the property rights index, further allows us to study to what extent past 
institutional  quality  determines  present  institutional  quality.  North  (1990)  argues  that 
history matters for institutional change, in the sense that institutional quality in the past has 
an impact on  current institutional quality. North states that the institutional framework 
provides society with opportunities (both political and economic opportunities), and agents 
try  to  benefit  from  these  opportunities  within  the  existing  institutional  framework; 
however, they also try to maximise profits by altering the existing institutional framework. 
North  (1990)  argues  that  the  nature  of  the  existing  institutional  quality  may  provide 
incentives  for agents  to alter it. To illustrate, in  an inefficient institutional  framework, 
organizations  will  form  with  the  specific  purpose  of  benefiting  from  the  opportunities 
offered by this inefficient framework, and these organizations will devote resources to 
maintain these inefficiencies. 
 North (1990) states that this mechanism explains the persistence of inefficient institutions 
in  developing  countries.  On  the  other  hand,  organizations  embedded  in  an  efficient 
institutional framework will devote resources to maintain efficiency, as this serves their 
interests.  North  (1990)  states  that  this  mechanism  explains  the  development  of  the 
American economy in the nineteenth century. Based on this argument, one would expect 
that lagged property rights have a positive impact on the current institutional quality, as 
efficient  institutions  provide  agents  with  incentives  to  further  increase  the  level  of 
efficiency, promoting even more efficient institutions in the future.   
Column 7 shows the results from system GMM estimation. In this Column, the lagged 
dependent  variable  (LInst)  is  included  as  an  additional  explanatory  variable.  In  this 
specification, the lagged dependent variable and the time-invariant country-specific error 
terms  are  correlated,  and  both  random  and  fixed  effects  models  produce  inconsistent 86 
estimations. Arellano and Bond (1991) solve this problem by using the generalized method 
of  moment  (GMM).  They  eliminate  the  country-specific  error  term  by  taking  the  first 
difference  of  the  model,  and  then  use  the  lagged  levels  of  the  dependent  variable  as 
instruments for the first differences of the dependent variable. The same procedure can be 
applied to any endogenous variable within the set of explanatory variables. This technique 
is often called difference-GMM (Baum 2006). Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998) acknowledge a potential weakness in difference-GMM, since the lagged 
levels  are  often  poor  instruments  for  first-differenced  variables  (Baum,  2006).  They 
propose, therefore, using lagged levels as well as lagged differences as instruments. This 
technique  is  generally  referred  to  as  system-GMM.  Both  difference  and  system-GMM 
require an absence of second-order serial correlation in the residuals of the differenced 
model. As standard errors of the difference and system-GMM estimators are shown to have 
a severe downward bias (Baum 2006), the Windmeijer (2005)‟s finite-sample correction is 
applied to correct this bias. The Hansen test of the over-identifying restrictions is used to 
test overall appropriateness of instruments. 
In Column 7, FDI inflows (FDI), economic growth (Growth), and trade ratio (Open) are 
treated  as  endogenous  variables.  As  shown  in  Column  7,  the  basic  assumption  of  no 
second-order serial correlation is satisfied. The Hansen test approves the validity of the 
instruments used. The results show that the lagged value of property rights has a positive 
and significant impact on the current level of the property rights index, which supports 
North‟s hypothesis. More importantly, FDI still has a positive and significant impact on the 
institutional quality index. Economic growth maintains its significance, while trade ratio 
loses  its  significance.  Interestingly,  all  cultural  and  political  variables  lose  their 
significance, apart from French legal origin which becomes significant but with the wrong 
sign. This can be interpreted as evidence that political and culture theory is sensitive to 
model specifications or sample changes. This may call for other proxies for the political 
factors.  One  attempt  could  be  made  by  replacing  the  ethno-linguistic  fractionalization 87 
index (Ethn), which primarily measures ethnic division, with an index that captures the 
degree of tension resulting from racial, ethnic, or language divisions
12. It seems reasonable 
to assume that the degree of social tension that results from ethnic and religious division is 
more important for inst itutional quality than ethnic division  per se. One can cite many 
cases  in  developed  countries  where  ethnic  linguistic  groups  live  in  relative  harmony 
without negative implications on institutional quality. For example, Canada and Belgium 
have Ethno-linguistic indices of 0.376 and 0.364, which are above the sample average, but 
they score among the highest on the property rights index, at 10.73 and 11.95 respectively. 
An additional advantage of using the ethnic tension index (Ethn.Ten) rather than the ethnic 
division index (Ethn) is that the former is time-variant, and hence allows us to study the 
impact of political variables on institutional quality over time. 
The results are shown in Column 8. As can be seen here, this change has led to substantial 
improvements  in  the  results.  Political  factors,  represented  by  the  ethnic  tension  index 
(Ethn.Ten), now have the expected sign: improvements in the ethnic tension index have a 
positive  and  significant  impact  on  institutional  quality  index  (Inst)
13. However, French 
legal origin is still significant but with the wrong s ing. More interestingly, cultural factors 
become  significant with the right   signs. More related to  this  chapter‟s  object,  FDI 
maintains  its  significance  which  can  be  viewed  as  additional  support  for  the  main 
hypothesis of this chapter.  
To summarize the results so far, FDI appears to be a robust predictor of property rights. 
The impact of FDI on institutional quality is not sensitive to model specifications, control 
variables, or estimation techniques. This supports the hypothesis that FDI inflows have a 
positive impact on the quality of institutions in host countries.  
                                                 
12 The Ethnic Tension index is published by PRS Group.     
13 Note that the index is scaled to take values between 0 and 12, with higher values mean less tension. 88 
3.5.  Conclusion  
This chapter introduces a hypothesis regarding the impact of FDI inflows on institutional 
quality in host countries, and provides an empirical assessment for it. The results show that 
FDI inflows have a positive and highly significant impact on property rights. These results 
seem very robust and are not affected by model specification, controlling variables, or 
estimation techniques. The main conclusion of this chapter is that FDI inflows can explain 
differences in property rights across countries and over time. In particular, FDI inflows 
have a positive influence on property rights in the host country.  
This conclusion has several important implications for academic and practical purposes. 
First, it shows a new mechanism by which FDI inflows may positively affect economic 
performance  in  the  host  country.  And  given  the  importance  of  institutional  quality  in 
determining economic growth, this mechanism may be comparable to other positive effects 
of  FDI.  The  results  suggest  that  foreign  investors  do  not  only  import  high  quality 
manufacturing and production technology to the host county, but that they also import high 
quality social technology and institutions. The findings of this chapter are also a significant 
step  towards  understanding  the  determinants  of  institutional  quality  and  institutional 
change.  They  establish  the  integration  into  the  world  economy,  and  openness  to  FDI 
inflows in particular, as a new factor in determining property rights. 
 Some policy implications emerge from this conclusion. First, there appears to be a positive 
interaction between integration into the world economy as a developmental strategy, and 
institutional reform, where efforts spent in attracting FDI may well reinforce institutional 
reform efforts. Furthermore, a policy more open to FDI may lead to improved institutional 
quality. Further analysis is needed to underpin these policy recommendations however.   89 
Finally and with particular relevance to the aim of this thesis, the results provided in this 
chapter suggest that FDI may affect economic growth rate indirectly through improving 
institutional  quality  in  host  countries.  However,  this  claim  requires  further  analysis  to 
empirically test whether such a channel of impact really exists, and if so, how significant it 
is. Chapter five will address this area of analysis. 90 
Appendix III 
 
List of countries included in the empirical analysis. 
Asia  Latin America and Caribbean  Middle East and North Africa  Sub-Saharan Africa 
Bangladesh  Argentina  Egypt  Angola 
Hong Kong, China  Bolivia  Jordan  Botswana 
India  Brazil  Lebanon  Burkina Faso 
Indonesia  Chile  Morocco  Cameroon 
Korea, Rep.  Colombia  Syrian   Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Malaysia  Costa Rica  Tunisia  Congo, Rep. 
Pakistan  Dominican Republic  Turkey  Cote d'Ivoire 
Papua New Guinea  Ecuador    Ethiopia 
Philippines  El Salvador    Gabon 
Singapore  Guatemala    Gambia, The 
Sri Lanka  Guyana    Ghana 
Thailand  Haiti    Guinea 
  Honduras    Kenya 
  Jamaica    Madagascar 
  Mexico    Malawi 
  Nicaragua    Mali 
  Panama    Mozambique 
  Paraguay    Namibia 
  Peru    Niger 
  Suriname    Nigeria 
  Trinidad and Tobago    Senegal 
  Uruguay    Sierra Leone 
  Venezuela    South Africa 
      Sudan 
      Tanzania 
      Uganda 
      Zambia 
      Zimbabwe 
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List of the variables used in the empirical analysis 
Variable  Definition  Source 
FDI   Net FDI inflows as Percentage of GDP  World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
 Growth  GDP per capita Growth (annual %)  World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Inst 
 
Average of indices of Law and Order &  
Investment Profile, scale 0-12. 
Calculated from ICRG 
Data, PRS Group. 
Ethn.Ten  Tensions among ethnic groups, Scale 0-
12. 
Calculated from ICRG 
Data, PRS Group. 
Reso  Ratio of primary exports to GDP  World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Open  Export + Imports as Percentage of GDP  World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
 
 
Ethn.Ten index is an assessment of the degree of tension within a country attributable to 
racial, nationality, or language divisions. Lower ratings are given to countries where racial 
and nationality tensions are high because opposing groups are intolerant and unwilling to 
compromise. Higher ratings are given to countries where tensions are minimal, even 
though such differences may still exist.92 
     
4.  Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment 
Contribution to Economic Growth 
4.1.  Introduction  
The  question  of  whether  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  helps  to  improve  economic 
growth  has  been  one  of  the  fundamental  questions  in  development  and  international 
economics, and has received a lot of attention in the economic literature in recent years. 
However, it seems that this question has not been settled yet. Given recent developments in 
growth  theory,  which  emphasize  the  importance  of  improvements  in  technology, 
efficiency, and productivity in determining growth, FDI can have a positive impact on 
growth  (Lim,  2001).  FDI,  which  is  viewed  as  a  mixture  of  capital,  know-how  and 
technology  (De  Mello,  1997),  can  increase  the  level  of  existing  technology  in  host 
countries in many ways. However, given the available empirical evidence, it is difficult to 
conclude that there is a universal relationship between FDI and economic growth (Lipsey, 
2003). Empirical evidence has shown that FDI can have positive, negative, or insignificant 
impacts on economic growth (Li and Liu, 2005).  
More recently, some empirical studies have highlighted the fact that not all host countries 
are capable of fully reaping positive externalities offered by FDI, and that the positive 
impact of FDI on economic growth depends crucially on the absorptive capacity of host 
economies (World Bank, 2001). The term „absorptive capacity‟ includes factors such as 
level of human capital, degree of financial development, level of economic development, 
etc. Several empirical papers show that host economies need to reach a certain level of 
absorptive capacity, called threshold of development, to be able to benefit from FDI. It 93 
seems  that  these  empirical  papers  have  provided  one  explanation  for  the  disparities 
between earlier empirical studies (OECD, 2002). Nevertheless, more recently, Carkovic 
and Levine (2005) argue that taking the role of absorptive capacity into account does not 
help to reduce the inconclusiveness of the evidence regarding the growth effects of FDI.   
Another explanation, however, is that not all types of FDI are capable of providing host 
countries with positive externalities. This issue was acknowledged as early as 1950 by 
Singer, who argues that FDI inflows to developing countries do not have a positive impact 
on  economic  growth  because  they  are  concentrated  on  the  primary  sector.  It  is  rather 
astonishing that this issue has received far less attention from the relevant literature. One 
exception is Alfaro (2003) who studied the impact of FDI on economic growth in the 
primary,  manufacturing,  and  services  sectors.  She  finds  that  while  total  FDI  exerts  an 
ambiguous effect on growth, the impact of FDI varies greatly across sectors. Services FDI 
has an ambiguous effect on growth, manufacturing FDI has a positive impact, and primary 
FDI has a negative one. Given these results, she concludes that differentiated incentives 
must be given to different types of FDI; in particular, primary FDI should be discouraged. 
Her findings are further confirmed by Aykut and Sayek (2007). The negative impact of 
primary FDI is also found by Khaliq and Noy (2007).  
Although the importance of institutional quality as one aspect of host countries‟ absorptive 
capacity, is generally recognized in the literature (World Bank, 2001), neither Carkovic 
and Levine (2005) nor Alfaro (2003) consider the role of institutions when examining the 
impact of FDI on economic growth. The aim of this chapter is to re-examine the impact of 
FDI inflows on economic growth, taking into account the role of institutional quality in 
host countries. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides an 
overview of the relevant economic literature. Section 4.3 describes the data set and the 
methodology used. Section 4.4 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 4.5 
concludes the chapter.   94 
4.2.   FDI  and  growth:  Cross-Country  evidence 
overview 
The literature related to the impact of FDI on economic growth is so vast that it is difficult 
to provide a comprehensive review of it, even if one limits the review to cross-country 
evidence. Instead, this section focuses on two aspects of this literature; the role played by 
absorptive capacity of host countries, and different types of FDI in determining the impact 
of FDI on economic growth.  
4.2.1.  The  role  of  the  absorptive  capacity:  Host 
countries’ characteristics  
The concept of host countries‟ absorptive capacity has helped to explain the ambiguity of 
the  contribution  of  FDI  to  economic  growth  documented  by  earlier  literature.  Several 
studies have found that FDI alone has an ambiguous  role in  contributing to economic 
growth. However, when it is interacted with some characteristics of host countries, FDI 
turns to have a robust positive impact on growth. 
Among the pioneering studies that consider the role of host countries‟ characteristics in 
determining the contribution of FDI to economic growth, is that of  Blomstrom, Lipsey, 
and Zejan (1996), who find that FDI has a positive impact on growth in higher-income 
countries, and does not have a robust impact in lower-income countries, concluding that a 
host country must reach a certain threshold of economic development before it can benefit 
from FDI. Inspired by the hypothesis of Bhagwati (1978), Balasubramanyam, Salisu, and 
Sapsford (1996) and (1999) investigate the role of trade regime in determining the impact 
of FDI on growth. They find tentative evidence that FDI contributes positively to growth in 
countries that adapt outward-oriented trade regimes, while its impact vanishes in countries 
that adapt inward-oriented trade regimes. Borenzstein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) find 95 
that FDI can have a positive contribution to growth only if a host country has sufficiently 
high levels of human capital. This result is further confirmed by The World Bank (2001).  
Financial development is also considered as one aspect of the host country‟s absorptive 
capacity. Financial constraints may hinder the ability of domestic firms to benefit from the 
positive externalities offered by FDI. A number of papers have shown that FDI can exert a 
positive influence on economic growth if a minimum level of financial development has 
been reached by a host economy. Hermes and Lensink (2003) find that the development of 
the financial system of the host country is a precondition for FDI to positively influence 
economic growth. This result is further confirmed by Alfaro et al  (2004) and Durham 
(2004).  
Absorptive capacity also includes the institutional quality of the host country. Given the 
growing literature emphasising the role of institutional quality in determining investment 
efficiency  and  economic  growth,  Olofsdotter  (1998)  states  that  the  adoption  of  new 
technology imported by FDI can be facilitated if high quality institutions are provided. His 
empirical results suggest that the positive impact of FDI on growth is stronger in countries 
with better institutional quality, and particularly, bureaucratic efficiency. Along the same 
line of argument, Durham (2004) finds that institutional quality is a precondition for FDI 
having a positive impact on economic growth. More specifically, Durham (2004) finds that 
FDI has  a positive impact  in  countries that have reached a minimum  threshold of the 
property rights protection index.   
4.2.2.  The role of sectoral characteristics 
The role played by differences in FDI sectors, in determining the impact on economic 
growth, has received very little attention in the empirical literature. Dutt (1997) is among 
the first papers to empirically investigate the relationship between the sectoral FDI inflows 
and economic growth. Dutt (1997) is inspired by the hypothesis of Singer (1950) about the 96 
impact of FDI on economic growth in developing countries. Singer (1950) stresses that 
FDI inflows to developing countries may not have positive impacts on their growth and 
development potential. This is because FDI in developing countries goes mainly to primary 
sectors and not to manufacturing sectors. Singer (1950) argues that because of the low 
income elasticity of demand for primary products, technological advances in the sector will 
benefit consumers, in the form of lower prices, rather than producers, in the form of higher 
incomes. Based on this argument, Dutt (1997) states that manufacturing FDI in developing 
countries is likely to have more positive implications for them, because it involves greater 
technological development and, more importantly, does not result in deterioration in the 
host economies‟ terms of trade. On the other hand, Dutt (1997) argues, primary FDI in 
developing countries is attracted to industries which produce less technologically advanced 
products competing with similar products from other developing countries, which results in 
deterioration in the host countries‟ terms of trade. Using cross-country growth equations 
and data on 47 countries for the period 1985-1994, Dutt (1997) fails to find empirical 
support for his previous argument. FDI on both primary and manufacturing sectors appears 
insignificant in his analysis. 
More recently, Alfaro (2003) has investigated the impacts of primary, manufacturing, and 
services FDI on economic growth. She argues that the ability of FDI to convey positive 
externalities and advantages to host countries might differ across primary, manufacturing, 
and  services  sectors.  In  particular,  the  often-mentioned  benefits  of  FDI,  such  as 
transferring  production  technology,  innovative  capacity,  organizational  and  managerial 
skills, and the provision of access to international markets, seem to be exclusively related 
to manufacturing  FDI rather than to primary FDI (Alfaro, 2003). This is because the scope 
for backward and forward linkages between foreign and domestic firms is far more limited 
in  the  primary  sector  as  compared  with  the  manufacturing  sector  (UNCTAD,  2001). 
Referring to Hirschman (1958), Alfaro (2003) emphasizes that linkages between foreign 
and domestic firms are weak in agriculture and mining sectors, which may limit the impact 97 
of primary FDI on economic growth in the host country, leading to „enclave‟ types of 
development. However, Hirschman (1958) also notices that primary production activities 
may exert some developmental effects as they increase exports. Exports, in turn, can be 
used to finance imports which are very powerful agents of development and growth.  
More recently, UNCTAD (2007) has identified several channels through which primary 
FDI may positively affect economic performance in host countries. In general, primary 
FDI  can  help  host  countries  to  exploit  their  natural  endowment,  which  provides 
opportunities  for  economic  development  and  growth  if  they  are  used  successfully. 
According to UNCTAD (2007), multinational national enterprises, MNEs, can help host 
countries to exploit their natural endowments in many ways. First, MNEs provide host 
countries with the financial resources required for investment in the extractive industries. 
As some extractive industries are highly capital-intensive and require large funds, some 
developing  countries  face  financial  barriers  to  exploiting  their  natural  resources 
endowments. Thus, primary FDI inflows help these countries to overcome these financial 
barriers. Second, extractive activities usually involve sophisticated technology that not all 
countries  have  the  necessary  skills  to  utilize.  MNEs‟  participation  in  these  extractive 
industries,  transfers  the  necessary  technology  and  skills  to  the  host  countries,  which 
enables  them  to  overcome  technology  barriers.  Moreover,  by  assisting  them  overcome 
these  barriers,  primary  FDI  enhances  development  and  growth  potential  in  the  host 
countries, by increasing the exports and foreign exchange earnings  required to finance 
imports of goods and services, as well as creating government revenue.  
However, the development implications of these increases in foreign exchange earnings 
and government revenue will ultimately depend on how these resources are put to use.  A 
successful  exploitation  of  this  potential  for  development  and  growth  requires  a  good 
institutional  framework  that  can  translate  these  resources  into  economic  growth.  One 
example is Botswana, which has had one of the fastest growth rates in Africa and among 98 
all  developing  countries.  According  to  Aykut  and  Sayek  (2007),  two  factors  helped 
Botswana to achieve these high growth rates: (1) large FDI inflows to its diamond and 
mining industries, which boosted foreign exchange earnings and government revenues; (2) 
sound policy and high quality institutional framework that wisely exploited these revenues 
to support long-term economic growth. Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman (1999) state that 
what makes Botswana different from other African countries is the fact that Botswana has 
managed  to  attract  large  FDI  inflows  and  adopted  a  sound  institutional  environment. 
Another example is Chile where primary FDI to its natural resources and mining sector 
boosted foreign exchange earnings and government revenues, whereas, sound policy and 
high quality institutions channel these resources to foster economic growth (De Gregorio, 
2003).  Thus, one could argue that primary FDI may have a positive impact on economic 
growth if a host country has high quality institutions.  
4.3.  Model and data description   
This  section  specifies  the  model  used  to  empirically  investigate  of  the  role  played  by 
institutional quality of a host country in determining the contribution of FDI inflows to 
economic growth.  It also provides a simple description to the data set used in the empirical 
investigation.  
4.3.1.  Model description  
Most of the empirical work on FDI and economic growth basically follows the influential 
work  of  Barro  (1991)  and  Mankiw  et  al  (1992),  which  derives  an  empirical  model 
specification  that  includes  the  initial  income  level  to  control  for  the  conditional 
convergence hypothesis. In addition to the initial income per capita, most of the empirical 
work on FDI and economic growth includes some controlling variables that are shown by 
growth literature to have some degree of robustness in their correlation with growth. One 99 
problem with this approach is that there is no decisive list of the candidate variables, and as 
a solution, most of the empirical papers test the sensitivity of their results by including 
additional  controlling  variables.  Therefore,  the  benchmark  model  specification  in  this 
chapter follows the voluminous growth regression literature and takes the following form: 
80 1 2 3 4 5 6       (1) i Growth LGDPpc Sch Inv Inst FDI                
Where: 
Growth is the average of GDP per capita growth. LGDPpc80 is the log of real GDP per 
capita at the beginning of the period, 1980. Sch is the log of the average years of secondary 
schooling  in  the  total  population  which  measures  human  capital.  Inv  is  gross  capital 
formation share in GDP. Inst is an index measuring institutional quality. FDI is FDI –GDP 
ratio  
Although, the specification of the benchmark is not totally non-arbitrary, it can be justified. 
The log of average years of secondary schooling (Sch) proxies the role of the stock of 
human  capital  on  determining  economic  growth,  which  is  one  of  the  most  important 
determinants of growth, and frequently appears significant in growth models. Investment 
share in GDP (Inv) is another important determinant of growth, and has been found to be 
among the few variables that have a robust correlation with growth (Levine and Renelt, 
1992). Moreover, the inclusion of investment share helps us to test whether FDI affects 
economic  growth  beyond  its  contribution  to  capital  formation  i.e.  through  positive 
externalities. The institutional quality index (Inst), on the other hand, apart from being 
increasingly  considered  in  the  growth  literature  as  one  of  the  main  determinants  of 
economic growth, is a variable of special interest in this chapter, since the aim of this 
chapter is to study the role played by institutional quality in determining the contribution of 
FDI to economic growth.  100 
This hypothesis can be tested by adding the interaction term of institutions and FDI i.e. by 
multiplying FDI by Inst and adding the resulting term to Model 1 as follows: 
80 1 2 3 4 5 6 7( )    (2) Growth LGDPpc Sch Inv Inst FDI FDI Inst                    
This specification allows us to assess the role of institutions in determining the impact of 
FDI on economic growth. Three possible results can be highlighted: (1) If  6  and  7  are 
both positive (negative), then FDI has an unambiguously positive (negative) impact on 
economic  growth, and institutions  enhance this  impact.  (2)  If  6   is  positive and  7  is 
negative,  then  FDI  has  a  positive  impact  on  economic  growth  and  this  impact  is 
diminishing with the improvements in institutional quality. (3) If  6  is negative and  7  is 
positive,  then  there  is  a  threshold  of  institutional  quality  beyond  which  FDI  can  have 
positive impact on economic growth. This threshold can be computed by finding the partial 
effect of FDI on Growth as follows: 
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And then calculating the institutions threshold, which is the precise break-even point of 
equation (3) i.e. the threshold is computed as follows: 
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Thus, the institutions threshold =
6
7



.  
To ensure that the interaction term does not capture the effects of FDI or institutions, both 
of the variables are kept in Model 2. The sensitivity of the model is tested by controlling 
for other determinants of economic growth. 101 
4.3.2.  Data description  
To study the impact of FDI by sectors on economic growth, I follow Alfaro (2003) and 
combine  two  sources  of  data:  (1)  UNCTAD‟s  World  Investment  Directory  (WDI).  (2) 
OECD‟s  The  International  Direct  Investment  Statistics  Year  Book.  These  two  sources 
provide comparable data on FDI broken down by sector. In total, the sample covers 62 
countries: 40 developing countries and 22 developed countries
.. The data generally covers 
the  period  1980  to  2005,  though  this  may  vary  from  country  to  country.  Institutional 
quality is proxied by using subcomponent indices of the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) published by Political Risk Services Group (PRS). They are: (1) Investment Profile 
which measures expropriation risk and (2) Law and Order which measures strength and 
impartiality of the legal system and rule of law. The institutional quality index is the sum 
of the two indices, and is scaled to take values between 0 and 12, with higher values 
indicating  better  institutions.  Appendix  IV  provides  a  list  of  countries  covered  by  the 
study. It also provides the definition and the sources of other variables included in the 
analysis.  All  variables  are  averaged  over  the  period  1980-2005,  as  cross-sectional 
regression analysis will be used to test the hypothesis of this chapter.   
Table 15 provides a summary of descriptive statistics for the key variables used in the 
analysis, and Table 16 shows the correlation matrix of the key variables. The correlations 
between FDI and the variables included in the benchmark model are further illustrated in 
Figure 9. 102 
 
Table 15: Descriptive statistics for the key variables  
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Growth  62  1.68  1.67  -1.93  8.49 
LGDPpc80  62  8.09  1.36  5.23  10.02 
Sch  62  0.51  0.62  -1.44  1.59 
Inv  62  22.89  4.58  14.53  38.12 
Inst  62  7.54  1.90  4.42  10.63 
FDI  62  2.09  2.40  -6.65  11.38 
Primary FDI  62  0.81  2.47  -0.12  15.65 
Manufacturing FDI  62  0.87  1.22  -0.18  6.91 
Services FDI  62  1.21  1.30  0.00  7.17 
 
Table 16: Correlation matrix of the key variables 
  Growth  LGDPpc80  Sch  Inv  Inst  FDI 
Growth  1.00           
LGDPpc80  -0.09  1.00         
Sch  0.23  0.79*  1.00       
Inv  0.55*  -0.24  -0.04  1.00     
Inst  0.27*  0.80*  0.74*  0.02  1.00   
FDI  0.25  0.10  0.04  0.17  0.14  1.00 
* indicates significance at the 0.05 level or better. 
 
The correlation matrix shown in Table 16 gives an initial but crude approximation of the 
relationship  between economic growth  rate and  FDI. The Table shows that FDI has  a 
positive but  insignificant  correlation  with  economic growth. The insignificance  of FDI 
gives a first insight into the nature of the relationship between economic growth and FDI, 
i.e. the contribution of FDI to economic growth is ambiguous and may depend on the host 
countries‟ characteristics. 103 
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Figure 9: Correlation matrix of the key variables 
 
4.4.  Empirical results  
The  analysis  is  started  by  applying  the  ordinary  last  square  method  (OLS)  to  the 
benchmark  model.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  17.  Column  1  shows  that  all  the 
explanatory variables have the expected sign and are significant, except FDI, which has the 
right  sign  but  is  not  significant.  This  result  represents  the  problem  of  the  empirical 
literature studying the impact of FDI on economic growth; while theory states that FDI has 
a positive impact on growth, empirical results show that total FDI alone has an ambiguous 
impact  on  economic  growth.  In  column  2,  the  interaction  term  between  FDI  and 
institutions is added to the model. The results show that FDI has a negative and significant 
sign, while the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and significant. This indicates 
that the impact of FDI on economic growth depends on the institutional quality of the host 
countries. In particular, this result indicates that there is a threshold of institutional quality 
beyond which FDI has a positive impact on growth.  104 
Table 17: Growth and FDI: OLS cross-sectional results (Dependent variable: Average of 
GDP per capita growth 1980-2005)   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
LGDPpc80  -1.108***  -1.076***  -1.059***  -1.207*** 
  (-4.14)  (-4.09)  (-4.25)  (-4.72) 
Sch  1.401***  1.426***  1.229***  1.422*** 
  (3.84)  (3.92)  (3.54)  (3.59) 
Inv  0.113**  0.113**  0.092**  0.064 
  (2.58)  (2.66)  (2.34)  (1.62) 
Inst  0.505***  0.291  0.147  0.605** 
  (3.22)  (1.63)  (0.79)  (2.49) 
FDI  0.133  -0.904***  -0.859***  -0.576** 
  (1.37)  (-3.06)  (-2.82)  (-2.18) 
(FDI×Inst)    0.112***  0.108***  0.062** 
    (3.28)  (3.10)  (2.04) 
Infl      -0.001  -0.001 
      (-1.19)  (-0.89) 
Credit      0.700**  0.736 
      (2.01)  (1.63) 
Cons  3.267*  4.933***  3.799**  2.518 
  (1.68)  (2.94)  (2.27)  (1.11) 
N  62  62  62  40 
F (p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 R2  0.531  0.597  0.618  0.671 
Values in parentheses are White heteroskedastic adjusted t-values. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. F is F-statistics. 
 
         
To gain some robustness, we expand the list of the explanatory variables to include some 
other variables that appear to have some significant correlation with economic growth in 
the relevant literature. These variables are: (1) Inflation measured by percentage change in 
the consumer price index to proxy macroeconomic stability; (2) Ratio of domestic credit to 
private sector to GDP to proxy the role of financial development in determining economic 
growth, which has been emphasized in the literature since the pioneering work of King and 
Levine (1993).  
The results are reported in column 3. The column shows that the ratio of domestic credit to 
private  sector  to  GDP  is  significant,  which  confirms  the  importance  of  financial 
development in determining growth. However, inflation appears to be insignificant. More 
relevant to the aim of this chapter is that the coefficient on FDI remains negative and 
significant, and the coefficient on the interaction term remains positive and significant, 
which confirms the previous findings that there is a threshold of institutional quality that 105 
has to be achieved in order for a host country to enjoy the positive externalities of FDI. The 
values of the estimated coefficients in column 3 indicate that the institutions threshold is 
7.95,  and  that  all  countries  with  an  institutional  quality  index  above  7.95  will  benefit 
positively from FDI inflows.
14 The data shows that within  the sample used, 29 out of 62 
countries satisfy this condition during the period 1990-2005. Table 18 shows a list of these 
countries.  
Table 18: Countries that achieved the institutional threshold  
Africa:  
Tunisia. 
Asia:  
South Korea, Singapore, Thailand. 
Latin America:  
Chile, Costa Rica. 
Europe and others:  
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States. 
 
 These  results  confirm  the  findings  of  Durham  (2004).  However,  one  limitation  of 
Durham‟s results is that his model does not include institutions alongside the interaction 
between institutions and FDI. This may cause the interaction term to capture the impact of 
institutions rather than the impact of the interaction between institutions and FDI. Thus, the 
appropriate way to test whether the impact of FDI on growth depends on institutions is to 
include both FDI and institutions alongside the interaction term (Hermes and Lensink, 
2003).  
In column 4, the sensitivity of the results is tested by dropping the developed countries 
from the sample. The results show that dropping the developed countries from the sample 
                                                 
14 The threshold is computed by dividing the coefficient on FDI by the coefficient on the interaction term as in model 4 
p. 100 i.e. – (-0.859/0.108)=7.95.  106 
does not affect the main findings of this chapter as the coefficient on FDI is still negative 
and significant and the coefficient on the interaction term still positive and significant.  
In Table 19, the role of each FDI sector is investigated by dropping FDI and the interaction 
term and adding FDI in primary, manufacturing, and services sectors. In column 1 in Table 
19, primary FDI is added to the model. The results show that primary FDI has a negative 
sign; however, it is not significant. Column 2 shows that manufacturing FDI has a positive 
and significant impact on economic growth, while column 3 shows that services FDI has 
an insignificant impact. 
Table 19: Growth and FDI by sector: OLS cross-sectional results (Dependent variable: 
Average of GDP per capita growth 1980-2005)   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
LGDPpc80  -0.987***  -0.923***  -1.026***  -0.985***  -1.189*** 
  (-4.07)  (-4.05)  (-4.19)  (-4.13)  (-4.78) 
Sch  0.898**  1.098***  1.061***  0.929**  1.206** 
  (2.28)  (3.44)  (2.95)  (2.46)  (2.63) 
Inv  0.114***  0.094**  0.109***  0.120***  0.083* 
  (2.97)  (2.39)  (2.82)  (3.09)  (1.99) 
Inst  0.386**  0.294*  0.391**  0.347*  0.620*** 
  (2.21)  (1.76)  (2.17)  (1.97)  (2.83) 
Infl  -0.001*  -0.001*  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (-1.72)  (-1.82)  (-1.43)  (-1.48)  (-1.16) 
Credit  0.588*  0.720**  0.614*  0.622*  0.713 
  (1.78)  (2.04)  (1.77)  (1.89)  (1.65) 
FDI.PRIM  -0.086      -1.013***  -0.685* 
  (-1.54)      (-3.62)  (-2.01) 
FDI.MANUF    0.224**       
    (2.10)       
FDI.SERV      -0.041     
      (-0.31)     
(FDI.PRIM×Inst)        0.154***  0.103* 
        (3.23)  (1.82) 
Cons  1.594  1.324  1.751  1.523  1.723 
  (0.91)  (0.71)  (0.97)  (0.87)  (0.89) 
N  62  62  62  62  40 
F (p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 R2  0.527  0.535  0.512  0.538  0.665 
Values in parentheses are White heteroskedastic adjusted t-values. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 F is F-statistics. 
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These  results  confirm  the  findings  of  Alfaro  (2003).  However,  primary  FDI  appears 
insignificant, though with a negative sign
15. To test the hypothesis of this chapter about the 
role of institutions in determining the contribution of primary FDI to economic growth, the 
interaction term between primary FDI and institutions is added to the Model. The results 
are reported in column  4. In this column, the co efficient  on primary FDI becomes 
significantly negative, while the coefficient of the interaction term is significantly positive, 
which indicates that institutions play a role in determining the contribution of primary FDI 
to economic growth. In particular, primary FDI can contribute positively to economic 
growth if a host country acquires a sufficiently high institutional quality that can utilize the 
positive externalities offered by primary FDI. The values of the estimated coefficients on 
column  4  suggest that all  countries  with institutional quality above  6.58  will benefit 
positively from primary FDI. In the sample used in this chapter,  40 countries out of 62 
attain  this level of institutional quality. Table  20  presents  countries  that  achieved  the 
institutional quality threshold required to benefit from primary FDI. 
Table 20: Countries that achieved the institutional threshold 
Africa:  
Tunisia, Zambia. 
Asia:  
China, India, Jordan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand. 
Latin America:  
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Paraguay, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uruguay. 
Europe and others:  
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 
 
  
                                                 
15 The reason for this difference between these results and Alfaro‟s could be due to the difference in model 
specifications, since the model in this chapter controls for more variables. When the same variables used by Alfaro 
are included in the model, primary FDI becomes significantly negative.    108 
To get an estimate of how important institutions have been in enhancing the contribution of 
primary FDI to economic growth, one can ask the hypothetical question of how countries 
with different levels of institutional quality would benefit from a given increase in primary 
FDI inflows. To give an illustration, one can show how a change of institutional quality of 
a host country from the second quartile to the third quartile, would affect the contribution 
of an increase in primary FDI by one standard deviation
16. An increase of one standard 
deviation of primary FDI would increase economic growth by 0. 183% points, if the host 
country‟s institutional quality is equal to the second quartile, while the same increase of 
primary FDI would increase economic growth by 1.146% points if the host country has 
institutional quality equal to the third quartile
17. This means that improving the institutional 
quality of a host country from the second to the third quartile would increase the 
contribution of primary FDI to e conomic growth by 0.962% points, which is quite large, 
given that the same result requires increasing the ratio of domestic investment to GDP by 
approximately two standard deviations i.e. by 8.019 % points
18. 
In column 5,  the sensitivity of the results is t ested by dropping the developed countries 
from the sample. The results show that dropping the developed countries from the sample 
does not affect the main findings of this chapter  as the coefficient on primary FDI is still 
negative and significant and the  coefficient on the interaction term  is still positive and 
significant. 
                                                 
16  According to the sample used, the second quartile of institutions equals 7.06; the third quartile equals 9.59; one 
standard deviation of primary FDI equals 2.47.  
17 In both cases, the contribution of increasing primary FDI to growth is computed as follows: 
78 . ( . ) FDI PRIM FDI PRIM Inst      . i.e. in the first case, the contribution of an increase in primary FDI by 
2.47 equals   ( 1.013 2.47) (0.154 2.47 7.06) 0.183       and in the second case equals 
( 1.013 2.47) (0.154 2.47 9.59) 1.146        
18 In column 4 Table 19, the coefficient on investment share (Inv) is 0.120 and thus increasing growth rate by 0.962 point 
requires increasing Inv by 0.962/.120= 8.019. Table 15 shows that the standard deviation of Inv is 4.58. Thus two 
standard deviations equal 9.16. 109 
 
So far there has been no consideration of the endogeneity bias. It should be noticed that the 
above results may be subject to endogeneity bias. In fact, there is a large body of literature 
showing that FDI is determined by economic growth in host countries, since economic 
growth is an indicator of the potential market size. Moreover, institutional quality is also 
determined  by  economic  development  and  growth.  Thus,  in  Table  21,  the  possible 
endogeneity  bias  is  controlled  for  by  using  the  instrumental  variable  approach  (IV). 
Choosing appropriate instruments should be driven by the literature of FDI and institutions 
determinants. A good instrument should be highly correlated with FDI and institutions, but 
not with the disturbance term of growth regression. Several empirical studies show that 
real exchange rate is among the significant determents of FDI inflows (Froot and Stein, 
1991; Blonigen, 1997; Alfaro et al, 2007). Moreover, Wheeler and Mody (1992) find that 
current FDI is determined by lagged levels of FDI, therefore lagged FDI and real exchange 
rates can be used to instrument FDI. Because real exchange rate is available only for a 
limited  number  of  countries,  only  lagged  FDI  is  used  to  instrument  FDI,  in  order  to 
maintain the same sample size. However, using both lagged FDI and real exchange rates 
produces results similar to those reported in Table 21. 
Regarding  institutions,  the  literature  on  institutional  quality  determinants  states  that 
institutions  are  determined  by  political  variables  like  the  degree  of  ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization,  and  the  origin  of  commercial  law,  and  by  cultural  variables,  such  as 
religious composition of population, and also by geographical variables like latitude (La 
Porta et al., 1999). Thus, institutions are instrumented by using these variables. The results 
are  shown  in  Table  21.  All  models  report  the  test  statistic  for  no  over-identification 
restrictions to confirm the validity of the instruments. Column 1 and column 2 in Table 21 
control for the endogeneity of FDI and institutions.  110 
Table 21: Growth and FDI: IV Cross-Sectional results (Dependent variable: Average of GDP 
per capita growth 1980-2005)  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
LGDPpc80  -0.764**  -0.793**  -1.071*** 
  (-2.40)  (-2.47)  (-4.10)    
Sch  1.304**  1.122**  0.748*   
  (2.38)  (2.29)  (2.01)    
Inv  0.160**  0.136**  0.139*** 
  (2.61)  (2.25)  (3.74)    
Inst  -0.285  -0.367  0.546**  
  (-0.89)  (-1.18)  (2.31)    
FDI  -3.141***  -2.901***                  
  (-3.26)  (-2.91)                  
Infl    -0.000  -0.001    
    (-0.19)  (-1.06)    
Credit    0.757*  0.312    
    (1.75)  (0.80)    
(FDI×Inst)  0.344***  0.320***                  
  (3.46)  (3.12)                  
FDI.PRIM      -0.924*** 
      (-3.72)    
(FDI.PRIM×Inst)      0.136*** 
      (3.20)    
Cons  6.664**  5.175**  1.636    
  (2.64)  (2.22)  (0.82)    
N  61  61  60    
F (p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
R2  0.310  0.378  0.544    
OIR test  0.387  0.798  3.684 
(Prob>χ2)  0.943  0.850  0.298 
Values in parentheses are White heteroskedastic adjusted t-values. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 F is F-statistics. Total FDI is instrumented by lagged FDI (average of 1970-1979); Institutions are instrumented by UK legal origin dummy, 
 Protestants dummy, Ethno-linguistic fractionalization index, and latitude. 
 
       
The results confirm the previous findings of this chapter. The coefficient on FDI is still 
significantly  negative,  and  the  coefficient  on  the  interaction  term  is  positive  and 
significant, which confirms that institutions play a role in determining the contribution of 
FDI on economic growth.  
Column 3 includes primary FDI. One might ask whether to consider primary FDI as an 
endogenous  variable or  not.  It  is  difficult  to  argue that  primary  FDI is determined by 
economic growth in host countries, which is an indicator of market size potential because 
primary FDI is a resources-seeking FDI. Dunning and Lundan (2008) provide a list of the 
candidate  determinants  of  resources-seeking  FDI;  they  are:  the  possession  of  natural 111 
resources, infrastructure, tax level, and other incentives. Chapter two shows that primary 
FDI is determined by the availability of natural resources, measured by the ratio of primary 
exports to GDP, and the level of corporate income tax. 
The endogeneity of primary FDI is tested by using marginal corporate income tax rate and 
ratio of primary export to GDP as instruments for primary FDI. Hausman test statistics 
could not reject the exogeneity of primary FDI as is clear from the P- Value of 
2(1)   
which  equals  0.3117.  Thus,  in  column  3  in  Table  21,  primary  FDI  is  entered  as  an 
exogenous variable, while institutions index is entered as an endogenous variable. Column 
3 shows that the main result of this chapter is not affected by allowing for the endogeneity 
of institutions, since the coefficient on primary FDI is still significantly negative, and the 
coefficient  on  the  interaction  term  between  institutions  and  primary  FDI  is  still 
significantly positive.  
    
4.5.  Conclusion 
The  question  of  whether  FDI  inflows  contribute  positively  to  economic  growth  and 
development is one of the most fundamental questions in international and development 
economics. It gains this importance not only from its obvious academic relevance, but also 
from its practical implications. One of these implications is whether the incentives given to 
foreign investors are justified. In spite of this importance, this question has not yet been 
settled.  
In an attempt to answer this question, researchers have recently shown greater interest in 
studying the impact of FDI on economic growth by sector. One conclusion of this body of 
research  is  that  primary  FDI  has  negative  effects  on  economic  growth  and  should, 
therefore, be discouraged. Nevertheless, there is anecdotal evidence that primary FDI helps 112 
host  countries  to  exploit  their  natural  resource  endowments,  which  increases  host 
countries‟ foreign exchange earnings and government revenues, and that countries with 
good institutions, like Botswana and Chile, have utilized these earnings and revenues to 
boost economic growth and development.  
This chapter re-examines the impact of FDI on economic growth, taking into account the 
interaction between institutional quality of host countries and FDI. Contrary to the findings 
of  the  recent  studies,  the  results  of  this  chapter  show  that  primary  FDI  contributes 
positively  to  economic  growth  if  a  host  country  achieves  a  minimum  threshold  of 
institutional quality. This result seems robust to model specifications, various controlling 
variables, and endogeneity bias. The results show that out of the 61 countries covered in 
the chapter, 40 countries acquired this minimum threshold and therefore benefited from 
primary FDI during the period 1990-2005. One implication of this result is that policy 
makers should direct their efforts towards improving institutions to benefit positively from 
primary FDI rather than discouraging it.  
The  chapter  also  provides  evidence  that  helps  to  reduce  the  inconclusiveness  of  the 
empirical evidence regarding the contribution of FDI to economic growth. In particular, the 
results  reinforce  and  improve  upon  the  suggestion  in  the  empirical  literature  that 
institutional quality in host countries is one attribute of the absorptive capacity upon which 
the contribution of aggregate FDI to economic growth depends. 
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Appendix IV 
 
A list of countries included in the empirical analysis 
Asia  Latin America and Caribbean  Middle East and North Africa  Sub-Saharan Africa  Others 
Bangladesh  Argentina  Iran, Islamic Rep.  Kenya  Australia 
China  Bolivia  Jordan  South Africa  Austria 
India  Brazil  Tunisia  Zambia  Belgium 
Indonesia  Chile      Canada 
Korea, Rep.  Colombia      Cyprus 
Pakistan  Costa Rica      Denmark 
Papua New Guinea  Dominican Republic      Finland 
Philippines  Ecuador      France 
Singapore  El Salvador      Germany 
Sri Lanka  Guyana      Greece 
Thailand  Honduras      Hungary 
Turkey  Jamaica      Iceland 
  Mexico      Ireland 
  Nicaragua      Israel 
  Panama      Italy 
  Paraguay      Netherlands 
  Peru     
New 
Zealand 
  Trinidad and Tobago      Norway 
  Uruguay      Portugal 
  Venezuela, RB      Spain 
        Sweden 
       
United 
Kingdom 
        United 
States 
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Definition of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable  Definition  Source 
FDI 
Foreign direct investment  net inflows as % of 
GDP 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 
LGDPpc80  Log of GDP per capita US $  World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 
Growth  GDP per capita Growth (annual %)  World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 
Infl  Consumer prices (annual %) 
 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 
LTax  Log of Top Marginal Income Tax Rate. 
Economic Freedom of the World, 
2006 Annual Report. The Fraser 
Institute. 
Inst 
 
Simple Average of indices of 
Law and Order & 
Investment Profile, scale 0-12. 
Calculated from ICRG Data, PRS 
Group. 
Sch  Average years of higher schooling in the total 
population. 
Barro R. and J.W. Lee.2000. 
 
Reso  Ratio of Primary exports to GDP  World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 
Credit  Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of 
GDP) 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 
Inv  Gross capital formation (% of GDP)  World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 115 
 
5.  FDI, Institutions, and Economic Growth: Is 
There a New Growth-Enhancing Role for FDI? 
 
5.1.  Introduction 
The rapid increase in the flow of foreign direct investment during the late 1980s and the 
1990s,  has  motivated  a  voluminous  empirical  literature  focusing  on  the  domestic 
consequences of FDI inflows. The main research area of this literature has been the growth 
effects of FDI, with particular emphasis on identifying factors that enable host countries to 
appropriate the beneficial effects of FDI. Examples of these studies include, but are not 
limited to: Balasubramanyam, Salisu et al. (1996) Borensztein, De Gregorio et al. (1998), 
Hermes and Lensink (2003), and Durham (2004). Another research area that has received 
less, but steadily growing attention in the recent literature, is the effects of FDI on policy 
variables and institutions in host countries. While some of the studies in this research area 
emphasize  that  FDI  has  negative  impacts  on  some  policy  variables,  such  as  tax  level 
(Garretsen and Peeters, 2007) and environmental regulations (Cole, Elliott et al., 2006), 
others provide evidence that FDI has a positive impact on institutional variables including 
democracy (Li and Reuveny, 2002) and corruption (Felipe Larraín and Tavares, 2004).  
These two research areas have stayed separate from each other despite the fact that if FDI 
can  positively  affect  institutions,  then  it  can  affect  growth  indirectly.  The  aim  of  this 
chapter is to bring together these two research areas into a single research study that seeks 
to explore the indirect impact of FDI on growth, and to test whether FDI has a new growth-
enhancing role that works via institutions.  116 
Given that recent economic growth literature states that institutional quality is one of the 
most robust determinants of economic growth, and the evidence presented in chapter three 
that FDI positively influences property rights in host countries, exploring whether FDI has 
an  indirect  impact  on  growth  becomes  an  area  worthy  of  study.  Such  study  can  be 
empirically carried out by developing a simultaneous equation model which includes FDI, 
institutions, and growth as endogenous variables that are jointly determined, and explicitly 
specifies the channel of influence from FDI to economic growth through institutions. In 
such a model, the impact of FDI on economic growth can be decomposed into: (1) direct 
impact and (2) indirect impact that works via institutions. This allows us to answer the 
question of whether and how FDI affects growth directly and via institutions.  
The question of whether FDI has growth effects that works via influencing institutions, is 
crucial for understanding the contribution of FDI to economic growth, and it also has some 
important implications. For example, if the impact of FDI on growth through institutions is 
a  significant  one,  a  failure  to  take  it  into  account  will  result  in  underestimating  the 
development role of FDI. Moreover, if FDI appears to have a positive impact on growth 
through institutions, then the current view that developing countries should attract FDI will 
be strengthened, and promotions of FDI will be justified. In addition, if FDI is proved to 
have an indirect impact on growth, then the scope of the literature on growth effects of FDI 
will enlarge to include additional impacts that work via institutions. 
The rest of the chapter will be organized as follows: section 5.2 provides a simple model 
that describes the relationships among FDI, institutions, and growth, and highlights the 
contributions of FDI and institutions to economic growth as they feature in the literature. 
Section 5.3 develops an econometric model that will be used to test the main hypothesis of 
the chapter. Section 5.4 describes the data, presents the results, and discusses the findings. 
Section 5.5 concludes the chapter.  117 
 
5.2.  FDI, institutions, and growth: A simple model 
To understand the complex role played by FDI in determining economic growth, one needs 
a model that helps organize our thinking about economic growth; such a model should 
show all the possible interactions and feedbacks between FDI and other determinants of 
growth, especially institutions. Rodrik (2003) provides a model that can serve this purpose.  
Rodrik  uses  this  model  to  simplify  the  complex  nature  of  the  process  of  generating 
economic growth, and to identify and sort out the complex web of causality running among 
factors  that  affect  economic  growth.  In  this  model,  Rodrik  distinguishes  between  the 
“proximate”  and  “deep”  determinants  of  economic  growth.  Proximate  determinants  of 
economic  growth  include  accumulation  of  physical  and  human  capital,  as  well  as 
productivity  and  technological  improvements,  while  deep  determinants  include 
institutions, integration into the world economy, and geography. The model shows that 
economic growth is not only affected by these determinants, but that it also affects these 
determinants, and most importantly, is affected by the interactions and feedbacks among 
these determinants. Thus, the model provides a simple but very effective framework for 
studying  economic  growth  and  answering  some  interesting  questions.  For  example, 
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) use a similar variant of this model to answer the 
question  of  which  factor;  institutions,  integration,  or  geography,  “trumps”  the  other 
determinants of economic growth, a question that helps to identify the relative importance 
of the “deep” determinants of economic growth. Another example is Bonaglia, Braga de 
Macedo, and Bussolo (2001), who use a very similar framework to study the impact of 
globalisation on governance and institutions, and show how globalisation, governance, and 
economic  performance  affect  each  other  in  very  complex  mutual  relationships.  In  this 
model and its two variants, the term “integration” or “globalisation” includes not only the 
flow  of  international  trade,  but  also  the  flow  of  international  capital  and  investment. 
However, both Rodrik et al (2004) and Bonaglia et al (2001) consider only the role of 118 
trade. The model used in this chapter departs from these  studies in two ways: first, it 
considers and highlights the role of FDI as another aspect of integration into the world 
economy; second, its main aim is to explore the role of FDI in determining economic 
growth directly and indirectly, through its impact on institutional quality. 
The modified version of Rodrik‟s model is shown in Figure 10. This Figure illustrates 
some stylised facts about the interactions among FDI, institutions, and economic growth; it 
reveals links operating at different levels between FDI and other determinants of economic 
growth, which can help to explore the role of FDI in determining economic growth, and 
then  to  devise  a  reasonable  empirical  strategy  for  answering  the  core  question  of  this 
chapter. The first panel of this model shows the “proximate” determinants of economic 
growth,  where  growth  is  determined  by  accumulation  of  physical  and  human  capital, 
productivity, and technological progress. In other words, the first panel decomposes the 
sources of economic growth into two factors: the increase in factor inputs in physical and 
human  capital  (which  is  known  as  capital  deepening),  and  the  improvements  in 
productivity with which these inputs are aligned to produce goods and services. 
Rodrik (2003) describes the analysis provided by the first panel as the “standard” way that 
most economists use to understand the determinants of economic growth. He also notes 
that although this panel gives a straightforward decomposition of the sources of economic 
growth, it does not provide many deeper insights in understanding the process of economic 
growth.  Physical  and  human  capital  accumulation,  productivity  improvements,  and 
technological progress, can be viewed as proximate sources of economic growth, and a 
proper understanding of growth process requires explaining and answering questions like 
what factors affect capital accumulation and productivity and technological progress? How 
to attain higher level of productivity and technology? Why do some economies tend to 
accumulate more capital and achieve higher levels of productivity than others?  119 
 
Figure 10: A simple model for economic growth 
 
These questions are addressed in the second panel. And as shown in this panel, the answers 
to these questions are closely related to institutions, integration into the world economy, 
and geography. The second panel of Figure 10 shows that the proximate sources of growth 
are themselves driven by some deeper and more fundamental factors. Rodrik (2003) calls 
these factors the “deeper” determinants of growth. Rodrik states that the literature provides 
three  major  variables  as  deeper  determinants.  They  are:  integration  into  the  world 
economy, institutions, and geography. 
5.2.1.  FDI and growth: The direct impact  
 A large body of economic literature states that FDI, as a combination of capital stock, 
technology and management experience, and entrepreneurial abilities, can affect economic 
growth in two distinct ways. On the one hand, FDI, particularly Greenfield FDI, represents 120 
a new addition to the host country‟s capital stock, and therefore may positively contribute 
to economic growth. However, in the standard neoclassical growth model, the contribution 
of FDI to economic growth as capital accumulation is limited, because of the diminishing 
returns to capital (De Mello, 1997). In other words, according to the neoclassical growth 
model,  the  impact  of  FDI  on  economic  growth  is  similar  to  the  impact  of  domestic 
investment, in that it is a transitory impact and does not affect the long-term economic 
growth rate (Campos and Kinoshita, 2003). Long-term economic growth is affected only 
by technological  progress  and/or population  and labour force  growth, all of which are 
considered  to  be  exogenously  determined  according  to  the  neoclassical  growth  model 
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).  
In  endogenous  growth  models,  on  the  other  hand,  FDI  is  considered  as  a  catalyst  for 
technological progress and productivity improvements, and it therefore has a long-term 
effect on economic growth (OECD, 2002). In these models, FDI has an endogenous effect 
on  economic  growth  because  it  creates  increasing  returns  to  capital  through  positive 
externalities  and  spillover  effects  (De  Mello,  1997).  In  general,  one  might  say  that 
economic literature states that the contribution of FDI to economic growth does not stem 
only from its contribution to capital accumulation, but also from its role as a vehicle for 
transferring knowledge and advanced technology and other managerial experience, all of 
which are expected to increase productivity level and technological progress, leading to 
higher economic growth rates in host countries.  
Technology can be transferred through a variety of channels, including international trade. 
However, FDI and the activities of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) in host countries 
represent  the  major  channels  through  which  technology  diffusion  can  take  place 
(Borensztein, De Gregorio et al., 1998). This is because Multinational Enterprises conduct 
most of the research and development (R and D) around the globe and therefore they are 
among the firms acquiring the most advanced technology in the world. Moreover, FDI 121 
does  not  only  provide  the  host  economy  with  advanced  technology,  but  also  with  the 
necessary  complements  of  these  technologies,  such  as  management  experience  and 
entrepreneurial abilities (OECD, 2002).  
The positive role played by FDI and Multinational Enterprises in transferring technology 
and increasing the level of productivity in host economies can be performed though several 
complex mechanisms. These mechanisms operate through the interactions of Multinational 
Enterprises with the host economy, including transacting with domestic firms that supply 
Multinationals  with  intermediate  products,  or  using  the  output  of  Multinationals,  the 
competition with domestic firms in the same industry, and training local workers (OECD, 
2002).  
Advanced technology can be transmitted to the host economy as a result of the cooperation 
of  Multinationals with  domestic firms,  particularly  with  their  suppliers of intermediate 
products.  The  efforts  of  Multinational  Enterprises  to  increase  their  competitiveness  in 
world markets may encourage them to help their local suppliers to improve the quality of 
the intermediate products that Multinationals use in their production operations. This can 
be done through providing domestic firms with technical assistance, know-how, and the 
organizational skills they need to improve the quality of their output, which ultimately 
improves the quality of Multinationals‟ products (OECD, 2002). Moreover, the assistance 
of  Multinationals  to  domestic  suppliers  may  go  even  further,  including  assistance  in 
purchasing raw materials and intermediate products, and in getting access to international 
markets and production networks (OECD, 2002). However, technology transmission can 
occur  without  assistance  from  Multinational  Enterprises,  as  the  competition  among 
domestic firms to supply Multinational Enterprises with intermediate products may force 
them to adopt modern technology, so that they can supply  the Multinationals (Lipsey, 
2004). Furthermore, the impact of Multinationals‟ transactions with domestic firms is not 
limited to their suppliers, but includes domestic firms that buy Multinationals‟ products. 122 
Positive externalities  to domestic firms in these industries include the benefit of using 
higher-quality  products  and  enjoying  lower-prices,  all  of  which  helps  to  increase  their 
productivity (OECD, 2002).     
Another way in which technology improvements occur is through the competition between 
domestic  and  foreign  firms.  The  advent  of  more  advanced  foreign  firms  may  force 
domestic firms operating within the same industry to improve their existing technology and 
adopt more efficient and up-to-date technology in order to survive the intense competition 
with foreign firms (Lipsey, 2004). However, it is also possible that advanced technology 
can be transmitted to domestic firms as a result of demonstration effects. The entry of 
multinational corporations to the host economy, and the introduction of new products and 
new technologies, will expose domestic firms to the superior technology of Multinationals, 
and this exposure may encourage them to copy and imitate not only the new advanced 
method  of  production  used  by  Multinationals,  but  also  their  managerial  practices  and 
organizational arrangements (Saggi, 2002).         
 The advent of FDI and the entry of multinational corporations can also improve the level 
of productivity in the host countries by training domestic workers, and hence augment the 
existing  human  capital  in  the  host  economy  (De  Mello,  1997).  When  Multinationals 
employ  domestic  workers,  they  usually  get  the  chance  to  acquire  knowledge  of  the 
advanced technology and managerial practices used by Multinationals. This knowledge 
and these skills can be transmitted to the rest of local economy when these workers leave 
the Multinationals and set up their own firms, or work for other domestic firms (OECD, 
2002). In this way, the switch of Multinationals workers and managers to domestic firms 
helps to increase the productivity level of the domestic economy and fosters the process of 
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5.2.2.  Institutions and growth 
A large body of economic literature documents evidence that institutional quality plays an 
important  role  in  determining  economic  growth  rate,  by  affecting  the  incentives  for 
investment in physical and human capital, and technological progress and innovations. In 
fact,  there  is  a  general  agreement  that  institutional  quality,  particularly  the  security  of 
property rights, is one of the key factors which assists towards long- term economic growth 
(Knack and Keefer, 1995) and (Rodrik, Subramanian et al., 2004). North (1990) postulates 
that  the  primary  cause  of  the  underdevelopment  and  low  growth  rates  in  developing 
countries is the failure to develop institutional environments that effectively define and 
protect  property  rights  and  enforce  contracts,  while  the  sustained  growth  achieved  by 
developed  countries  has  been  the  result  of  sound  institutions  that  foster  exchange  and 
protect  property  rights.  Institutional  environment  plays  this  role  because  it  sets  the 
incentives of actions, and defines the available choices which ultimately determine not 
only economic growth, but also the way the whole society evolves.   
One way in which institutional quality can affect economic growth, is related to the role 
played by institutions in determining transaction costs and the implication of this to the 
market  size,  specialization,  and  technological  progress.  Trade  and  transactions  among 
individuals involve some sort of risk and uncertainty about the behaviour of the other party 
involved  in  the  exchange.  This  risk  and  uncertainty  stems  from  the  fact  that  different 
parties  may  have  asymmetric  information,  and  that  transactions  are  not  always 
instantaneous. Parties of exchange, therefore, may act opportunistically when the payoff 
for  such  behaviour  exceeds  the  payoff  for  other  alternatives.  For  example,  Parties  of 
exchange may cheat or lie about the quality of what is being traded, or they may shirk from 
their  responsibilities,  or  renege  on  their  deals  and  not  live  up  to  agreements.  Thus, 
transacting and trading involve some sort of costs related to this risk and uncertainty, and 
to the time, effort, and resources devoted to defining, protecting, and enforcing agreements 124 
and property  rights,  in  addition  to  any losses resulting from  imperfect monitoring and 
policing  of  the  agreements  (North,  1990).  As  Coase  (1992)  argues,  exchange  Parties 
consider transaction costs when they make their decisions regarding trade and exchange, 
and  when  transaction  costs  are  so  high  that  they  exceed  the  expected  gains  of  trade, 
individuals will refrain from trading, which will reduce the volume of trade and limit the 
market size. 
To elaborate more on the role of institutions and how they affect individuals‟ behaviour 
regarding cooperation and trading with others, and therefore transaction cost, North (1990) 
uses the terminology of game theory. North documents that the literature of game theory 
shows that individuals usually find it to their advantage to cooperate with other, including 
trading and exchange, when the game is repeated, when they possess complete information 
about the other parties of exchange, and when the exchange involves a small number of 
individuals. However, North (1990) argues that individuals may find it to their advantage 
to act opportunistically or decide not to cooperate with others when the exchange is not 
repeated, when they do not have enough information about the other party of the exchange, 
or when the exchange involve lots of parties. In such cases, individuals may find the payoff 
for opportunistic behaviour (e. g lying, shirking, and other sorts of defection) higher than 
the  payoff  for  cooperation.  As  a  result,  North  concludes  that  impersonal  complex 
cooperation and exchange cannot be sustained without the intervention of a coercive state 
that provides a well-developed institutional framework.  
When institutional environment does not provide formal, well established mechanisms for 
enforcing contracts and adjudicating and settling disputes among parties, individuals will 
incur high transaction costs, such as search and information costs related to finding an 
honest  trading  partner,  deciding  on  the  terms  of  trade,  policing  and  enforcing  the 
agreement etc. (Shirley, 2005). In such institutional environments, individuals will refrain 
from engaging in complex impersonal trading that extends across space and time, and that 125 
involves individuals whom they do not already know. They will limit their transactions to 
individuals they know and have a great deal of information about, and individuals with 
whom they have kinship relations, such as ethnic or religious connections, or any other 
social  networks.  These  ways  of  trading  provide  them  with  mechanisms  of  enforcing 
contracts and policing agreements that reduce transaction costs. These mechanisms include 
threats  to  reputation  that  increase  the  cost  of  opportunistic  behaviour  in  repeated 
transactions, and threats to ostracise individuals from kinship ties that increases the cost of 
opportunistic behaviour in transactions between the members of the same social network 
(North, 1990). In this way, they keep the level of transaction cost low, but they do so at the 
expense of reducing the volume of trade, and lowering the extent of specialization and 
division of labour. In other words, they resort to reducing the volume and the extent of 
their transactions and lowering the degree of specialization as insurance against the high 
risk and uncertainty involved in complex impersonal exchange. In general, one might say 
that in countries where institutions are not well developed, the level of trade and market 
size will be smaller and the degree of specialization and division of labour will be lower, 
while improving institutional quality will reduce transaction costs and allow individuals to 
capture the gains of trade which will encourage them to engage in complex impersonal 
exchanges that extend across time and place.     
By affecting the extent of trade, market size, and the degree of specialization and division 
of  labour,  institutional  environments  also  affect  the  rate  of  technological  progress  and 
productivity.  North  and  Thomas  (1973)  explain  how  market  size  affects  the  rate  of 
technological progress. Their main argument is that the expansion of market size helps to 
raise the private rate of return on innovative activities. They argue that when the markets 
expand, and when the division of labour become more specific, the reward for finding 
ways to improve production methods increases. They argue that the expansion of markets, 
and  the  resulting  increase  in  specialization  degree,  allows  individual  entrepreneurs  to 
concentrate on a narrow range of activities which help them to direct their innovative skills 126 
to  more  limited  problems,  thus  increasing  the  rate  of  technological  and  productivity 
improvements.  Moreover,  the  expansion  of  the  market  size  will  not  only  encourage 
innovation, but will also encourage the adoption and dissemination of advanced technology 
already  present in other countries (North and Thomas, 1973). To sum  up, institutional 
improvements lower transaction costs and widen the market size, increasing potential gains 
from  specialization  and  trade,  and  encouraging  the  invention  and  adoption  of  new 
technology which ultimately increases the rate of economic growth.  
The institutional environment affects the rate of technological progress beyond the effect 
that is attributable to increasing market size and specialization, because it also determines 
whether  inventors  or  entrepreneurs  would  get  appropriate  returns  for  their  efforts. 
Institutions may discourage innovation if inventors and entrepreneurs could not be sure 
that they will obtain the fruits of devoting their time and resources to innovations. This will 
reduce and delay the adoption of new technology, which ultimately reduces the economic 
growth rate.  
Schmookler  (1966)  argues  that,  contrary  to  the  popular  idea  that  scientific  discoveries 
stimulate inventions, it is economic reward and taking advantage of potentially profitable 
opportunities  that  stimulate  invention  and  technological  progress.  Schmookler  (1966) 
provides evidence that the effort to seize profitable opportunities or to reduce the cost of 
production  is  the  main  force  behind  many  cases  of  remarkable  industrial  inventions. 
Schmookler‟s  argument  means  that  there  is  a  link  between  factors  that  affect  market 
conditions and determine the expected reward for innovative activities on the one hand, 
and innovation rates on the other (Grossman and Helpman, 1993). Referring to Medieval 
China,  Baumol  (1996)  shows  that  institutional  quality  in  general,  and  the  risk  of 
expropriation  of  private  gains  from  innovative  activity  by  the  government,  hindered 
technological  progress,  despite  the  fact  that  Medieval  China  witnessed  some  major 
inventions like the printing press. Baumol (1996) argues that the institutional environment 127 
that encouraged individuals to become bureaucrats rather than entrepreneurs, in order to 
gain  high  status  and  wealth,  explains  at  least  partly,  the  lagging  of  China  behind  the 
industrialized countries.    
North (1990) explains how institutional quality in general, and the risk of expropriation in 
particular,  affects  the  incentives  to  innovation  and  technological  progress,  and  thus 
economic growth. As shown above, sustaining impersonal exchanges that extend across 
time and place and involve large numbers of individuals, requires some kind of third-party 
enforcement.  Put  another  way,  institutions  must  be  created  to  provide  sufficient 
information for parties to exchange and to enforce contracts and police agreements through 
the threat of coercion and punishment. The role of the third party can be played by a state 
that is strong enough to enforce rules that define and protect property rights and police, and 
enforce contracts. However, North (1990) explains that a strong state poses a dilemma, 
because any party strong enough to enforce rights, is also strong enough to expropriate 
them, and since rulers have their own utility function, they may be encouraged to use their 
power  to  expropriate  rights  or  alter  them  for  their  advantage.  Therefore,  sustaining 
impersonal exchange that allows individuals to capture gains from trade and productive 
activity, requires not only a strong third party that enforce rights, but also a strong third 
party that acts impartially.  
Impartiality here means that the state must show credible commitment to neutrality, and 
never engage in predatory activities that expropriate private rights, violate contracts, or 
pursue  redistributive  policy  that  radically  alters  individuals‟  wealth  or  income.  North 
argues  that  complete  impartiality  of  state  is  difficult  to  achieve  even  in  developed 
countries. However, there is a huge difference in institutional environment with regard to 
impartiality of the state between developed and developing countries, and this difference 
reflects on the quality of institutions and the protection of property rights, and therefore on 
the rate of technological progress and productivity.   128 
To summarize, one can say that when individuals and entrepreneurs decide how to allocate 
their time, efforts and innovative skills, they take the expected returns of their activities 
into  account.  If  property  rights  are  well  protected,  individuals  will  devote  time  and 
resources to take advantage of the profitable opportunities. However, if property rights are 
not protected, either because the state is too weak to protect them or strong enough to 
protect  them,  but  at  the  same  time  is  not  self-controlled  not  to  expropriate  them, 
entrepreneurs  will  not  risk  their  time  and  resources  in  investments  that  might  be 
expropriated. Thus, in a low-quality institutional environment, entrepreneurs will be forced 
to use technology that employs low levels of capital, and to adopt short-term prospects for 
their businesses, and keep them small in scale, all of which leads to slow economic growth 
(North, 1990). 
 
 
5.2.3.  Geography and growth 
The argument that geography exerts some influence on economic growth is based on the 
observation  that  geographical  factors  such  as  climate  zones,  disease  ecology,  resource 
endowments, distance from the coast, etc, tend to play a crucial role in determining various 
key economic variables ranging from the quality and quantity of economic resources to 
institutional  quality  and  economies‟  socio-political  structures.  Economic  literature 
documents that the impact of geography on economic growth is twofold: geography affects 
economic growth indirectly though effects on institutional quality, and directly through 
effects on economic resources and their productivity. These effects are shown by arrows 7 
and 8, respectively, in Figure 10.  
Arrow 7 shows that the impact of geographically related variables on economic growth 
works  through  their  long-term  effect  on  institutional  quality.  There  are  three  major 
arguments  in  the  literature  that  support  this  channel  of  influence.  The  first  one  is  put 129 
forward by Hall and Jones (1999), who stress the role of climate, particularly the distance 
from the equator, in shaping institutional quality. Their argument is based on three basic 
elements: first, that Western European countries have long adapted Adam Smith‟s idea and 
built high quality institutions that protect property rights, and have established the principle 
of check and balance in governments. Second, Western Europeans carried with them these 
principles  and  institutions  wherever  they  settled,  and  therefore  helped  to  improve 
institutional quality in their settlement regions. Third, the settlement of Western Europeans 
around the globe was influenced by the climate, because Western Europeans were more 
likely  to  settle  in  locations  that  have  a  climate  similar  to  that  of  Western  Europe  i.e. 
temperate regions that are far from the equator. Hall and Jones (1999) further argue that the 
influence of Western Europeans on institutions tends to be persistent and is changing very 
slowly over time. Thus, they conclude that institutional quality is influenced at least partly 
by climate, and the distance from the equator in particular.  
The second argument is advanced by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). Their 
argument  is  basically  similar  to  Hall  and  Jones‟s,  in  that  they  also  stress  the  role  of 
Western Europeans in influencing institutional quality in the regions where they settled. 
However, they highlight a different geographical factor that influenced the distribution of 
Western  Europeans  around  the  globe.  According  to  Acemoglu,  Johnson  and  Robinson 
(2001), the settlement of Western Europeans was determined by the disease burden and the 
mortality rates they faced. They also provide further elaboration on the way that Western 
Europeans  influenced  institutions  in  colonized  countries.  Europeans  adapted  different 
colonization policies regarding building institutions in colonized regions, depending on 
disease ecology. On the one hand, Europeans settled in large numbers in regions where 
they faced low disease burden, and they built “settler colonies” which were similar to their 
home countries, in that they had institutions that effectively defined and protected private 
property rights, and promoted representation, check and balance in their governments. On 
the other hand, in high disease burden environments, where they faced high mortality rates, 130 
Western Europeans did not settle, but rather exploited and transferred as much as possible, 
the resources of these colonies, through setting up “extractive states” and built institutions 
that  did  not  strongly  support  private  property  rights  or  competition,  and  nor  did  they 
promote  principles  of  representation  and  check  and  balance  in  governments.  These 
extractive colonies were largely characterized by institutions that promoted monopolies, 
trade restrictions, and even compulsory work and slavery on cash crop plantations and 
other mines, in order to extract resources. Thus, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) 
argue that disease environment affects the institutional quality in colonized regions through 
influencing  Europeans‟  settlement  and  their  institutional  building  policy.  Regions 
characterized by high disease burden ended up having poor institutions, whereas regions 
characterized  by  low  disease  burden  and  low  mortality  rates  among  settlers  ended  up 
having high quality institutions. These differences in institutional quality endured even 
with the end of colonialism. 
The third argument is offered by Engerman and Sokoloff (2000). This argument gives a 
slightly  different  explanation  for  the  way  in  which  geography  affects  institutions.  In 
general, this argument stresses the role played by factor endowments, and their implication 
for  production  technology  established  by  Europeans  in  their  colonies  in  shaping  the 
institutional quality. In colonies endowed with climate and soils that made them suitable 
for growing sugar, coffee, and other crops that require large  economies of scale to be 
produced,  Europeans  established  large  slave  plantations  to  exploit  these  colonies,  with 
slaves being brought to them from Africa. Using this method of production created high 
levels of inequality in wealth and human capital, and led to the emergence of a small, elite 
class of landholders that enjoyed disproportionate political power. In these colonies, the 
elite  were  able to  use their power to  build institutional  structures  that  reinforced their 
political and economic domination, by establishing rules and laws to limit access of non-
elites to opportunities, reducing competition, and hindering innovation, all of which led to 
poor institutional quality. The same can be applied to colonies endowed with rich mineral 131 
deposits,  as  well  as  an  abundance  of  native  labour  power.  This  pattern  of  production 
method and institutions is in sharp contrast to the colonial experience in colonies endowed 
with climate and soil that were suitable for grain agriculture that can be produced at a 
small-scale level. These colonies witnessed a completely different path of development in 
which there was more equal distribution of wealth and human capital, and a high degree of 
homogeneity in the population, all of which encouraged the adoption of an institutional 
framework  that  fosters  equality  and  provides  opportunities  to  all  members  of  its 
population, leading to high quality institutions. Thus, according to Engerman and Sokoloff 
(2000), it is the availability of resources endowment, especially crops and minerals, that 
shaped institutional quality and their influence tends to be persistent and long lasting.      
The direct  impact  of  geography on economic  growth is  shown by arrow 8. Economic 
literature  holds  that  geographically-related  variables,  such  as  climate  and  location,  can 
directly affect economic growth. They play this role because they influence not only the 
quantity of economic resources, but also the productivity of these resources. For example, 
Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) find evidence that the productivity of land in tropical 
regions is considerably lower than the productivity of land in more temperate regions, 
other things being equal. In other words, the agriculture land in tropical regions tends to 
produce smaller crop yields because soils are generally fragile and of low fertility. The 
productivity of land in tropical regions is also adversely affected by the high prevalence of 
crop pests and parasites that hinder the growth of plants (Easterly and Levine, 1997).  
Geographical  factors  also  affect  economic  growth  by  influencing  human  capital.  For 
example,  the  prevalence  of  infectious  diseases,  such  as  malaria,  yellow  fever  etc,  in 
tropical climates, adversely affects human health and reduces life expectancy. These sorts 
of infectious diseases are prevalent in tropical regions and rare in other regions, because 
tropical climates tend to have the ecological conditions that favour them and foster their 
transmission. Another geographical factor that can affect economic growth is location. For 132 
example, a costal location and the accessibility to navigable waterways, positively affects 
economic  growth  through  reducing  transport  costs,  increasing  openness  to  trade,  and 
enlarging market size, accelerating the diffusion and transmission of new technology etc.  
Therefore economies in regions that are costal or have access to navigable water tend to 
grow faster than in regions that are landlocked.  
 
  
5.2.4.  FDI  –  Institutions  interrelationships:  A  new 
growth-enhancing role for FDI 
One interesting feature of Figure 10 is that it makes clear that economic growth is a very 
complex process, which is determined not only by each of these factors, but also by the 
interactions and the web of cause-effect relations that links them together. Sorting out this 
complex web of causality has been problematic for studies trying to disentangle the impact 
of these variables on economic growth. However, it can also be useful in allowing us to 
study how one variable may affect growth via another variable or variables.  
The figure shows that with the exception of geography, most of the variables included in 
the model are both a cause and effect, not only for economic growth, but also for each 
other. For example, institutional quality can be regarded as a cause of economic growth 
arrow (9) and as a result of growth arrow (3). FDI can positively affect growth arrow (10), 
however, it is also possible that countries that grow faster will attract more FDI, as shown 
by arrow (4). More related to the aim of this chapter is the interrelationship between FDI 
and  institutions.  As  the  figure  shows,  institutional  quality  determines  FDI,  with  better 
institutions attracting more FDI, as can be seen from arrow (5). And arrow (6) shows that 
FDI in turn affects institutions. FDI plays this role because it creates effective demand for 
better institutions, and provides governments with incentives to adopt favourable rules or 133 
improve the enforcement of existing ones. Thus FDI can contribute to economic growth 
via improving institutional quality; arrows (6) and (9). 
5.3.  Model specification  
To empirically investigate the indirect effect of FDI on economic growth, one needs to 
specify  a  model  that  allows  us  to  capture  the  interrelationships  that  exist  among  FDI, 
institutions,  and  economic  growth.  In  particular,  one  needs  a  model  that  allows  us  to 
endogenize  institutions,  with  FDI  included  as  a  determinant  of  institutional  quality. 
Therefore, this chapter specifies a basic econometric model that consists of a series of three 
main equations describing the behaviour of the endogenous variables. In particular, the 
model consists of a cross-country growth equation, and two other equations; one for FDI 
and the other for institutions.  
5.3.1.  The growth equation:  
The  first  endogenous  variable  in  the  model,  Growth,  is  economic  growth,  which  is 
measured as the average of growth rate of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
over  the  period  1980-2005.  The  growth  equation  specification  follows  the  commonly 
accepted form in the cross-country growth literature (Barro, 1991), and includes a group of 
economic  variables  that  have  been  identified  by  empirical  growth  literature  as  robust 
determinants  of  economic  growth  (Levine  and  Renelt,  1992).  In  addition  to  FDI  and 
institutions,  the  growth  equation  includes  five  variables.  The  first  variable,  LGDP80, 
captures the impact of initial income level and is approximated by the log of GDP per 
capita in 1980. According to conditional convergence hypotheses, the impact of initial 
income level on economic growth is negative after controlling for other variables affecting 
economic growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). The other two variables capture the 
impact  of  physical  and  human  capital  on  economic  growth.  Physical  capital,  Inv,  is 134 
measured by the average of cross capital formation as a ratio to GDP, while human capital, 
LSch,  is  measured  by  the  log  of  average  years  of  secondary  schooling  in  the  total 
population;  both  of  the variables  are  expected  to  have  a  positive  impact  on  economic 
growth. The equation also includes two dummy variables one for sub-Saharan African 
countries and one for Latin American countries. As regards FDI and institutions, both of 
the variables are expected to have a positive impact on economic growth, as they have 
positive externalities that increase the productivity of economic resources.    
 
5.3.2.  The institutions equation:  
 The second endogenous variable, Inst, is institutions. Inst is measured by the ICRG index, 
which is scaled to vary from 0 to 12, with higher values indicating better institutional 
quality. Following the empirical literature on the determinants of institutional quality and 
property rights (Levine, 2005) and (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 1999), institutional 
quality  is  related  to  a  set  of  variables  representing  the  role  of  political,  cultural,  and 
geographical factors. The impact of political factors is approximated by two variables. The 
first variable, Ethn, is the index of the ethno linguistic fractionalization, and is expected to 
have a negative influence on institutional quality and property rights protection, because 
societies characterized by a high degree of ethnic and linguistic diversity are more likely to 
experience higher political tension, which has a negative impact on institutional quality (La 
Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes  et  al.,  1999).  In  such  societies,  governments  tend  to  restrict 
political  freedoms  and  use  their  coercive  powers  to  redistribute  resources  to  their 
advantage, and to expropriate rights rather than protect them (Levine, 2005). The second 
political variable, BCLaw, is a dummy variable for British Common Law, and is expected 
to have a positive influence on institutional quality, because compared with other legal 
systems such as French Civil Law, British Common Law tends to limit the state‟s power 135 
and better protect private property rights (Shirley, 2005) and (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
et al., 1999).  
Cultural influence is captured by including the percentage of protestant affiliation, Prots. 
Compared with other religious affiliations, Protestantism tends to be more egalitarian and 
tolerant,  and  less  hierarchical.  Thus  Protestantism  tends  to  encourage  the  creation  of 
institutions that protect private property rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 1999). 
Therefore, the percentage of Protestant affiliation, Prots, is expected to positively influence 
institutional quality.  
The impact of geographically related variables is captured by the log of settler mortality 
rate, Geog, which is expected to have a negative impact on institutional quality. In addition 
to these factors, the institutions equation also includes the other two endogenous variables; 
Growth and FDI. Economic growth is expected to have a positive impact on institutions, 
because the process of economic growth and development tends to create higher demand 
for better institutions, and to provide the necessary resources for building such institutions. 
FDI inflows also tend to create demand for better institutions and encourage governments 
to provide such institutions, and thus FDI is expected to positively influence institutions.     
5.3.3.  The FDI equation:  
The third endogenous variable in the model, FDI, is foreign direct investment, which is 
measured as the average of foreign direct investment net inflows as ratio of GDP over the 
period 1980-2005. The specification of the FDI equation includes, in addition to GDP per 
capita growth rate and the indicator of institutional quality, four other variables which are 
identified by  FDI literature as  key determinants  of FDI  (Lim, 2001)  and  (Chakrabarti, 
2001). The first variable, LGDPpc, is the log of the average of GDP per capita over the 
period 1980-2005, which is included to capture the impact of market size on FDI, and is 
expected to have a positive sign, since the increase in market size increases the profitability 136 
of FDI. The second variable, Tarif, is the average of the tariff rate. The average tariff rate 
is included to proxy the impact of trade barriers on FDI. Trade barriers have an ambiguous 
influence on FDI, because higher trade barriers encourage horizontal FDI that seeks to 
serve the domestic market, while lower trade barriers encourage vertical FDI that has an 
outward orientation, and seeks to compete in international markets. Thus, the final impact 
of trade barriers depends on the empirical investigation.  
The third variable, Tele, is the average of the number of telephone mainlines per 1,000 of 
people. Tele is used to approximate the impact of infrastructure on FDI, and is expected to 
have a positive influence. The fourth variable, LTax, is the log of the average of the top 
marginal income tax rate, which is expected to have a negative impact on FDI. The FDI 
equation also includes the other two endogenous variables: GDP per capita growth rate, 
Growth,  to  capture  the  impact  of  economic  growth  on  FDI,  and  the  average  of  the 
institutional  quality  index.  Growth  is  included  to  capture  the  role  of  market  growth 
potential in encouraging FDI inflows, while the institutional quality index captures the role 
of the institutional environment on FDI.  
5.3.4.  The complete model  
The  complete  model  used  in  this  chapter  to  estimate  the  impact  of  FDI  on  economic 
growth has the following formula: 
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As can be seen from equations (1), (2), and (3), this model contains three endogenous 
variables: 137 
Growth:   the average of growth rate of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
Inst:  Institutions measured by ICRG index 
FDI;  the average of foreign direct investment net inflows as ratio to GDP 
 
The model also includes a wide range of exogenous variables. While it is very difficult to 
argue that some of these variables are completely exogenous, the exogeneity here means 
that they do not appear on the left-hand side of any of the structural equations and that they 
are assumed to be determined outside the model. The following is a list of the exogenous 
variables included in our model.    
LGDP80:  The log of GDP per capita in 1980. 
Inv:  The average of cross capital formation as ratio to GDP. 
LSch:  The log of average years of secondary schooling in the total population 
Latin  A dummy variable for Latin American countries. 
Africa  A dummy variable for sub-Saharan African countries. 
Ethn:  An index measuring the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a 
country will not speak the same language.  
BCLaw:  Dummy  variable  that  takes  on  value  of  one  if  a  country‟s  legal  system  is 
British Common Law origin.  
Prots:  The percentage of the population that follows the Protestantism affiliation.   
Geog:  The  log  of  annualized  deaths  per  thousand  European  soldiers  in  European 138 
colonies in the early 19th century.  
LGDPpc:  The log of the average of GDP per capita. 
Tarif:  The average of the tariff rate. 
Tele:  The average of the number of telephone mainlines per 1,000 people. 
LTax:  The log of the average of the top marginal income tax. 
 
5.3.5.  How does FDI affect economic growth? 
The interest of this chapter centres on the way in which FDI affects economic growth 
directly and indirectly via institutions. Equation (1) shows that a change in FDI by one unit 
causes economic growth to change by an amount equal to 5  . Furthermore, Equation (1) 
shows that a change in institutional quality index by one unit causes economic growth to 
change by an amount equal to 4  . However, equation (2) shows that a change in FDI by 
one unit can also induce a change in the institutions index by an amount equal to 6  which 
means that the effect of change in FDI by one unit is not limited to its direct influence on 
growth, but also includes the indirect impact via institutions channel. Thus, the total impact 
of FDI on growth equals the sum of direct impact and indirect impact.    
This  effect  can be  calculated by  finding the derivative of  growth with  respect  to  FDI, 
which is equal to 
45
Growth Inst
FDI FDI



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The  above  expression  makes  it  clear  that  the  impact  of  FDI  on  economic  growth  is 
twofold: the direct impact, which is equal to  5   and the indirect impact, which is equal to 139 
4    multiplied by the derivative of institutions with respect to FDI. Equation (2) in the 
model shows that the derivative of institutions with respect to FDI is 6
Inst
FDI




. Thus the 
total  impact  of  FDI  on  economic  growth  equals 4 6 5 ()     .  Estimating  the  above 
complete system of equations and finding  4 6 5 ,  , and      allows us to test whether and 
how FDI affects economic growth. 
5.4.  Data and model estimation 
This section describes the data set used to estimate the model and presents the results of the 
estimation. 
5.4.1.  Overview of the data 
As can be seen from the model specification, estimating the model requires combining a 
wide range of diverse data sets, that vary in their availability, with differences in their 
number of observations for different variables. And because some data sets cover a limited 
number of countries, as is the case with the settler mortality rate, the analysis is restricted 
to a small number of countries. The analysis is also restricted in terms of time coverage, 
because  the  data  on  the  institutional  quality  index,  ICRG,  is  available  only  from  the 
beginning of the 1980s. Thus, the time period under study is 1980-2005 and the data refers 
to a diverse cross section of 42 developed and developing countries. However, to gain 
some  robustness  and  to  expand  the  sample,  settler  mortality  rate  is  replaced  with  the 
absolute  value  of  latitude,  which  covers  a  larger  number  of  countries,  expanding  the 
analysis to cover 74 countries. Table 22 provides summary statistics for the endogenous 
variables in this study, which may help in the interpretation of the estimated coefficients, 
and for measuring the impact of changes in FDI on both economic growth and institutions.  140 
Table 22: Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables 
variable  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Growth  1.387  1.516  -2.353  5.599 
FDI  2.660  2.955  0.200  16.089 
Inst  6.606  1.706  3.325  10.370 
 
Table 23 shows the simple correlations between the dependent variables in the model, 
which  helps  in  exploring  the  nature  of  the  relationships  between  them.  This  Table 
documents  a positive and significant  correlation  between  economic  growth on the one 
hand,  and  FDI  on  the  other,  with  a  correlation  coefficient  of  0.449.  This  positive 
correlation is also illustrated in Figure (11). The data also indicates a positive association 
between  institutions  and  economic  growth,  with  a  positive  and  significant  correlation 
coefficient  of  0.5.  Figure  (11)  shows  a  scatter  plot  of  economic  growth  rate  and 
institutional quality. As regards the relationship between FDI and institutions, Table 23 and 
Figure (11) show a significant positive correlation between the two variables.  
Table 23: Correlation matrix of dependent variables  
  Growth  FDI  Inst 
Growth  100  -  - 
FDI  0.449*  -  - 
Inst  0.500*  0.435*  - 
* indicates significance at the 0.05 level or better. 
Correlation coefficients presented in Table 23 represent a first approximate test for the 
hypothesis that FDI may exert indirect positive impact on economic growth by positively 
influencing institutions. First, the Table shows that FDI has a positive correlation with 
institutional  quality.  This  means  that  countries  receiving  higher  FDI  inflows  tend,  on 
average, to have better institutional quality as measured by the ICRG index. Second, the 
Table shows that there is a positive correlation between economic growth and institutions, 
which means that countries that have well-functioning institutions tend to grow faster.  141 
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Figure 11: Association between growth, institutions, and FDI (small sample). 
 
 
Thus, one can infer that these correlations provide some support to the claim that FDI 
exerts a positive influence on growth via institutions. However, it is quite possible that 
these correlations are the results of the feedback and reverse causality among the involved 
variables. For example, one cannot rule out the possibility that the positive correlation 
between institutions and FDI is a result of the impact of institutions on FDI, not the other 
way around. Similarly, the positive correlation between institutions and economic growth 
may  be  the  result  of  the  impact  of  growth  on  institutions.  As  a  consequence,  testing 
whether FDI exerts influence on economic growth via institutions channel requires a more 
sophisticated technique that can deal with the endogeneity problem and take account of the 
feedback relationships between FDI, institutions, and economic growth. 
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5.4.2.  Estimation method
19  
In  a  simultaneous  equation  model,  like  the  one  developed  in  the  previous  section,  a 
dependent variable in one equation can be an explanatory variable in other equations in the 
model. For example, in equation (3), FDI is the dependent variable, which is determined by 
institutions, growth, and other variables, but at the same time FDI enters the institutions 
equation and the growth equation (equations (2) and (1) respectively), as an explanatory 
variable. As a result, some of the explanatory variables in simultaneous equation models 
are  endogenous  and,  therefore,  are  correlated  with  the  disturbance  terms  in  all  the 
structural equations of the model. As a consequence, using Ordinary Least Square, OLS, to 
estimate  the  structural  equations  will  result  in  inconsistent  estimates  for  the  model 
parameters. A consistent estimation for the model parameters requires using an estimation 
method that can deal with the endogeneity problem.    
But before considering the method of the estimation, the identifiability of the model has to 
be checked to see whether the parameters of the model are estimable. Putting the model in 
a clear mathematical notation makes it easier to find out whether the model is identified, 
and therefore whether the parameters are estimable or not. Bringing all the variables to the 
left-hand side of the equations, the structural form of the model described in the above 
section can be written in matrix terms as  
                                                 
19 The discussion in this subsection is derived largely from: Kmenta (1971) and Greene (2003). 143 
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             (4) y x U     
 
Where  B is the matrix of the parameters of the endogenous variables,  y is the vector of the 
endogenous variables,  is the matrix of the parameters of the exogenous variables,  xis 
the vector of the exogenous variables, and U is the vector of the disturbance terms. The 
reduced form of the model can be obtained by solving the structural form for the values of 
the endogenous variables. The reduced form can be expressed in matrix notation as  
             (5) yx     
Where 
11  ;  = B B U 
      
The  reduced  form  equations  express  the  endogenous  variables  as  functions  of  the 
exogenous variables only, and therefore solve the endogeneity problem. This means that 
OLS can be used to consistently estimate the matrix of reduced form parameters. The 
identification  problem  refers  to  whether  we  can  derive  estimates  for   and  B from. 
There are three possibilities in this regard:  
(1) It is not possible to derive estimates for   and  B from; this case is called under-
identification.  144 
(2) It is possible to derive estimates for   and  B from in a unique way; this case is called 
exact identification. 
(3) It is possible to derive estimates for   and  B from in more than one way; this case is 
called over-identification.  
For a given structural equation to be identified, two conditions have to be met. The first 
condition is called the  order condition, which  states that the number  of the  exogenous 
variables that are excluded from the equation has to be greater than or equal to the number 
of the endogenous variables included in the equation, minus one. Put another way, the 
order condition requires that:  
** 1 KG
   
where 
** K is the number of the exogenous variables that are excluded from the equation 
under consideration, and  G
is the number of the endogenous variables included in  the 
equation. The order condition is a necessary but not  sufficient condition for identification, 
i.e. if this condition is not met, then the equation under consideration is not  identified, 
however, satisfying this condition does not make it certain that the equation is identified.  
The second condition is called the rank condition , which is a necessary and  sufficient 
condition. This condition states that for a given equation to be  identified, the rank of the 
matrix with parameters formed by the restriction s in the equation under consideration , 
must have a rank equal to the number of the endogenous variables included in the equation, 
less one. In other words, the rank condition states that  
 1 Rank A G
   
where  Ais the matrix with columns that represent the restrictions in the equation. 145 
Applying these conditions to our model shows that the three structural equations satisfy the 
order and the rank conditions
20.    
As discussed above, using OLS to estimate the parameters of  the structural equations will 
result in inconsistent estimates when some of the explanatory variables are endogenous. 
Thus, we need to apply a method that can deal with the endogeneity problem in order to 
get consistent estimates for the structural parame ters. In general, there are two main 
approaches for methods that can consistently estimate the structural parameters. The first 
one is the limited information approach. The methods in this approach estimate each 
equation separately,  i.e. these methods esti mate the equations of the structural system 
equation by equation,  and without reference to the information contained in the other 
equations in the system. That is why methods in this approach are labelled as limited 
information methods or single equation methods. This approach includes methods like the 
Instrumental  Variable  M ethod  (IV),  Two -Stage  Least  Square  (2SLS),  and  Limited 
Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML). The other approach is   the full information 
approach.  Methods in this approach estimate the  equations of the structural system 
simultaneously, and take into account prior restrictions and all information contained in 
other equations in the system. In particular, methods in this approach take into account the 
correlation between the disturbances o f different structural equations ,  and use all the 
available information about each equation to estimate the whole system. That is why 
methods in this approach are labelled as full information methods or system methods. The 
full information approach includes methods like Three-Stage Least Square (3SLS), Full -
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML), and Generalized Method of Moment (GMM). 
Both of the approaches provide consistent estimates for the parameters of the structural 
equations. However, the system meth ods are asymptotically more  efficient  than single 
equation methods. This is because single equation methods ignore the information that 
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contemporaneous correlation exists between the disturbance terms of the complete system, 
while  full  information  methods  take  this  information  into  account.  Therefore,  system 
methods are asymptotically better than single equation methods
21. Among system methods, 
the 3SLS method is  easier to compute and  is  therefore preferred. This makes 3SLS a 
popular method to estimate simultaneous equation models, therefore, 3SLS will be used to 
estimate our model.  
5.4.3.  Estimation results     
Table 24 reports the estimation results of the simultaneous equation model using the 3SLS 
method for the period 1980-2005. The first column presents the estimation results of the 
growth equation. In this equation, all the explanatory variables have the expected sign and 
are statistically significant, expect investment - GDP ratio and the Latin American dummy 
variable. In particular, the equation shows that countries with low levels of initial GDP per 
capita grow faster, as shown by the negative sign of the log of GDP per capita in 1980; a 
higher level  of education attainment  is  associated with  a faster  economic growth rate; 
African  countries  tend,  ceteris  paribus,  to  grow  more  slowly  than  other  countries.  As 
regards the impact of institutions and FDI on economic growth rate, the equation shows 
that both of the variables have positive and statistically significant impacts on growth.  
                                                 
21 However, this is not without cost. System methods have some limitations, e.g. errors in specifying any structural 
equation in the model will affect the estimation of other equations, which is not the case in single equation methods 
where errors in one structural equation will not transmit to the rest of the system. 147 
  
Table 24: Simultaneous equation estimation of growth, institutions, and FDI (3SLS) 
  Growth  Inst  FDI 
LGDP80  -1.213***  -  - 
  (-3.58)  -  - 
Inv  -0.006  -  - 
  (-0.12)  -  - 
LSch  0.747**  -  - 
  (2.41)  -  - 
Growth  -  0.370**  0.634** 
  -  (2.51)  (2.23) 
Inst  0.814**  -  1.174 
  (2.49)  -  (1.36) 
FDI  0.178**  0.224***  - 
  (2.12)  (2.91)  - 
Ethn  -  -0.096  - 
  -  (-0.16)  - 
BCLaw  -  -0.707  - 
  -  (-1.48)  - 
Prots  -  0.037***  - 
  -  (2.69)  - 
Geog  -  -0.722***  - 
  -  (-3.64)  - 
LGDPpc  -  -  0.257 
  -  -  (0.48) 
Tarif  -  -  -0.065** 
  -  -  (-2.31) 
Tele  -  -  -0.077 
  -  -  (-1.09) 
LTax  -  -  -3.072*** 
  -  -  (-2.83) 
Latin  -0.229  -   
  (-0.40)  -   
Africa  -1.328***  -   
  (-2.68)  -   
Cons  4.934***  8.404***  5.721 
  (2.80)  (8.65)  (1.00) 
N  42  42  42 
F (p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
R2  0.665  0.582  0.443 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-values. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  F is F-statistics. 
 
The estimated coefficient on institutions shows that improving institutional quality by one 
standard deviation will increase the economic growth rate by 1.389 % points; the estimated 148 
coefficient  on  FDI  shows  that  increasing  FDI  inflows  by  one  standard  deviation  will 
increase the economic growth rate by 0.526 % points
22.   
The second column in Table 24 presents the estimation results of the institutions equation. 
The overall significance of the set of the explanatory variables included in the equation is 
confirmed by F statistics, which shows that the probability that the set of the explanatory 
variables does not explain any  variation on institutions, is equal to zero. Moreover, the 
results show that cultural factors, as captured by the percentage of Protestants in the total 
population, play a significant role in determining institutional quality. The co efficient on 
economic growth is positive and statistically significant as expected; the co efficient on 
geographical factors, captured by the log of settler mortality rates, indicates that geography 
plays a significant role in determining institutional quality , where lower settler mortality 
rates are associated with better institutions as expected.  However, the results show that 
political factors, captured by   the  ethno-linguistic fractionalization index and British 
Common Law dummy, are not statistically different from zero. More  related to the main 
argument of this chapter is that the co efficient  on FDI is positive and statistically 
significant. Furthermore, the results indicate that a one standard deviation increase in FDI 
ratio will cause institutional quality to improve by 0. 662 point
23 which is more than one 
third of institutions standard deviation.   
The third column in Table   24  shows the estimation result of   the  FDI equation. As 
expected, the results indicate that FDI is affected positively and significantly by economic 
growth rate, and negatively and significantly by tariff rates and the log of income tax rates. 
                                                 
22  The impact of Inst and FDI on Growth is computed as follows:  4 ( ) ( ).  Growth Inst     Table 24 shows that 
4  = 0.814; Table 22 shows that the S.D of Inst = 1.706. Thus,  () Growth  0.8141.706=1.389; for FDI 
5 ( ) ( ) Growth FDI     . Table 24 shows that  5  =0.178; Table 22 shows that the S.D of FDI= 2.955. Thus, 
() Growth  0.1782.955=0.526. 
23  The impact of FDI on institutions is calculated as follows:  6 ( ) ( ) Inst FDI     . Table shows 24 that 
6  =0.224; Table 22 shows that the S.D of FDI=2.955. Thus,  () Inst  0.2242.955=0.662. 149 
However,  the  results  show  that  institutions,  infrastructural  quality,  as  captured  by 
telephone line per 1000 people, and the log of GDP per capita, do not play significant roles 
in determining FDI.  
 
5.4.4.  The impact of FDI on economic growth  
As stated in the introduction section, the main aim of this chapter is to test whether FDI 
can  affect  economic  growth  by  positively  influencing  institutions,  and  to  evaluate  the 
significance of any such effect. Thus, the parameters of interest in Table 24 are: (1) The 
coefficient that describes the effect of FDI on economic growth, 5  . (2) The coefficient that 
describes  the  effect  of  institutions  on  economic  growth, 4  .  (3)  The  coefficient  that 
describes the effect of FDI on institutions, 6  . Table 25 summarizes the results regarding 
the impact of FDI on economic growth. As reported in the Table, the second column shows 
the direct impact of FDI on economic growth where an increase in FDI by one standard 
deviation increases economic growth by 0.526% point. The third column shows the impact 
of  FDI  on  institutions.  The  estimated  coefficient  on  FDI  in  institutions  equation,  6    , 
shows that an increase in FDI by one standard deviation increases the institutional quality 
index by 0.662point. However, as shown in Table 24, the coefficient on institutions in 
growth equation,  4   , indicates that an increase in the institutional quality index by one 
point leads to an increase in economic growth rate by 0.814 % point
24. Thus, the combined 
effects suggest that FDI can foster economic growth by positively influencing institutions. 
This indirect impact of FDI on economic growth can by computed by the product of the 
coefficient of institutions in the growth equation,   4   , and the coefficient of FDI in the 
institutions  equation,  6  .  The  fourth  column  in  Table  25  shows  the  results  of  the 
multiplication of   4  and  6   which indicates that a one standard deviation increase in FDI 
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can indirectly increase economic growth rate by 0.539%, an amount slightly higher than 
the direct impact. The fifth column computes the total impact of FDI in economic growth 
as the sum of the direct and indirect impacts. The numbers in the column indicate that a 
one standard deviation increase in FDI increases economic growth by 1.065% points. 
Table 25: The impact of FDI on economic growth  
 
The direct 
impact on 
growth 
The impact on 
institutions 
The indirect 
impact on 
growth 
The total impact 
on growth 
The coefficient  5    6    46 ()     5 4 6 ()     
         
The estimated 
coefficient  0.178***  0.224***  0.183*  0.360** 
         
The impact of 
one S.D  0.526% points  0.662points  0.539 % points  1.065 % points 
Note:  *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. One standard deviation of FDI 
equals  2.955;  4   = 0.814. 
 
Overall, the results presented in Table 25 make it very clear that FDI has a significant
25 
impact on economic growth beyond its direct impact; an impact that works via improving 
the institutional quality in the host countries. The results also show that this indirect impact 
is of considerable volume and   is  comparable to the direct or traditional impact. More 
importantly, the  results indicate that the total impact of FDI on economic growth is far 
greater than, or more than the double that of the direct impact of FDI on growth considered 
by FDI literature so far.  
 
5.4.5.  Sensitivity analysis 
The empirical results presented above are based on a sample of 42 countries, which is quite 
small number. The reason for using this small sample is that the geographically related 
variable, the log of settler mortality rates, is only available for a small number of countries. 
                                                 
25 Appendix V shows the method used to test the significance of the combined coefficient. 151 
As  a  consequence,  the  results  might  be  sensitive  to  the  sample  choice.  Moreover,  the 
results might be sensitive to model specification and the choice of the controlling variables. 
Thus, in this subsection, the robustness of the results is tested: first, by using a larger 
country sample, and second, by controlling for more growth determinants.  
To  enlarge  the  sample  size,  the  log  of  settler  mortality  rates  is  replaced  by  another 
geographically related variable, the absolute value of latitude, which is available for a 
larger number of countries. This change increases the sample size from 42 to 74 countries. 
Table 26 reports the correlation matrix of Growth, FDI, and inst for the large sample. The 
correlation coefficient between Growth and FDI becomes smaller but is still significant. 
The same applies to the coefficients between Growth and Inst, and between FDI and Inst. 
This might indicate that changing the sample may not affect the findings of this chapter. 
The correlations between Growth, FDI, and Inst are further illustrated in Figure 13.      
Table 26: Correlation matrix of dependent variables (large sample) 
 
Growth  FDI  Inst 
Growth  1 
   
FDI  0.27*  1 
 
Inst  0.42*  0.28*  1 
* indicates significance at the 0.05 level or better. 
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Figure 12: Association between growth, institutions, and FDI (large sample). 
 
Table 27 presents the results based on the large sample. As can be seen from the Table, 
changing the geographical variable and the sample size does not essentially affect the main 
results of this chapter, as FDI still exerts a positive and statistically significant influence on 
institutions;  the  coefficient  on  institutions  in  growth  equation  is  also  positive  and 
significant. Thus, the results of the large sample confirm that FDI exerts a positive indirect 
impact on economic growth by improving institutional quality in host countries. Moreover, 
the results show that this impact becomes larger in volume and more significant, as shown 
in Table 28. 153 
Table 27: Simultaneous equation estimation of growth, institutions, and FDI. (large sample) 
  Growth  Inst  FDI 
LGDP80  -1.391***  -  - 
  (-3.85)  -  - 
Inv  0.108**  -  - 
  (2.29)  -  - 
LSch  0.430  -  - 
  (1.28)  -  - 
Growth  -  0.167  0.504** 
  -  (1.64)  (2.43) 
Inst  1.163***  -  -0.539 
  (3.72)  -  (-0.93) 
FDI  0.109  0.560***  - 
  (0.94)  (5.35)  - 
Ethn  -  0.464  - 
  -  (0.76)  - 
BCLaw  -  0.158  - 
  -  (0.51)  - 
Prots  -  0.006  - 
  -  (0.95)  - 
Geog  -  6.048***  - 
  -  (6.40)  - 
LGDPpc  -  -  0.931** 
  -  -  (2.23) 
Tarif  -  -  -0.054** 
  -  -  (-2.06) 
Tele  -  -  -0.001 
  -  -  (-0.03) 
LTax  -  -  -1.141 
  -  -  (-1.29) 
Latin  0.456  -  - 
  (0.83)  -  - 
Africa  -0.954*  -  - 
  (-1.76)  -  - 
Cons  1.267  3.674***  3.255 
  (0.66)  (7.84)  (0.69) 
N  74  74  74 
F (p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000 
R2  0.554  0.456  0.189 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-values. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  F is F-statistics. 
 
However, one essential difference between the results based on the small sample and those 
based on the large one  is  that the coefficient on FDI in the  growth equation loses  its 
significance, which means that the direct impact of FDI on economic growth is not robust. 
Nevertheless, this does not seriously affect the main result of this chapter, as the sensitivity 
of the direct impact of FDI on economic growth to sample and/or model specification is 154 
well documented in the literature. In fact, the relevant literature emphasizes that the direct 
impact of FDI on economic growth is ambiguous and depends crucially on various aspects 
of the absorptive capacity of the host countries
26.  
 
 
Table 28: The impact of FDI on economic growth (large sample). 
 
The direct 
impact on 
growth 
The impact on 
institutions 
The indirect 
impact on growth 
The total impact 
on growth 
The 
coefficient 
5    6    46 ()     5 4 6 ()     
The estimated 
coefficient 
0.109  0.560***  0.651***  0.760** 
The impact of 
one S.D 
0. 281 % points  1.441  1.676 % points  1.957 % points 
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. One standard deviation of FDI equals 
2.955;  4   = 1.163. 
 
 
The robustness of the results of this chapter is also tested by controlling for more growth 
determinants. As is well documented in growth literature, a large number of variables have 
been  found  to  be  significantly  associated  with  economic  growth.  Thus,  providing  a 
decisive list of the candidate variables is difficult. However, some variables seem to appear 
constantly  on  the  empirical  growth  studies,  which  gives  them  some  robustness  as 
candidates. While deciding what  these variables  are is  certainly controversial,  one can 
argue that the model specification used in this chapter contained most of these variables, 
given that the main focus of this chapter is not in finding variables that are most related to 
growth, but rather to test whether FDI exerts an indirect impact on growth. Nevertheless, 
other variables can be added to the model specification presented in the above subsection. 
These variables include: inflation,Infl , to capture the impact of macroeconomic stability in 
growth; a dummy variable to capture the impact of trade openness,Open; the log of the 
ratio of demotic credit to private sector,LCredit, to proxy the impact of the development 
                                                 
26 Chapter 4 provides evidence that the impact of FDI on growth depends on the institutional quality on host countries. 
When the interaction term between FDI and Inst is added to the model the results show that FDI can have direct 
positive impact on growth if a minimum threshold of institutional quality is achieved. These results are shown in 
Appendix V.   155 
of financial development on economic growth, and the ratio of government spending to 
GDP,Gov, to capture the impact of government size.  
Table 29 shows that adding these variables to the model does not affect the main result of 
this chapter. As can be seen from the Table, FDI still has a positive and significant impact 
on institutions, and institutions still have a positive and significant impact on economic 
growth.  Thus,  FDI  still  exerts  an  indirect  impact  on  economic  growth  via  institutions 
channel. However, FDI has no significant direct impact on economic growth, a result that 
is in accordance with the existing literature on FDI and growth. The Table also shows that 
all  the  added  variables  are  not  significantly  associated  with  economic  growth.  The 
exception is the indicator of government size, which has a negative and significant impact 
on  economic  growth,  where  higher  government  spending  to  GDP  ratio  leads  to  lower 
economic growth.     156 
 
Table 29: Simultaneous equation estimation of growth, institutions, and FDI (sensitivity 
check) 
  Growth  Inst  FDI 
LGDP80  -1.388***  -   
  (-3.73)  -   
Inv  0.105**  -   
  (2.14)  -   
LSch  0.367  -   
  (0.98)  -   
Growth  -  0.173*  0.396* 
  -  (1.68)  (1.97) 
Inst  1.318***  -  -0.241 
  (3.69)  -  (-0.46) 
FDI  0.062  0.548***   
  (0.48)  (5.15)   
Ethn  -  0.300   
  -  (0.49)   
BCLaw  -  0.193   
  -  (0.61)   
Prots  -  0.007   
  -  (1.09)   
Geog  -  5.700***   
  -  (5.97)   
LGDPpc  -  -  0.779* 
  -  -  (1.83) 
Tarif  -  -  -0.054** 
  -  -  (-2.09) 
Tele  -  -  -0.009 
  -  -  (-0.22) 
LTax  -  -  -1.243 
  -  -  (-1.40) 
Latin  0.320  -   
  (0.58)  -   
Africa  -0.814  -   
  (-1.38)  -   
Gov  -0.061*  -   
  (-1.90)  -   
Inf  0.001  -   
  (0.81)  -   
Openness  -0.395  -   
  (-0.69)  -   
Lcredit  0.195  -   
  (0.62)  -   
Cons  0.629  3.806***  3.039 
N  70  70  70 
F (P-value)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-values. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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So far, the results presented in this chapter are based on Three Stage Least Square; 3SLS. 
However,  as  shown  in  section  5.4.2,  there  are  other  system  methods,  namely,  Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) and Generalised Method of Moment (GMM), 
which  can  be  used  to  estimate  the  complete  model  simultaneously.  The  argument  for 
preferring 3SLS to other methods is related to its computational simplicity, however, this 
advantage may be reduced by the availability of econometrics software (Greene, 2003). 
Thus, one might wonder whether the results presented in this chapter are sensitive to the 
choice  of  the  estimation  method.  Moreover,  other  estimation  methods  have  some 
advantages  over  3SLS,  given  certain  assumptions.  For  example,  Full  Information 
Maximum Likelihood (FIML) is efficient among all estimators under the assumption of 
normally distributed disturbances, while Generalised Method of Moment (GMM) brings 
efficiency gains in the presence of heteroscedasticity (Greene, 2003). 
Table 30 reports the results of estimating the complete model using the Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood method (FIML), and Table 31 reports the results of estimating the 
complete model using the Generalised Method of Moment (GMM). The results in each 
Table indicate that changing the estimation method does not affect the main finding of this 
chapter; that FDI contributes positively and significantly to economic growth by positively 
influencing institutions in host countries. 158 
  
Table 30: Simultaneous equation estimation of growth, institutions and FDI (FIML estimates) 
  Growth  Inst  FDI 
LGDP80  -2.409**  -  - 
  (-2.28)  -  - 
Inv  0.009  -  - 
  (0.895)  -  - 
LSch  0.128  -  - 
  (1.571)  -  - 
Growth  -  -0.013  0.617 
  -  (-0.03)  (1.59) 
Inst  1.880**  -  -1.939* 
  (2.53)  -  (-1.82) 
FDI  0.925**  0.965*  - 
  (2.25)  (1.87)  - 
Ethn  -  1.858  - 
  -  (1.02)  - 
BCLaw  -  0.111  - 
  -  (0.14)  - 
Prots  -  0.011  - 
  -  (0.51)  - 
Geog  -  8.176***  - 
  -  (2.94)  - 
LGDPpc  -  -  2.585** 
  -  -  (2.17) 
Tarif  -  -  0.005 
  -  -  (0.99) 
Tele  -  -  -0.008 
  -  -  (-1.23) 
LTax  -  -  0.043 
  -  -  (0.34) 
Latin  0.093  -  - 
  (0.83)  -  - 
Africa  -0.066  -  - 
  (-0.57)  -  - 
Cons  4.351  1.888  -5.308 
  (1.17)  (0.94)  (-1.45) 
N  74  74  74 
F(P-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-values. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 31: Simultaneous equation estimation of growth, institutions and FDI (GMM estimates) 
  Growth  Inst  FDI 
LGDP80  -1.504***  -  - 
  (-5.212)  -  - 
Inv  0.126***  -  - 
  (3.25)  -  - 
LSch  0.274  -  - 
  (1.04)  -  - 
Growth  -  0.134*  0.444*** 
  -  (1.84)  (2.63) 
Inst  1.243***  -  -0.462 
  (5.24)  -  (-1.27) 
FDI  0.074  0.597***  - 
  (0.90)  (6.01)  - 
Ethn  -  0.286  - 
  -  (0.58)  - 
BCLaw  -  -0.09  - 
  -  (-0.36)  - 
Prots  -  0.006  - 
  -  (1.28)  - 
Geog  -  6.658***  - 
  -  (10.54)  - 
LGDPpc  -  -  0.479* 
  -  -  (1.83) 
Tarif  -  -  -0.053*** 
  -  -  (-2.63) 
Tele  -  -  0.016 
  -  -  (0.69) 
LTax  -  -  -2.655*** 
  -  -  (-3.07) 
Latin  0.912**  -  - 
  (2.09)  -  - 
Africa  -0.786*  -  - 
  (-1.80)  -  - 
Constant  1.252  3.69***  11.756*** 
  (0.83)  (11.33)  (2.94) 
N  74  74  74 
F(P-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-values. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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5.5.    Conclusion  
Much of the economic literature on growth effects of FDI has considered the direct impact 
of FDI, while the possibility that FDI may affect economic growth via other channels has 
received little or no attention, despite the recent emergent evidence that FDI can affect 
policy environment and institutional variables of host countries. This chapter contributes to 
the literature on growth effects of FDI by exploring whether FDI has a positive impact on 
economic growth that works by positively influencing institutional quality.  
In order to investigate this question, a simultaneous equation model has been developed in 
a way that endogenizes institutions and allows FDI to affect institutional quality. Applying 
the Three-Stage Least Square method to this model shows that FDI has a positive indirect 
impact on economic growth that works via institutions. Moreover, the estimated indirect 
growth effect of FDI is greater than the direct one. Furthermore, the results show that while 
the direct effect of FDI on growth is not robust and ambiguous, the indirect effect on 
growth, through the channel of institutions, is robust to changes in samples and controlling 
variables and estimation methods.  
These findings suggest some important implications: first, they enhance our understanding 
of the contribution of FDI to economic growth, and show that the impact of FDI on growth 
is not limited to its role in improving technology, but rather goes further beyond that, and 
includes a positive influence on institutional quality. Second, these findings indicate that 
the favourable development effects of FDI are in actuality greater than what is usually 
thought,  and  therefore  these  additional  benefits  must  be  taken  into  account  when 
evaluating the merits of the programs aiming to attract FDI.    
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Appendix V 
 
1- The following shows how the order and the rank conditions are satisfied for all the 
equations.  
 
equation  ** K   1 G
    () Rank A  
(1) Growth  8  2  2 
(2) Inst   9  2  2 
(3) FDI   9  2  2 
 
Where 
** K is the number of the exogenous variables that are excluded from the equation 
under  consideration;  G
is  the  number  of  the  endogenous  var iables  included  in  the 
equation;  Ais the matrix with columns that represent the restrictions in the equation. 
 
The matrix (A) for growth equation  
1 2 3 4
1
1 2 3 4
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
A
   
   
    
       
1 A  can be transformed into 2 (  0) I , which means that it has a rank of 2.  
The matrix (A) for institutions equation is 
1 2 3 6 7
2
1 2 3 4
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
A
    
   
     
       
2 A can be transformed into  2 (  0) I . 
The matrix (A) for FDI equation is 
1 2 3 6 7
3
1 2 3 4
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
A
    
   
     
       
3 A can be transformed into  2 (  0) I .  162 
 
2- Greene (2003) provides a formula that can be used to test the significance of the 
nonlinear restriction that 46 0   .  
Following this formula, we first put 46 d   . Testing the significance of d requires 
calculating the standard deviation ofd , . ( ) S D d .   
The estimated asymptotic variance of d is given by  
22 ( ) . ( ) ( ) 2 ( , ) Var d g Var g Var g g Cov              
Where
d
g 



;
d
g 



. 
The  . ( ) S D d  equals the square root of () Var d .   
To test the hypothesis   0 :0 Hd   
We use
. ( )
d
Z
S D d
 .  163 
 
List of countries included in the empirical analysis (the small sample) 
Asia  Latin America and Caribbean  Middle East and North Africa  Sub-Saharan Africa  Others 
Bangladesh  Argentina  Egypt, Arab Rep.  Cameroon  Canada 
Hong Kong  Bolivia  Tunisia  Ghana  Malta 
India  Brazil    Kenya  New 
Zealand 
Indonesia  Chile    Senegal  United 
States 
Malaysia  Colombia    South Africa  Canada 
Pakistan  Costa Rica       
Papua New Guinea  Dominican Republic       
Singapore  Ecuador       
Sri Lanka  El Salvador       
  Guatemala       
  Guyana       
  Haiti       
  Honduras       
  Jamaica       
  Mexico       
  Nicaragua       
  Panama       
  Paraguay       
  Peru       
  Trinidad and Tobago       
  Venezuela, RB       
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List of countries included in the empirical analysis (the large sample) 
 
Asia  Latin America and Caribbean  Sub-Saharan Africa  Middle East and North Africa  others 
Bangladesh  Argentina  Botswana  Egypt, Arab Rep.  Australia 
China  Bolivia  Cameroon  Syrian Arab Republic  Austria 
Hong Kong, China  Brazil  Ghana  Tunisia  Belgium 
India  Chile  Kenya    Canada 
Indonesia  Colombia  Malawi    Cyprus 
Jordan  Costa Rica  Senegal    Denmark 
Korea, Rep.  Dominican Republic  South Africa    Finland 
Malaysia  Ecuador  Zambia    France 
Pakistan  El Salvador  Zimbabwe    Germany 
Papua New Guinea  Guatemala      Greece 
Philippines  Guyana      Hungary 
Singapore  Haiti      Iceland 
Sri Lanka  Honduras      Ireland 
Thailand  Jamaica      Israel 
Turkey  Mexico      Italy 
  Nicaragua      Japan 
  Panama      Malta 
  Paraguay      Netherlands 
  Peru      New Zealand 
  Trinidad and Tobago      Norway 
  Venezuela, RB      Portugal 
        Spain 
        Sweden 
        Switzerland 
        United Kingdom 
        United States 
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Simultaneous Equation estimation of growth, institutions and FDI (3SLS estimates). 
  Growth  Inst  FDI 
LGDP80  -1.158***  -  - 
  (-3.02)  -  - 
Inv  0.234***  -  - 
  (4.28)  -  - 
LSch  0.915**  -  - 
  (2.22)  -  - 
Growth  -  0.214**  0.075 
  -  (2.57)  (0.34) 
Inst  0.497  -  1.196* 
  (1.17)  -  (1.90) 
FDI  -3.168***  0.300***  - 
  (-2.90)  (6.06)  - 
(FDIInst)  0.334***     
  (2.77)     
Ethn  -  -0.162  - 
  -  (-0.29)  - 
BCLaw  -  0.308  - 
  -  (1.12)  - 
Prots  -  0.008  - 
  -  (1.46)  - 
Geog  -  5.888***  - 
  -  (7.11)  - 
LGDPpc  -  -  -0.0428 
  -  -  (-0.09) 
Tarif  -  -  -0.057* 
  -  -  (-1.90) 
Tele  -  -  -0.059 
  -  -  (-1.27) 
LTax  -  -  -3.693*** 
  -  -  (-3.67) 
Latin  1.747**  -  - 
  (2.32)  -  - 
Africa  -0.460  -  - 
  (-0.73)  -  - 
Cons  2.372  4.351***  9.940* 
  (1.09)  (11.98)  (1.87) 
N  74  74  74 
F (p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000 
R2  0.324  0.672  0.205 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-values. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  F is F-statistics. 166 
6.  Conclusion 
Economic growth literature has recently shown a greater interest in studying the deeper 
determinants of economic growth, and within this body of literature, the role played by 
integration into the world economy and institutions in determining economic growth has 
received a great deal of attention by scholars. A growing number of papers have explored 
various  aspects  of  the  relationship  between  integration  into  the  world  economy  and 
institutions on the one hand, and economic growth on the other. The main conclusion of 
this literature is that integration into the world economy and institutions are among the 
most important determinants of economic growth, leading to a belief that openness to trade 
and foreign investment, and reforming institutions, are the best ways forward to achieve 
sustained economic growth and improve living standards in developing countries. This 
belief  has  spread  from  academic  economists  to  policy  makers  and  development 
practitioners,  and  in  consequence,  openness  to  trade  and  investment,  and  building 
institutions that support market  economy and protect  property rights, have became the 
main development policies recommended by international development organizations like 
The World Bank and World Trade Organization, etc.   
Despite the growing interest in studying the role of integration into the world economy and 
institutions  in  fostering  economic  growth,  the  interplay  between  various  aspects  of 
integration into the world economy and institutions, and their implications to economic 
growth, has received little attention in economic literature. This thesis has tried to fill this 
gap by exploring various phases of the interplay between one aspect of the integration into 
the world  economy; foreign direct  investment, and one  aspect  of institutions;  property 
rights, and their implications for economic growth. In particular, the aim of this thesis was 
to empirically examine the implication of the interrelationship and the complementarity 
between FDI and institutions to the contribution of FDI to economic growth. The main 
argument  of  this  thesis  was  that  a  better  understanding  of  the  contribution  of  FDI  to 167 
economic growth can be achieved if the interrelationship and the complementarity between 
FDI and institutions are taken into account.  
To achieve this aim and to verify this argument, the thesis was designed to include four 
empirical chapters in addition to two chapters: one for the introduction and the other for 
the conclusion. The first two empirical chapters studied the interrelationship between FDI 
and  institutions.  And  the  other  two  empirical  chapters  studied  the  implications  of  the 
interrelationship  and  the  complementarity  between  FDI  and  institutions  to  economic 
growth. Chapter two explored the role of institutional environment in determining FDI 
inflows. Chapter three explored the impact of FDI on institutions in host countries. Chapter 
four studied the role of the complementarity between FDI and institutions in determining 
the  contribution  of  FDI  to  economic  growth.  Chapter  five  tested  whether  the 
interrelationship  between  FDI  and  institutions  leads  to  an  indirect  effect  of  FDI  on 
economic growth that works via institutions.  
6.1.  Summary of the findings 
The main results of this thesis can be summarised as follows: 
1-  Chapter  two  showed  that  institutional  quality  in  host  countries  is  one  of  the  most 
important determinants of FDI inflows. In particular, institutional quality in host countries 
appeared  more  important  for  foreign  investors  than  many  other  characteristics  of  host 
countries, such as market size, quality of infrastructure, tax levels, etc. Another important 
finding  in  this  chapter  is  that  the  security  of  property  rights  appeared  to  be  the  most 
important institutions attribute for foreign investors, i.e. property rights protection is more 
important than democracy, corruption, political stability, and social tension. However, the 
results of chapter two also showed that the importance of institutions varies across FDI 
sectors.  In  particular,  it  appeared  that  institutions  do  not  play  a  significant  role  in 168 
determining primary FDI. Moreover, the results showed that there is tentative evidence that 
services FDI is more sensitive to institutions than manufacturing FDI.  
2- The main finding of chapter three is that FDI appeared to play an important role in 
explaining  variations  in  institutional  quality  on  host  countries.  More  specifically,  FDI 
appeared to have a positive impact on the security of property rights in host countries. In 
other words, this chapter proved that the positive externalities of FDI are not limited to 
those  attributes  related  to  physical  and  production  technology,  but  extend  to  include 
institutional quality in host countries. 
3- The major finding of chapter four is that the contribution of FDI to economic growth 
depends critically on the institutional quality in a host country. In particular, a host country 
needs  to  achieve  a  minimum  threshold  of  institutional  quality  before  it  can  positively 
benefit from FDI inflows. The most significant result of this chapter is that primary FDI 
can make a positive contribution to economic growth in host countries once a minimum 
level of institutional quality is achieved, a result that contradicts recent evidence which 
suggests that primary FDI has a negative impact on economic growth. 
4- Chapter five proved that FDI has an indirect positive impact on economic growth that 
works through improving institutional quality in host countries. The results also showed 
that this indirect impact is greater in volume and more robust than the direct impact related 
to influencing technology progress and productivity improvements.               
6.2.  Academic contributions 
Some of the findings of this thesis can be viewed as significant academic contributions to 
the debate about FDI, institutions, and economic growth. The main contributions of the 
thesis can be summarized as follows: 169 
1- The findings of chapter two help reduce the inconclusiveness of the empirical evidence 
regarding  the  role  of  institutions  in  determining  FDI  inflows,  and  explain  why  some 
previous studies failed to report significant correlation between institutions and FDI. The 
chapter showed that using indictors that only partially capture the security of property 
rights is one of the likely reasons, as the security of property rights is what matters most for 
foreign investors when it comes to the role of institutions. Another possible reason for the 
failure  of  some  of  the  previous  studies  to  find  a  significant  role  for  institutions  in 
determining FDI inflows, is that the role of institutions in determining FDI varies across 
sectors. In particular, institutions do not play a significant role in determining primary FDI, 
and  as  such,  institutions  may  not  appear  significantly  related  to  FDI  if  primary  FDI 
accounts for a large share of aggregate FDI in the country sample or time period under 
consideration. Another important contribution of chapter two is that it provides empirical 
evidence that helps to evaluate the relative importance of institutional quality in attracting 
FDI compared with other determinants of FDI. 
 
2- One important result of chapter three is that it suggests FDI inflows as a factor that 
explains variations in institutional quality not only across countries, but also over time. 
This result can be viewed as a significant contribution to our understanding of the process 
of  institutional  change,  as  the  available  literature  provides  explanations  based  on 
geographic, cultural, and historical factors. The only variable factor proposed by available 
empirical literature to explain variations in institutional quality, is economic growth and 
economic  development  level.  However,  we  need  an  explanation  that  can  help  us 
understand the process of economic growth and economic development, rather than an 
explanation  that  refers  us  again  to  economic  growth  and  development  to  understand 
institutional change. The results of chapter three provide such explanation.    170 
Another  important  contribution  of  this  chapter  is  that  it  showed  that  the  scope  of  the 
positive externalities of FDI expand beyond the positive externalities related to production 
technology, and include new dimensions related to the institutional quality of the host 
countries, or in another words, a dimension related to the social technology.  
3- The main contribution of chapter four is that it provided evidence to help reduce the 
inconclusiveness of the empirical evidence regarding the contribution of FDI to economic 
growth. In particular, chapter four reinforced and improved upon the suggestion in the 
empirical  literature  that  institutional  quality  in  host  countries  is  one  attribute  of  the 
absorptive capacity upon which the contribution of FDI to economic growth depends. 
 The most significant contribution of chapter four is that it corrects the recently emerging 
claim  that  primary  FDI  has  a  negative  impact  on  economic  growth.  In  particular,  the 
empirical results presented in chapter four made it clear that primary FDI can contribute 
positively  to  economic  growth  if  a  host  country  achieves  a  minimum  threshold  of 
institutional quality.  
4 – The main contribution of chapter five is that it provided empirical evidence showing 
that the contribution of FDI to economic growth is of larger scope than what has been 
considered in economic literature so far. In particular, the results of chapter five expanded 
the ways in which FDI can affect economic growth, to include its impact on institutions. 
Moreover, the results made it clear that the impact of FDI on economic growth that works 
via institutions, is not only a significant one, but is also greater in volume and more robust 
than the direct impact documented by economic literature so far. In general, the evidence 
reported in chapter five has gone some way towards enhancing our understanding of the 
contribution of FDI to economic growth.  171 
Overall, the major contribution of this thesis is that it showed that a better understanding of 
the  contribution  of  FDI  to  economic  growth  requires  taking  into  account  the 
interrelationship and the complementarity between FDI and institutions. 
6.3.  Policy implications 
 Besides the academic contributions, a number of policy implications can be drawn from 
the analysis and the findings of this thesis.  
1- The results reported in chapter two suggest several policy implications for attracting 
FDI. The result that the impact of institutional quality on FDI is greater in volume and 
more  robust  than  the  impact  of  tax  levels  and  the  indicator  of  economic  stability  and 
infrastructure, can help policy makers to realize the significance of institutions to foreign 
investors, and therefore give institutional reform a higher priority when formulating their 
policy options for attracting FDI. The result that the security of property rights is the most 
important of institutional aspects for foreign investors, implies that reforming institutions 
in order to attract FDI is relatively easy, as increasing the security of property rights is 
easier than reforming efforts related to increasing democratization and reducing the degree 
of  political  instability  and  social  tension.  Moreover,  the  result  that  the  impact  of 
institutions on FDI varies across sectors, implies that institutional reform may not be an 
effective policy option for countries trying to attract primary FDI.  
2- The results of chapter three suggest that increasing openness to FDI inflows can be 
considered  as  a  policy  option  to  improve  institutional  quality.  Moreover,  the  results 
indicate that there is no conflict between the policy of increasing the degree of openness to 
FDI, and policies of institutional reform, but rather, that there is some sort of harmony 
between the two policies, as efforts spent on one policy reinforce the other.  172 
3- The results shown in chapter four suggest that policy makers need to direct their efforts 
to improve and reform institutions related to property rights in order to fully reap the 
positive externalities of FDI, including the positive externalities of primary FDI. As far as 
primary FDI is concerned, the results of chapter four imply a major change in the policy 
recommendations  made  by  pervious  studies;  i.e.  a  shift  from  recommending  the 
discouragement of primary FDI to avoid its negative effects on economic growth (Alfaro, 
2003)  to  recommending  improving  institutional  quality  to  be  able  to  reap  its  positive 
externalities.   
4- The results of chapter five suggest that the growth effects of FDI are in actuality higher 
than the economic literature recognises so far, which provides a solid foundation to support 
and justify various sorts of incentives given to foreign investors. Recognizing the new 
growth effects of FDI that work via institutions, helps to shift policy recommendation from 
questioning the merits of the incentives given to foreign investors (Carkovic and Levine, 
2005)  because  the  direct  impact  of  FDI  on  growth  is  not  robust  to  emphasising  the 
importance of such incentives as FDI has positive to robust indirect impact on economic 
growth.   
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